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Quantum Times: Physics, Philosophy, and Time in the Postwar United States 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 The concept of time in physics underwent significant changes in the decades 
following World War II. This dissertation considers several ways in which American 
physicists grappled with these changes, analyzing the extent to which philosophical 
methods and questions played a role in physicists’ engagement with time. Two lines of 
questioning run through the dissertation. The first asks about the professional identities of 
postwar American physicists in relation to philosophy, as exemplified by their 
engagement with the concept of time. The second analyzes the heterogeneous nature of 
time in physics, and the range of presuppositions and assumptions that have constituted 
this “fundamental” physical concept. 
 The first chapter looks to the development of atomic clocks and atomic time 
standards from 1948-1958, and the ways in which new timekeeping technologies placed 
concepts such as “clock”, “second,” and “measure of time” in a state of flux. The second 
chapter looks to the experimental discovery of CP violation by particle physicists in the 
early 1960s, raising questions about nature of time understood as the variable “t” in the 
equations of quantum mechanics. The third chapter considers attempts to unify quantum 
mechanics and general relativity in the late 1960s, which prompted physicists to question 
 iv 
the “existence” of time in relation to the universe as a whole.  In each episode considered, 
physicists engaged with the concept of time in a variety of ways, revealing a multiplicity 
of relationships between physics, philosophy, and time. Further, in each case physicists 
brought a unique set of assumptions to their concepts of time, revealing the variety ways 
in which fundamental concepts functioned and changed in late twentieth century physics. 
The result is a heterogeneous picture of the practice of physics, as well as one of physics’ 
most basic concepts. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.  
The concept of time is a central one for contemporary scholars in a range of disciplines, 
including physics, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and literary theory. As such, it 
is a particularly appropriate point of entry for investigating relationships among the 
disciplines of the late twentieth century. What do conceptions of time, as employed by 
different groups of scholars, have in in common and how do they differ? How are 
questions about time framed differently in various disciplines, and which methods are 
used to answer these questions? What presuppositions about the nature and boundaries of 
a given discipline contribute to its practitioners’ treatments of time? Even within a 
traditional academic discipline such as physics, there are subgroups of researchers who 
understand the concept of time, and the intellectual problems it poses, very differently. 
Thus, a study of the ways scholars have handled the concept of time can illustrate the 
relations among disciplines, as well as within a given discipline. 
 This dissertation will examine how different subgroups of physicists, working in 
the United Sates in the 1950s and 1960s, approached fundamental questions about time. 
Specifically, it will consider the extent to which each subgroup asked questions about the 
meaning and nature of time, as well as how speculative and interpretive methods factored 
into their answers. Within each subgroup, physicists operated under a particular 
understanding of what it meant to do physics, influencing the types of questions they 
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asked and how freely they speculated about the nature of their central concepts. The 
primary objective of this dissertation will be to account for the various ways American 
physicists understood their work and discipline in the decades following World War II, as 
exemplified by their engagement with the concept of time. This will set the stage for a 
secondary objective: to understand what a fundamental concept, like time, looks like 
when situated within shifting understandings of physics. 
Each chapter focuses on a specific episode in the history of physics in the postwar 
United States in which the nature of time emerged as a salient issue. The first chapter 
considers a subgroup of physicists working on the development of atomic clocks and 
atomic time standards in the 1950s, who engaged in debates over the universality of 
measures of time. The second chapter considers a subgroup of experimental particle 
physicists in the early-1960s, whose work raised questions about the directionality of 
time. The third chapter looks to a subgroup of physicists seeking to unify quantum 
mechanics and general relativity in the late-1960s, who argued about the existence of 
time. In each case, leading physicists approached questions about time in remarkably 
different ways, revealing a variety of relationships among interpretation, physics, and 
time. The subgroup working on atomic clocks and standards in the 1950s did not overtly 
acknowledge that their work raised questions about the nature of time, although their 
definitions of basic timekeeping concepts were in flux. The subgroup of experimental 
particle physicists in the early 1960s identified questions about the nature of time as at 
stake in their research, but did not pursue these questions themselves, considering them to 
be outside the boundaries of their discipline. Finally, the subgroup working on the 
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unification of quantum mechanics and general relativity understood interpretive questions 
and methods as central to their work.  
I use the word “subgroup” to refer to clusters of physicists, working directly 
alongside one another, in pursuit of a related set of problems. Rather than examining 
“physicists” at the general level, or the large and diverse groups designated by the labels 
“theorists” and “experimentalists,” I take small groups of physicists, directed toward a 
specific objective, as my unit of analysis. These subgroups were narrower in scope than 
professionally designated fields of physics, such as the divisions named by the American 
Philosophical Society (APS), and did not necessarily persist as cohesive units throughout 
the postwar period. Rather, during the episodes at stake in this dissertation, each 
subgroup coalesced around a common goal: developing atomic clocks and time standards 
in chapter one, describing symmetry relations in particle interactions in chapter two, and 
uniting quantum mechanics and general relativity in chapter three. This being said, each 
subgroup approached their work from within the context of a field of research that 
corresponds closely to the scale of an APS division. The atomic timekeeping subgroup 
belonged largely to the field of molecular beam research, the subgroup working on 
symmetries belonged to the field of particle physics, and the quantum gravity subgroup 
operated from within the context of general relativity research. Throughout the 
dissertation, I use the attitudes of members of the specific subgroups in question to gain 
insight into the sensibilities of the larger fields of research in which they were embedded, 
and vice versa. I then set these insights in relation to one another in order to draw more 
general conclusions about the overall landscape of professional attitudes among postwar 
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American physics. 
 
*** 
 
This dissertation builds on a body of literature that explores a tension in twentieth century 
physics between a philosophical approach to physics that was a feature of European 
physics in the first half of the twentieth century, and a more pragmatic approach that 
characterized much of American physics following World War II.1 For example, in his 
2011 book How the Hippies Saved Physics, David Kaiser describes how famous 
European physicists of the 1920s and 30s, such as Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein, 
believed “that progress could only be made by tackling […] philosophical challenges 
head on. Manipulating equations for their own sake would never be enough.”2 Kaiser 
contrasts this position with the attitudes of postwar American physicists, who believed 
“their business was to calculate, not to daydream about philosophical chestnuts.”3 Kaiser 
                                                
1 See for example Silvan S. Schweber, “The Empiricist Temper Regnant: Theoretical 
Physics in the United States, 1920—1950,” Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences 17 (1986): 55-98; Alexi Assmus, “The Americanization of Molecular 
Physics,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 23, no. 1 (1992):1 – 
34; Nancy Cartwright, “Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory: The Response of 
American Physicists”, in The Probabilistic Revolution, V2, ed. Lorenz Kruger et al. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Peter Galison, How Experiments End (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987); Peter Galison, Image and Logic (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1997); and David Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, 
Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival  (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2011). 
2 Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics, xiii. 
3 Ibid., xiv. 
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thus presents two contrasting pictures of what it meant to be a physicist in the twentieth 
century – one in which interpretive, speculative thinking was central to the project of 
physics, and another in which the purpose of physics research was obtaining useful 
results. 
Scholars have offered various accounts of when and how the more pragmatic 
sensibility came to characterize American physics. For example, several historians of 
science have located the emergence of a pragmatic sensibility among American 
physicists in the first half of the twentieth century. In his 1986 paper “The Empiricist 
Temper Regnant,” Sam Schweber attributes the pragmatic mindset among American 
theoretical physicists to the close contact between theoreticians and experimentalists in 
American research universities following World War I,4 as well as the influence of 
American pragmatist thinkers such as Peirce, Dewey, and Bridgeman.5 Along similar 
lines, in her 1989 paper “Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory,” Nancy Cartwright 
describes how pre-World War II American physicists were influenced by the “philosophy 
of science that most of them shared, a philosophy akin, but not identical, to the well-
known American doctrines of pragmatism and operationalism.”6 Other scholars have 
pointed to the emergence of a pragmatic sensibility in the wartime years, in the context of 
the contact between physics and engineers, as well as the practical, technical problems 
with which physicists were faced. For example, David Kaiser describes how a form of 
                                                
4 Schweber, “The Empiricist Temper Regnant,” 54. 
5 Ibid., 61-65. 
6 Cartwright, “Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory,” 417. 
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pragmatism became entrenched in the culture of American physics following World War 
II: 
Torn from their prewar routines and thrust into projects of immediate, 
worldly significance – radar, the atomic bomb, and dozens of lesser-
known gadgets – physicists’ day-to-day activities in 1945 bore little 
resemblance to those of 1925. […] Physicists in the United States 
adopted an aggressively pragmatic attitude. The equations of quantum 
mechanics had long since lost their novelty, even if their ultimate 
meaning still remained obscure. The pressing challenge became to put 
those equations to work.7 
 
Peter Galison has also identified World War II as pivotal in the emergence of an 
increasingly pragmatic mindset among physicists, arguing that physicists’ direct 
encounters with machine culture and instrument making during wartime affected the 
ways in which they approached physics after the war.8  
In this dissertation I will not be explicitly concerned with the questions of when 
and how American physicists came to be more pragmatic about their work, although I 
will refer to continuities and discontinuities between prewar, wartime, and postwar 
attitudes, methods, and tools as they become relevant. Rather, the tension between 
pragmatic and philosophical sensibilities among postwar American physicists will serve 
as the point of departure for my analysis. My objective will be to unpack the ways in 
                                                
7 Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics, xiii. 
8 See for example Peter Galison, “Feynman’s War: Modelling Weapons, Modelling 
Nature,” in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 29 (1998): 391- 
434; Peter Galison, “Structure of Crystal, Bucket of Dust,” in Circles Disturbed, the 
Interplay of Mathematics and Narrative, eds. Apostolos K. Doxiadēs and Barry Mazur 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 52-78; and Peter Galison, Image and 
Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 
Ch. 4.   
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which subgroups of physicists forged out their professional identities in relation to the 
competing pulls of philosophy and pragmatism. I will consider how, why, and to what 
extent postwar American physicists engaged in a particular form of philosophical 
questioning in physics; that is, investigation into the deeper meaning of their basic 
concepts. Throughout, I will use the term “philosophy” to refer to this type of interpretive 
thinking, while recognizing it represents one of many ways one could pose philosophical 
questions about physics and time.9 This being said, other forms of philosophical 
questions will enter the conversation as they arise in physicists’ discourse, for example 
surrounding ethics, consciousness, and the meaning of life. Further, I will loosely use 
“pragmatism” to refer to the valuation of useful results over deep understanding among 
physicists, while recognizing that pragmatism also took many forms during this period. 
By focusing on moments when subgroups of physicists encountered basic questions 
about the meaning of time, and examining how they engaged or failed to engage these 
questions, a complex and heterogeneous picture of the identities of postwar American 
physicists, in relation to the competing pulls of philosophy and pragmatism, will emerge.  
The scope of the dissertation is limited to subgroups of American physicists, 
although physicists from the international community will be discussed insofar as they 
are relevant to the American subgroups in question. The United States serves as the 
geographical focus due to the unique ways in which the tension between philosophical 
                                                
9 For a discussion of how this type of investigation became the prevailing mode of 
philosophical questioning about time in physics, see Jimena Canales, “Einstein, Bergson, 
and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations,” MLN 
120 (2005): 1168–1191. 
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and pragmatic sensibilities played out in postwar America. Each chapter will consider 
one small section of the larger landscape of the professional identities of postwar 
American physicists; while doing so, a second line of questioning will arise regarding the 
concept of time itself. How did physicists’ understandings of time change during this 
period? Further, what can be said about the concept of time in general, after it has been 
examined in several contexts and on multiple registers? This will involve analyzing the 
many contours of physicists’ assumptions about time, showing the plurality and 
contingency of these assumptions. Each chapter will consider a different set of 
assumptions about time and the degree to which physicists questioned these assumptions. 
The result will be a heterogeneous picture of one of physics’ most basic concepts. The 
conclusion will take this line of thinking one step further, using the insights gained from 
each chapter to analyze physicists’ assumptions about “fundamental concepts” and 
“conceptualization” in general. 
 
2.  
Each chapter considers a specific community of postwar American physicists, as well as 
a specific set of questions about time. In doing so, each draws upon studies in the history 
and philosophy of science that have analyzed these communities and questions. For 
example, chapter one builds on literature surrounding standardization and metrology in 
the history and philosophy of science, including work by Ken Alder, Peter Galison, 
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Hasok Chang, Simon Schaffer, and Robert Crease.10 Chapter two makes use of 
scholarship about the culture and categories of high-energy physics in the postwar period, 
including the work of Andrew Pickering, Peter Galison, and David Kaiser.11 Chapter 
three engages scholarship about the community of general relativity researchers in the 
twentieth century, including work by David Kaiser, Jean Eisenstaedt, Daniel Kennefick, 
and Dean Rickles.12 Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 below will briefly describe the stakes of 
each chapter as they stand in relation to the bodies of scholarly literature on which they 
build. Looking more specifically at the arguments of each chapter and the 
historiographical context for these arguments, these sections will delineate the two lines 
                                                
10 Ken Alder, “A Revolution to Measure: The Political Economy of the Metric System in 
France” in The Values of Precision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 39-71; 
Peter Galison, Einstein’s Clocks and Poincare’s Maps: Empires of Time (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003); Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Simon Schaffer, “Late Victorian Metrology and Its 
Instrumentation: A Manufactory of Ohms,” in the Science Studies Reader, ed. Mario 
Biagioli (New York: Routledge, 1999), 457-478; Robert Crease, World in the Balance: 
The Historic Quest for an Absolute System of Measurement, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2011). 
11 Andrew Pickering, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Peter Galison, How Experiments End 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A 
Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1997); David 
Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar 
Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
12 Jean Eisenstaedt, The Curious History of Relativity: How Einstein’s Theory of Gravity 
was Lost and Found Again (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); David Kaiser, 
“A Psi is just a Psi? Pedagogy, Practice, and the Reconstitution of General Relativity, 
1942-1975,” HSPS 33 (2002): 131-159; Daniel Kennefick, Travelling at the Speed of 
Thought: Einstein and the Quest for Gravitational Waves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Dean Rickles, “Quantum Gravity: A Primer for Philosophers,” 
in The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics, ed. Dean Rickles, 
2008. 
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of questioning that run through the dissertation - respectively concerning the professional 
identities of postwar American physicists and the nature of time as one of their 
fundamental concepts – more concretely.  
 
2.1: Atomic Clocks and Standards 
Chapter one describes the development of the first atomic clocks and time standards in 
the 1950s. Specifically, it treats the period beginning in 1948, when the first “clock” 
based on the quantum properties of matter was built, up until 1958, when the first atomic 
time standard was established. In chapter one I argue that during this period timekeeping 
concepts were in a state of flux, with physicists and astronomers renegotiating the 
meaning of concepts such as “clock,” “second,” and “time” in light of new atomic clock 
technology. I trace the factors that contributed to this period of conceptual renegotiation, 
including the institutional and disciplinary allegiances of the physicists involved, their 
values with respect to time-keeping, and the specific features of the new instruments and 
techniques with which they were working. I show that despite the changes that occurred 
in the way this subgroup of physicists understood basic time-keeping concepts, they 
viewed philosophical questions about the meaning of time to be firmly outside the 
domain of physics. Although philosophical questions were at stake in their work, they did 
not explicitly discuss them as such.  
Units of measure are arguably among the most foundational concepts in physics; 
thus, a change in the definition a unit of measure provides an excellent point of entry for 
unpacking physicists’ basic assumptions about their fundamental concepts. Several 
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historians of science have studied changes in standard units of measure to gain insight 
into how basic scientific concepts are created, adopted, and disseminated.13 These studies 
show how metrological standards, which are often assumed to be objective and 
universally valid, are in fact the products of contingent value systems. Ken Alder argues 
along these lines in his article “A Revolution to Measure: The Political Economy of the 
Metric System in France,” claiming that “at the core of ‘universal standards’ commonly 
taken to be the product of objective science lies the historically contingent.”14 Alder goes 
on to describe how “these seemingly ‘natural’ standards express the specific, if 
paradoxical, agendas of specific social and economic interests.”15 Along similar lines, 
Hasok Change argues in Inventing Temperature that units of measure, the “simple items 
of knowledge that we take for granted,” are in fact “spectacular achievements, obtained 
only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, 
and serious controversies which may in fact never have been resolved quite 
satisfactorily.”16  
What is the process by which old standards are replaced with new ones? Several 
scholars have noted the seemingly circular way in which standard units of measure come 
to be redefined. Robert Crease has described the redefinition of standard units of measure 
as a “bootstrapping” process, in which a property that has been calibrated to a standard 
                                                
13 See note 9.    
14 Alder, “A Revolution to Measure,” 39. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Chang, Inventing Temperature, 4.  
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becomes the standard, in turn becoming unmeasurable.17 Hasok Chang’s Inventing 
Temperature analyzes the complexities of this bootstrapping process with respect to the 
study of heat in the 18th and 19th centuries. Peter Galison’s Einstein’s Clocks and 
Poincare’s Maps further unpacks this process in relation to the redefinition of 
international metric standards in the late 19th century. Chapter one of this dissertation 
builds upon the work of Chang and Galison, looking to the process by which time 
standards were redefined in the mid-twentieth century.  
During the period considered in chapter one, physicists developed an atomic 
definition of the second that supplanted previous definitions based on astronomical 
observations. This change was part of a larger trend toward atomic definitions of units of 
measure, which by the late twentieth century obtained for all standard international 
measures except for the kilogram.18 As opposed to definitions based on the specifications 
of physical objects, such as the platinum bars that have been used to define the meter, 
standards came to be defined by quantum processes within atoms, specifically the 
wavelengths and frequencies of radiation emitted during atomic transitions. These 
standards represented a new ideal of universality, as in theory they were reproducible 
anywhere in the universe. As Robert Crease has described this ideal: “For the first time in 
history, if all basic standards were somehow lost, they could be recovered and the world 
would have exactly the same measurement standards as before.”19 Nevertheless, the 
                                                
17 Crease, World in the Balance, 252. 
18 See Crease, World in the Balance, 15. 
19 Ibid. 
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redefinition of standards in terms of atomic processes were embedded in historical 
contingencies, and involved unique and complicated forms of “bootstrapping”. 
Robert Crease’s World in the Balance begins to describe the historical transition 
toward atomic standards, beginning in the 19th century. Crease tells the story primarily 
with respect to the establishment of new standards for units of length, specifically the 
redefinition of the meter in terms of wavelengths of light. He begins with the work of 
C.S. Peirce in the mid nineteenth century, who according to Crease was the first person to 
attempt to define the meter in terms of wavelengths of light, with an experimental 
apparatus involving diffraction gratings.20 As Crease describes, Peirce’s instruments 
lacked the precision required to arrive at a meaningful result. In the meantime, Albert 
Michelson took up a similar project upon learning of Peirce’s work, and in 1887 
published the results of his efforts using his interferometer.21 Michelson’s publication 
began a long process that led to a 1952 decision by the Bureau International de Poids et 
Mesures (BIPM) to officially redefine the meter in terms a wavelength of chosen 
frequency, effective beginning in 1960.22 As Crease describes: “After the redefinition 
[…] would take place, the wavelength of the chosen spectral line would no longer be 
measurable; it would be the ruler, not the ruled.”23 The chosen frequency was a line in the 
spectrum of the Krypton-86 atom, which served as the foundation of the standard meter 
                                                
20 Ibid., 195-202.  
21 In 1907 Michelson won the Nobel Prize, largely for this work. 
22 Crease, World in the Balance, 215. 
23 Ibid., 215. 
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until 1983, when the meter was again redefined, this time in terms of the speed of light 
and the then-established atomic second.24  
Crease discusses the establishment of the atomic second as similar in kind to the 
redefinition of length in terms of spectral wavelengths, without elaborating any of the 
specific details. However, as chapter one of this dissertation shows, the redefinition of the 
second in terms of atomic processes was embedded in a unique set of contingencies and 
values that distinguish it from the redefinition of the meter. Further, the process by which 
the atomic second was established raised a unique set of conceptual problems about 
timekeeping. Before the development of atomic time, the second was defined in terms of 
astronomical observations tied to the cycles of day and night, as well as the change of 
seasons as experienced on earth. By redefining the second in terms of atomic processes, 
measures of time became officially divorced from such cycles of experience. Thus, the 
redefinition of the second in atomic terms raised questions about what a “measure of 
time” is, as well as about the connection between time as measured in the lab and time as 
a feature of everyday experiences of change. While some physicists aspired to the 
perceived “universality” of an atomic definition of the second, others felt that such a 
definition inappropriately divorced time from human experience. Further, the technical 
establishment of the atomic second involved novel processes, particularly a series of 
feedback loops, resonance effects, and fine tunings. This technique raised the question of 
where the standard second is “located” within the complicated technical processes that 
now serve as atomic time standards. Chapter one explores the specific issues that 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
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accompanied the atomic definition of the second, including the values at stake and the 
new technical processes involved, showing it to be a unique and revealing moment in the 
history of standardization and metrology. 
 Overall, the first chapter looks to what is often taken for granted as objective and 
universal – the atomic definition of the second - and unpacks the contingencies and 
conceptual issues out of which it emerged. The second, as defined by atomic processes, is 
foundational in twenty-first century physics; however, in the 1950s the concept of the 
second, along with other timekeeping concepts, was in a state of flux. Yet arguably more 
foundational than the concept of the “second” is the concept of “time” itself. What can a 
study of the redefinition of the second reveal about the assumptions about that which the 
second is a measure of? Is there a background concept of time that physicists presuppose 
as “true”, independent of specific time standards? This dissertation will make it clear that 
there is no single truth of time; time per se is as conventional and heterogeneous as the 
units used to measure it. However, the conclusion to this dissertation will further argue 
that physicists must necessarily presuppose that there is a “truth” about time before they 
can begin to discuss and use the concept. Chapter one will begin to address this issue by 
looking at physicists’ presuppositions about time in the development of atomic clocks 
and time standards, revealing a plurality of presuppositions and assumptions about the 
concept, as well as a common presupposition about the commensurability of times 
understood in different contexts. Set in relation to concepts of time presupposed by the 
physicists considered in chapters two and three, this will contribute to the deeply 
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heterogeneous picture of one of physics’ most basic concepts, as well as an account of 
what holds this concept together. 
 
2.2 Chapter Two: Particle Physics and the Direction of Time  
Chapter two considers the work of experimental particle physicists whose research 
affected notions about time as a physical variable at the intersection of physical laws and 
experimental practice. In particular, it looks to a development in experimental particle 
physics in the 1960s that diverged from the consensus understanding among physicists 
about the directionality of time in physical laws. The directionality of time can been 
regarded as one of time’s defining characteristics, as well as the characteristic that 
differentiates it from space;25 thus, insight into the directionality of time could potentially 
provide insight into the nature of time per se. Experimental particle physicists Val Fitch 
and James Cronin encountered this potential in the early 1960s, when they ran an 
experiment that implied the fundamental laws of physics are asymmetrical with respect to 
the direction of time. This result touched upon a longstanding line of questioning about 
whether or not the laws of physics take different forms in the forward and backward 
directions of time, and went against the accepted conclusions of this line of questioning. 
Cronin and Fitch acknowledged that their work impacted philosophical and physical 
questions about the directionality of time; however, they did not engage such questions. 
While they exhibited certain philosophical tendencies in their approach to physics, at the 
                                                
25 It is described as such, for example, in Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time 
(Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956). 
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level of their explanations of the impact of their experiment, their understanding of the 
practice of physics did not leave room for discussion of philosophical implications of 
their results for the meaning of a basic concept like time.  
From the point of view of everyday human experience, there appears to be a 
difference between physical processes in the forward and backward directions in time. 
That is, many of the processes we observe on an everyday basis appear to occur only in 
the forward time direction, such as in the classic example of an ice cube melting in a hot 
cup of coffee. However, the fundamental laws of physics are for the most part 
symmetrical with respect to the direction time: the fundamental equations of physics 
yield the same predictions in both time directions, and do not change when the variable 
“𝑡” is replaced with “−𝑡”. So while from the point of view of everyday human 
experience there appear to be significant differences between physical processes in the 
forward and backward directions of time, insofar as certain processes appear to only 
occur in one direction, such differences vanish at the level of physical laws.  
The discrepancy between the human experience of the time asymmetry of physics 
and the time symmetry of the fundamental laws of physics is an issue that has occupied a 
wide range of past thinkers, particularly those involved in study of heat in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century. As Theodore Porter describes in his 1988 book The Rise of Statistical 
Thinking: 1820-1900:  
That the laws of Newtonian mechanics are fully time-symmetric and 
hence can equally run backwards or forwards could not easily be 
reconciled with the commonplace observation that heat always flows 
from warmer to cooler bodies. This discrepancy became for a time one 
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of the deepest theoretical problems of the dynamical – or, as it later 
came to be regarded, statistical – gas theory.26 
 
Within the context of the nineteenth century of study of heat, the directionality of 
physical processes became codified in the second law of thermodynamics. In 1865 
physicist Rudolph Clausius described the second law of thermodynamics as “the 
universal tendency of entropy to increase,”27 with entropy understood as a measure of 
“the uselessness of a certain amount of energy.”28 Thus, during the mid-to-late nineteenth 
century the discrepancy between the time asymmetric appearance of physical processes 
and the time symmetry of physical laws was primarily framed as a discrepancy between 
the laws of thermodynamics and the laws of Newtonian physics.  
A possible resolution came with the work of Ludwig Boltzmann in the 1870s, 
proposing that the macroscopic directionality observed in physical processes is a 
statistical consequence of the microscopic behavior of atoms.29 Boltzmann reformulated 
the second law of thermodynamics to state that physical systems tend to move from states 
of lower statistical frequency to higher statistical frequency, with entropy understood as 
“a measure of the number of particular microscopic arrangements of atoms that appear 
                                                
26 Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 193. 
27 Huw Price, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point: New Directions for the Physics of 
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 22.  
28 See Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time, 
(New York: Dutton, 2010), 34. 
29 Ibid., 36-38.  
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indistinguishable from a macroscopic perspective.”30 This meant that at the microscopic 
level the time symmetric Newtonian laws obtained; it was only at the macroscopic level 
that an asymmetry with respect to time appeared. This development was the source of 
much controversy in the late nineteenth century, and was the source of debates that 
involved issues including the nature of time, determinism, and free will. Many of the 
prominent physicists involved in nineteenth century thermodynamics participated, such 
as Maxwell and Boltzmann, and each brought his own agenda to the issue. The positions 
of Maxwell and Boltzmann within these debates has been summarized by Porter as 
follows: 
Whereas Maxwell stressed the imperfection of statistics and hence of 
most knowledge in physics, emphasizing the possible existence of 
instabilities and singularities, Boltzmann took the exceptional 
improbability of the visible universe and sought to fit it into a pattern of 
equilibrium conditioned by statistical regularity.  Maxwell, while never 
advocating positive indeterminism or acausality, wished to establish the 
possibility of a nonphysical causality that depended on the action of the 
will. Boltzmann, never comfortable with the dependence of science on 
probability, except in terms of stable frequencies, refused to 
countenance the idea that the most fundamental phenomena of nature 
could be other than mechanically determined.31 
 
Following Boltzmann’s statistical definition of entropy and the second law of 
thermodynamics, the question of why systems tended to move forward in time toward 
higher entropy states, as opposed to backward, remained open. Boltzmann proposed one 
possible solution, suggesting that the universe began in a low entropy state, and that the 
                                                
30 Ibid., 37-38. 
31 Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 216-217. 
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perceived directionality of physical process is the result of this initial boundary 
condition.32 This proposal has been widely accepted by physicists, and is currently 
believed by most to explain the directionality of thermodynamic processes.33 Thus, the 
issue appeared to be largely resolved by the twentieth century. The fundamental laws of 
physics were thought to be universally symmetric with respect to time, just as they were 
with respect to space. The appearance of time asymmetry was due to the statistical 
behavior of microscopic processes, as well as contingent boundary conditions.  
 When Cronin and Fitch conducted their experiment in the early 1960s, the 
consensus among physicists was that the fundamental laws of physics were completely 
symmetrical with respect to time. This meant that at the most fundamental level the laws 
of physics treated the forward and backward time directions identically, and did not 
display a directionality in the time dimension that did not exist for the space dimensions. 
However, as I describe in chapter two, Fitch and Cronin’s experiment implied that there 
were basic laws of physics that were not symmetrical with respect to time, even when 
taking the boundary conditions into account. In other words, their work suggested that the 
forms of certain physical laws were different in the forward and backward directions of 
time. This presented the possibility that the classic nineteenth century conversation about 
the direction of time with respect to physical laws could be reopened. Do physical laws 
differentiate between the forward and backward direction in time? If so, how should the 
difference be characterized? How does this speak to the physical relationship between 
                                                
32 Ibid., 38. 
33 Price, Time’s Arrow, 22. 
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time and space? These are questions Fitch and Cronin identified but did not engage with 
on a substantive level, believing them to be beyond the scope of their roles as 
experimental particle physicists. Further, many other physicists, philosophers, and 
popular writers who were interested in questions about the nature of time were at a loss 
for how to incorporate Fitch and Cronin’s result into their thinking, and largely dismissed 
it.34 In chapter two I argue that Fitch and Cronin’s discovery is relevant to basic questions 
about the nature of time, but I also explain why this relevance hasn’t been explored in 
any depth. I claim that within the context of postwar particle physics there was no 
framework through which the relevance of such a discovery for fundamental questions 
about the nature of time could be explored.  
 In chapter two I draw upon works in the history and philosophy of science that 
analyze the theoretical entities of postwar particle physics, in order to gain insight the 
status of a concept like the directionality of time. I then use this insight to explain why 
the philosophical implications of Fitch and Cronin’s result have not been pursued. 
Drawing on works such as Andrew Pickering’s Constructing Quarks, Peter Galison’s 
How Experiments End and Image and Logic, and David Kaiser’s Drawing Theories 
Apart, I look to how scholars have understood the status of conceptual entities that 
operated as part of the experimental and theoretical practices of postwar particle physics. 
Focusing on the presuppositions about time held by members of this community, and the 
                                                
34 For example P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974); Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2004). 
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relationship between these presuppositions and notions about time and its direction, I will 
shed light on how the concept of time gained meaning within the context of postwar 
particle physics. This in turn will be used to show why questions about the implications 
of Fitch and Cronin’s result were not explored by Fitch and Cronin themselves, nor by 
other thinkers interested in the nature of time, even though the result appears to be 
relevant to a traditional line of philosophical questioning about time.  
 Chapter two presents postwar American particle physicists as caught between 
philosophical and pragmatic tendencies within physics. In keeping with a partially 
philosophical sensibility, this subgroup was deeply concerned with fundamentals; yet on 
the pragmatic side, it treated a fundamental concept like time as a technical variable 
confined to the technical interface of theory and experiment. In this context, the 
framework of particle physics did not afford a mechanism by which its concept of time 
could be transported into philosophical discourses about its nature. The chapter looks to 
the contingencies and values that went into particle physicists’ understanding of time as a 
technical variable, and how it gained meaning within the framework of postwar 
American particle physics. Drawing on historiography surrounding the theoretical entities 
conceptualized by the postwar particle physics community, I show the conventions that 
helped form this understanding of time, and why there was no philosophical 
consideration of the impact of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment for deeper understandings 
of this fundamental concept.  
My analysis of why the philosophical implications of Fitch and Cronin’s 
discovery for the concept of time have not been explored will extend beyond the fact that 
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Fitch, Cronin, and their colleagues never asked or answered questions about the 
philosophical implications of the discovery. While it is true that the posing of 
philosophical questions about time was outside of the scope of this subgroup’s self-
understanding, the technical nature of the experiment, and they way it pulled different 
presuppositions about time together, left little room for philosophical discussion. With 
time cast as a technical variable within the framework in which the experiment was 
conducted, even self-identified philosophers lacked the resources to dig deeply into the 
experiment’s implications for the direction of time. The concept of time itself, as 
conceived within the particle physics community, could not be set in relation to 
philosophical lines of questioning, even if it appeared on the surface to address 
traditionally philosophical issues. The earlier nineteenth century debates about time and 
its direction had little meaning for the time as conceptualized in the context of Fitch and 
Cronin’s experiment. 
Chapter two builds on chapter one to add a further element to the larger landscape 
of ways American physicists understood and engaged with the concept of time during the 
postwar period. It describes physicists who had different understandings of what it meant 
to be a physicist from those considered in chapter one, with more complicated 
relationships to philosophical approaches to physics. Further, it shows an additional 
register on which the concept of time was at issue – that is, its “directionality” – and 
maps out the contours of this issue. Finally, it shows why, within these contours, there 
was hardly any philosophical investigation into the nature of time on a fundamental level. 
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This will shed light on particle physicists’ understanding of time as a technical variable, 
as well as the assumptions that went into this understanding of time. 
 
2.3 Chapter three: Quantum Gravity and the Illusion of Time  
Chapter three moves from the large community of postwar experimental particle physics 
to the significantly smaller subgroup of physicists who conducted research into general 
relativity in the 1950s and 1960s. Specifically, it focuses on the efforts of several 
members of this subgroup to bring general relativity and quantum mechanics together to 
form a universally valid theory of quantum gravity. Questions about the nature of time 
were explicitly at stake in this subgroup’s research program. Specifically, these physicists 
asked questions about whether time can be said to “exist” at all, frequently making the 
claim that time does not exist. What did these physicists mean by the claim that time does 
not exist? Further, what does the fact that they made such a claim reveal about their 
understanding of the role of the physicist, with respect to the tension between philosophy 
and pragmatism? Finally, what presuppositions did they make about time, and on what 
level did they question these presuppositions? 
 Chapter three explains the willingness of these physicists to engage with the 
concept of time in two parts. First, it argues that questioning the notion of time was 
central to the intellectual inheritance of relativity researchers. Questions about the nature 
of time have played a central role in the study of relativity beginning with Einstein’s first 
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paper introducing the special theory of relativity in 1905.35 In this paper Einstein defined 
time operationally, as no more or less than the measurements recorded by a system of 
synchronized clocks. This definition was directly opposed to the previously held 
Newtonian notion of absolute time. Einstein’s definition, together with the two principles 
of special relativity, yielded the famous and counterintuitive insights into the relativity of 
simultaneity and time dilation that are foundational to special relativity. 36 These insights 
placed questions about the nature of time at the center of the original formulation of 
special relativity. Further, Minkowski’s 1908 interpretation of special relativity in terms 
of a four dimensional spacetime, and Einstein’s 1916 geometrical description of gravity 
in terms of curved spacetime in the general theory of relativity, continued the tradition 
whereby insights into the nature of time were central to advances in relativity.37 For 
                                                
35 Albert Einstein, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” in in The Principle of 
Relativity, ed. H. Lorentz et. al, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1952), 35-65. 
36 Scholars such as Peter Galison, John Norton, and John Statchel have written 
extensively about the redefinition of time in the special theory of relativity, noting the 
central place the redefinition of time played in Einstein’s formulation of the from 
multiple angles. For example, see Galison, Einstein’s Clocks and Poincare’s Maps; John 
Norton, “Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and the Problems in the 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies that Led him to it,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Einstein, ed. M. Janssen and C. Lehner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Michel Janssen, “Drawing the Line between Kinematics and Dynamics in Special 
Relativity,” in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2009): 352-
362. 
37 See Hermann Minkowski, “Space and Time,” in The Principle of Relativity, ed. H. 
Lorentz et. al, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1952), p. 75; Albert Einstein, “The 
Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity,” in The Principle of Relativity, ed. H. 
Lorentz et. al, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1952), p. 109. 
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researchers working on relativity in the decades leading up to the postwar period, posing 
questions about the concept of time was central to their intellectual inheritance.  
 This subgroup was further predisposed to overtly ask questions about the nature 
of time due to unique challenges that emerged from the task of uniting general relativity 
and quantum mechanics into a theory of quantum gravity. That is, the concept of time 
underwent significant changes over the course of the development and interpretation of 
the theory of relativity, and was understood by relativity researchers as bound up with the 
notion of the curved four-dimensional spacetime central to Einstein’s theory of gravity. 
As such, it was not immediately obvious that the relativistic concept of time was 
compatible with the concept of time built into quantum mechanics. This has often been 
described as the “problem of time” in quantum gravity, and is an issue with which 
physicists working on quantum gravity have directly grappled. In his paper “Quantum 
Gravity: A Primer for Philosophers,” Dean Rickles has described the problem of time as 
follows: 
Time is a fixed ‘external’ parameter in standard quantum theory, a 
structure against which dynamics unfolds but that is not itself 
determined dynamically. In quantum mechanics time appears in the 
fundamental dynamical equation (the Schrodinger equation) as 
Newtonian absolute time. […] Not so in general relativity where the 
spacetime geometry will be determined by the state of matter.38 
 
Thus, in addition to the fact that questioning the nature of time was part of the intellectual 
inheritance of the field of relativity, the project of uniting general relativity and quantum 
                                                
38 Rickles, “Quantum Gravity: A Primer for Philosophers,” 18. 
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mechanics into a single theory was particularly primed to directly grapple with questions 
about the nature of time. 
 In addition to intellectual reasons, the community working on general relativity 
had a different relationship to the mainstream pragmatic culture of physics than the other 
subgroups considered in this dissertation. In the 1950s and 60s, the subgroup was quite 
small, and often found itself on the margins of the mainstream physics community, while 
still having several prominent members. Thus, the subgroup was better situated to deviate 
from the pragmatic mainstream of physics than other, larger subgroups of physicists 
working during this period. Several historians of science have written about the size and 
status of the community of general relativity researchers in the United States during the 
twentieth century, including David Kaiser, Jean Eisenstaedt, and Daniel Kennefick. 
These scholars explain why the subgroup American physicists working on general 
relativity in the early years of relativity research was small and often marginalized. 
Further, they show how and why the field of relativity research grew and transformed 
during the postwar period. Chapter three of this dissertation situates physicists working 
on quantum gravity within this transitional period in the history of general relativity 
research, in order to explain how they came to their questions and answers about the 
nature of time. Although they shared much of the pragmatic sensibility that characterized 
the practices of many of their colleagues working in other fields of physics, they also felt 
a greater license to speculate about philosophical questions, as they were closer to the 
margins of the discipline. In a unique position with respect to mainstream physics, along 
with the specific historical circumstances in which the community emerged, this 
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subgroup was able to think deeply about the nature of time and make philosophical 
claims about its very existence. 
 Chapter three demonstrates that the physicists working on quantum gravity during 
the postwar period were closer to the philosophical end of the spectrum than many other 
subgroups during this period; further, it seeks to explain why their more philosophically-
minded sensibility was possible. This being said, although the physicists considered in 
chapter three were more open to asking philosophical questions about their basic 
concepts than other physicists, these questions were still constrained by their 
understandings of what it meant to do physics. Even though they understood the 
boundaries of physics to be more inclusive than did other physicists, they still had a 
defined sense of these boundaries. Further, the physicists shared a great deal with the 
mainstream pragmatic culture of physics, and their approaches involved many pragmatic 
elements. Chapter three thus aims to describe the nuanced understanding of the 
boundaries of physics that enabled physicists working on quantum gravity to ask and 
answer questions about time in the specific form in which they did. While doing so the 
chapter builds on the first two chapters by adding analysis of a further layer of questions 
and assumptions about the nature of time. By looking to the presuppositions that postwar 
physicists working on quantum gravity held about time, and how these presuppositions 
affected the questions they asked and the answers they arrived at about time’s existence, 
a further dimension will be added to the heterogeneous picture of the concept of time in 
the postwar United States. 
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3.  
This dissertation describes communities of postwar American physicists that treated time 
differently on multiple registers. First, each subgroup cast time in a different role, i.e. as a 
unit of measure, experimental variable, or background for change. Further, the work of 
each raised questions about different characteristics of time, such as its universality, 
directionality, or ontology. Finally, each used different methods to derive insight into 
time, including instrumental advances, experimental techniques, and speculative musings. 
More generally, the subgroups differed on the degree to which they understood 
interpretive questions about time to be at stake in their work. The dissertation aims to 
consider all of the above registers of difference, unpacking and explaining the 
presuppositions about time and physics in which they were embedded. In doing so it will 
set subgroups of postwar American physicists in relation to one another in terms of their 
engagement with time, illuminating the boundaries that existed within the physics 
community during this period. Time will emerge as a heterogeneous and contingent 
concept situated at these boundaries, simultaneously blurring and rarefying the 
distinctions between subgroups of physicists. 
The dissertation involves two complementary lines of questioning: the first 
inquires into the professional identities of subgroups of postwar American physicists, and 
the second asks about the nature and status of time as a fundamental concept within these 
subgroups. The first uses physicists’ various levels of engagement with philosophical 
questions about time to show how different subgroups of physicists understood their 
professional roles and the boundaries of their discipline, in terms of the spectrum running 
 30 
from philosophical to pragmatic sensibilities. It shows that different subgroups of 
physicists engaged with questions about the nature of time to varying degrees, in turn 
revealing a wide range of conceptions of, and approaches to, physics. In the first chapter, 
the physicists were firmly rooted within the mainstream pragmatic culture of physics, and 
were not attuned to fundamental conceptual changes with respect to timekeeping brought 
about by their work. In chapter two, the physicists were pulled between philosophy and 
pragmatism, causing them to identify but not pursue basic questions about time. In the 
third chapter, the physicists were closer to the philosophical side of the spectrum than 
those considered in the first two chapters, and openly speculated about the nature of time. 
Nevertheless, even the physicists in chapter three were closely aligned with the 
mainstream pragmatic culture in many ways, which constrained their philosophical 
conversations. As part of this first line of questioning, the dissertation will explain the 
differences between physicists’ approaches to the concept of time. This will involve 
looking to the intellectual, institutional, and cultural inheritances of each subgroup, as 
well as the historical and technical details of the specific research programs under 
consideration. 
The second line of questioning concerns the concept of time itself, and the ways 
in which it changed and was conceptualized in postwar American physics. It charts the 
ways in which the concept of time emerged as a philosophical issue within each 
subgroup, and the specific ways the concept changed. In chapter one, this involves 
describing the changes in basic time keeping concepts within the community of physicists 
working on the development of atomic clocks and atomic time standards. In chapter two, 
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it involves a demonstration of how the results of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment presented 
a potential complication to longstanding debates about the direction of time. In chapter 
three, it involves describing the line of reasoning that led physicists to the conclusion that 
time does not exist. This line of investigation seeks to use these moments when the 
concept of time was at stake to understand physicists’ assumptions and presuppositions 
about time. Beginning with time as a unit of measurement in chapter one, moving 
through time as a technical variable in chapter two, and ending with time as an object of 
problematic ontology in chapter three, the dissertation unpacks multiple layers of 
assumptions and presuppositions about time. Building on this, it aims to contextualize 
these assumptions and presupposition within the values and contingent circumstances of 
each subgroup. Finally, in the conclusion this line of questioning will abstract away from 
the concept of time and look to the nature of fundamental concepts in postwar physics 
more generally. Considering the variety of presuppositions about time held by postwar 
physicists, it argues for the contingency, heterogeneity, and necessity of physicists’ 
presuppositions about fundamental concepts, and the role that these presuppositions play 
in giving physical concepts meaning. 
Overall, the dissertation reveals a multiplicity of ways of engaging the concept of 
time, as well many different presuppositions about time. It paints a picture of time as a 
historically contingent and heterogeneous concept. Time meant different things to 
different subgroups of physicists during the postwar period; further, each subgroup made 
different assumptions about time. This raises the question of whether there were any 
presuppositions about time that were shared among the subgroups considered. Is it 
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possible that all of the physicists upheld a basic presupposition about a “truth” of time? 
Even though the physicists in chapter three did not assume time “exists”, did they 
presuppose anything about time before they speculated about its existence? 
 In the conclusion to the dissertation, I will explore how presuppositions can 
function as preconditions for physical concepts in a variety of ways. This will be used to 
form a more general argument about the nature of the concept of time – and 
conceptualization in general – in physics. In order to do so, I will draw upon the work of 
several thinkers from twentieth century continental philosophical tradition to help 
develop insight into the nature of time as a fundamental concept in physics.39 With 
somewhat different emphases, these thinkers draw attention to the relationship between 
the presuppositions that structurally precede concepts – the conditions of possibility for a 
concept – and the content of a given concept. They discuss the difference between 
presupposition and content – what they see as the inescapable heterogeneity of a concept 
in relation to itself – and the consequences of this difference. By drawing on the 
structures discussed by these thinkers, I will give contour to my own discussion of the 
meaning of the particular heterogeneity of the concept of time in the history of physics, 
and the presuppositions that underlie it. By considering the specific, historical 
contingency of the presuppositions that underlie physicists’ concepts of time – together 
                                                
39 E.g., Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008), 29-31;
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Heidegger, “Modern Science, Mathematics, and Metaphysics,” in Basic Writings (New 
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with the more radical heterogeneity of concepts in general as described by twentieth 
century continental thinkers – I will draw conclusions about the nature of a fundamental 
concept, like time, in postwar American physics.  
The overall aim of this dissertation will be to offer a nuanced account of the 
landscape of professional identities of postwar American physicists, as well as the way 
these physicists conceptualized time. Together with the concluding philosophical analysis 
of conceptualization in general in physics, the dissertation will provide a deeper 
understanding of physicists’ relationships to their most fundamental concepts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Atomic Times: Clocks and Time Standards in the Post-War Era 
 
1. Introduction 
On January 7th, 1949, the New York Times published an article with the headline 
"Government Makes Atomic Clock Telling Time Better Than the Stars." The article 
described a clock, unveiled in late 1948 by physicist Harold Lyons and his team at the US 
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), which used the properties of the ammonia molecule 
to keep time.40 The announcement of Lyons’ ammonia clock, and the soon to be iconic 
photograph of the apparatus connected to an ordinary clock face,41 garnered a great deal 
of attention both from within the scientific community and from the mainstream 
American press. One person acutely aware of Lyons’ work on the ammonia clock was 
astronomer William Markowitz, working within the time services division of the US 
Naval Observatory (USNO). Markowitz had been paying close attention to the progress 
of atomic clock building, and was worried that the development of atomic clocks would 
shift control of timekeeping away from “the stars” and toward physics laboratories.42 
 
                                                
40 The ammonia clock is often referred to as an atomic clock, even though it was 
technically based on a molecule as opposed to an atom.  
41 See figure 1.1. 
42 William Markowitz, Interviewed by Steven Dick, 18 August 1987. 
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Figure 1.1.  Publicity Photo of Lyons with his Ammonia Clock 
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Although the ammonia clock never did tell time “better than the stars,”43 and the 
project was quickly abandoned, it catalyzed efforts by Lyons and others to begin 
developing a more promising clock based on cesium atoms.44 Markowitz, believing the 
development of a cesium clock to be inevitable, felt strongly that astronomers should help 
physicists develop a cesium time standard compatible with existing astronomical time 
standards. He approached Lyons in the early 1950s, hoping to collaborate on the 
establishment of a new atomic definition of the second. Lyons had no interest in 
collaborating with an astronomer, so Markowitz instead struck up a partnership with 
British physicist Louis Essen at the UK National Physics Laboratory (NPL). Essen had a 
cesium clock up and running in 1955 and, through his collaboration with Markowitz, had 
established the first atomic definition of the second by 1958. 
 During this ten-year period, from the unveiling of Lyons’ ammonia clock in 1948 
to Markowitz and Essen’s establishment of the first atomic time standard in 1958, 
remarkable changes occurred in the ways scientists measured, used, and conceptualized 
time. In the process, scientific communities implicitly renegotiated their understandings 
of basic timekeeping concepts such as “clock”, “second”, and “time”, proliferating a 
multiplicity of meanings and usages of these terms. These concepts did not have single, 
fixed meanings before or after the development of atomic clocks and time standards; 
                                                
43 The ammonia clock was highly unstable, and never more precise than the non-atomic 
clocks and time standards already in existence. As described in As described in Paul 
Forman, “Atomichron ®: The Atomic Clock from Concept to Commercial Product,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE, 73 (1985), 1184. 
44 Ibid. 
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however, their heterogeneous meanings shifted as a result of practical work carried out in 
the field of atomic timekeeping from 1948-1958. Such conceptual changes did not occur 
at the level of explicit discourse – neither physicists nor astronomers overtly discussed 
the meanings of their basic concepts or the ways in which they were changing.  
Nevertheless, in this chapter I will show how the advent of atomic clocks and time-
standards was accompanied by implicit conceptual renegotiation. 
Why did the physicists involved in the development of atomic clocks and atomic 
time standards fail to explicitly discuss the meanings of basic time keeping concepts? In 
what follows, I will argue that these physicists were firmly rooted in a postwar, pragmatic 
professional culture that placed philosophical investigation into the meaning of basic 
timekeeping concepts outside the domain of physics. I will describe the institutional 
context in which the physicists working on atomic time were situated - focusing 
specifically on NBS, NPL, and USNO, which respectively supported Lyons, Essen, and 
Markowitz - to help understand this professional culture. By considering the projects, 
mandates, and sources of funding for these institutions, I will outline the ways in which 
the wartime physics legacy and the postwar context contributed to these physicists’ 
professional self-identities. Further, I will look to the attitudes and personalities of 
prominent physicists whose work helped pave the way for atomic time, to show how they 
helped stabilize this pragmatic culture. I will use the professional culture within the 
institutions supporting research into atomic time, along with the personalities of its model 
physicists, to explain the absence of philosophical discourse about the meaning of 
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timekeeping concepts among the physicists involved in the establishment of atomic time; 
conversely, I will use this absence to gain insight into the contours of this culture. 
Nearly all of the institutions that supported atomic time research during the post-
World War II period were either run or funded by government agencies. Government 
involvement in this research, within the post-World War II context, was thus one of the 
major factors that influenced the culture of these institutions, setting the tone and 
mandate of this research in a variety of ways. The role of the government in physics, and 
the ways in which physics institutions changed as a result increased government 
involvement during the Cold War, has been written about extensively by historians of 
science including David Kaiser, Stuart Leslie, Peter Westwick, Peter Galison, George 
Reisch, Paul Forman, and many more.45 In this chapter I will build on these works, 
showing how the changing relationship between science and government affected work 
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on atomic time in the 1950s, contributing to a professional culture of physics that had 
little room for speculative conversations about the meaning of timekeeping concepts. 
In what follows, my primary objective will be to trace the destabilization and 
renegotiation of fundamental timekeeping concepts during the early years of atomic 
timekeeping. Further, I will show how this destabilization and renegotiation occurred at 
the implicit level, due to the pragmatic culture in which the physicists and astronomers 
working on atomic time were situated. While doing so, I will draw attention to two 
closely related secondary tensions at play. Both tensions reveal a set of factors that 
contributed to the establishment of atomic time, showing the many values, contingencies, 
and agendas that produced the clocks and standards that are now the basis for the most 
precise measurements in physics. The first is a disciplinary tension between physics and 
astronomy. This tension manifested itself during debates over how time-keeping labor 
was to be distributed among physicists and astronomers following the development of 
atomic clocks. How did physicists and astronomers define their disciplinary roles in 
relation to one another? To what extent did their visions of these roles overlap, and how 
did each group stake claims on contested domains? These questions were at stake in early 
developments in atomic timekeeping, and the tension between physics and astronomy 
influenced the way atomic clocks and standards were developed in the 1950s.  
The second tension existed between those striving toward the ideal of universality 
in timekeeping and those emphasizing the contingency of time. There was a sentiment 
among some physicists, such as Harold Lyons, that timekeeping concepts could and 
should be defined such that they would be true and valid anywhere in the universe. Such 
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a definition would not rely on specific periodic motions as viewed from our particular 
planet; rather, it would be valid throughout the universe independent of context. 
Conversely, many astronomers, such as William Markowitz, believed that timekeeping 
concepts have and always should be tied to our contingent experiences of time on earth, 
with its particular orbit and axis of rotation.46 For Markowitz, a definition of the second 
that was “universal”, but unrelated to the human experience of change, would detrimental 
to the field of timekeeping. Thus, the universality and contingency of time measures were 
at stake during the early days of atomic timekeeping, revealing another set of factors that 
influenced the development of atomic clocks and standards. The tension between these 
values affected the way the atomic second was defined, as did the tension between 
physics and astronomy, showing again that standards for atomic time measurements are 
not objective “facts” but rather the product of specific values and agendas.  
These two tensions - physics versus astronomy, and universality versus 
contingency - map closely onto one another: one side involves physicists, striving for a 
universal atomic time; the other involves astronomers, believing contingent human 
experience to be of vital importance in defining atomic time. In this chapter I will show 
that these tensions, along with the meanings of time keeping concepts themselves, were 
being negotiated among the scientists working on atomic time during in the late 1940s 
and 1950s. The relationships between astronomy and physics, as well as universality and 
contingency, were at stake during this period. Further, these tensions reveal the human 
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agendas, contingencies, and values that contributed to the destabilization of timekeeping 
concepts during the early years of atomic timekeeping, influencing the way clocks, 
seconds, and time were conceptualized by physicists.  
The humans factors that have influenced the development of standards have been 
discussed in many interesting works in the history of science, for example by Ken Alder 
with respect to the development of the metric system in the 18th century, Hasok Chang 
with respect to the standardization of temperature in the 19th century, and Peter Galison 
with respect to the standardization of length, time, and weight measures at the turn of the 
20th century.47 These historical accounts contrast the scientific impulse toward objectivity 
with the human contingencies involved in the establishment of standards. These scholars 
make the case for why standards should not be taken as objective facts, but rather be 
understood as the product of historical contingencies; in doing so, they show how the 
ideal of objectivity is but one of the contingencies that has influenced the production of 
standards. The standardization of atomic time adds a new element to the ideal of an 
objective standard unit measure, insofar as atomic standards were grounded in the 
characteristic frequencies of atoms, and offered a new level of stability and precision to 
time measurement. Of course, despite this, atomic time was still born of historical 
contingency. The story of atomic time involves human judgment, decisions, and agendas. 
Through a discussion of the two tensions described above, along with the technical 
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details of the specific tools and techniques involved in atomic timekeeping, I will draw 
attention to some of the contingencies that factored into the development of atomic time 
standards.  
In section two of this chapter, I will briefly discuss a few points regarding the 
history of clocks and time standards before any serious efforts to build an atomic clock 
were underway. In section three, I will unpack the story of Lyons, Markowitz, Essen, and 
their work on atomic clocks and atomic time standards. This will involve discussion of 
the specific institutions within which they were working. In section four, I will draw 
conclusions about the ways in which the basic concept of a ‘clock’, a ‘second’ and ‘time’ 
were at stake in these episodes. This will involve delving deeper into the novel elements 
of atomic timekeeping tools and techniques, the technical and conceptual challenges they 
posed, and why and how atomic clocks and standards challenged previously held 
timekeeping concepts. Throughout, I will draw attention to the ways in which changes in 
new time-keeping instruments, and new types of standards and techniques, affected 
timekeeping concepts during the postwar period.  
 
2. Before Atomic Clocks and Standards 
2.1 Pre-Atomic Clocks and Time Standards 
Before the development of atomic clocks, the distinction between clocks and time 
standards was relatively straightforward. Time standards established the length of time 
intervals, and belonged primarily to the domain of astronomy. Astronomers used periodic 
motions observed in the sky to establish standard lengths of intervals such as the day, 
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hour, and second. Clocks, on the other hand, were physical objects engineered by humans 
to mark the passage of time on earth, and were more closely connected to the domains of 
physics and engineering. Clocks marked or measured time, their rate depending on the 
properties of a specific clock, for example the length of a pendulum string or the cut of a 
quartz crystal. Physical clocks were not ‘universal,’ which is to say no two pendulums or 
quartz crystals were exactly alike; this meant that basing a time standard on a specific 
clock would be unwieldy, and there were in effect no physical time standards. Physicists 
and engineers calibrated their clocks in keeping with the time standards established and 
disseminated by astronomers. 
 The tension between astronomy and physics surrounding timekeeping has a long 
history. For example, it was pronounced in the 19th century search for longitude, which 
raised the question of whether astronomical measurements or precise physical clocks 
would be more successful in establishing longitude accurately.48 Further, quartz-crystal 
clocks, developed in 1927, confirmed scientists’ suspicions that the rotation of the Earth 
was unstable. This spurred an effort for an increasingly stable astronomical standard that 
could compete with the best clocks in terms of accuracy.49 Measurements made with 
quartz clocks went a long way toward destabilizing established definitions of the second 
and the nature of time measures in general. By casting doubt on the sufficiency of the 
rotation of the Earth to establish a reliable time standard, the quartz clock played an 
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important role in sending the concept of the second, as a standard measure of time, into 
flux. Quartz clocks didn’t offer an alternative time standard, however; they rather 
demonstrated that the standard based on the rotation of the Earth was problematic. This 
ultimately led to the development of the ephemeris time standard, discussed in detail in 
section 3.3 below, which was defined in terms of the motion of the earth around the sun, 
as opposed to the earth on its axis. The development of quartz clocks, and the discovery 
that the rotation of the earth was not stable, set the stage for conceptual changes 
precipitated by the advent of atomic clocks and time standards. 
 
 
2.2 The Beginnings of Atomic Time 
The idea that atoms could keep time and serve as a time standard can be traced to the 19th 
century writings of James Clerk Maxwell, famous for his work on electromagnetism. In 
1873 Maxwell published a paper in which he noted that the frequency of the vibrations of 
atoms and molecules are ‘universal’ and could, in theory, be used as a time standard.50  
Due to the universality of the properties of atoms and molecules, Maxwell noted that it 
was possible for these properties to form the basis of a definition of a second.51 Sir 
William Thompson made an observation along similar lines in 1879, claiming that “the 
time of vibration of a sodium particle corresponding to any one of its modes of vibration 
is known to be absolutely independent of its position in the universe, and will probably 
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remain the same so long as the particle itself exists.”52 It was not until the twentieth 
century, with the development of quantum mechanical technique of molecular beam 
resonance advanced by physicist I.I. Rabi at Columbia University, that physicists began 
to see atomic clocks, and eventually an atomic time standard, as a practical possibility. 
The molecular beam resonance method involved inducing transitions between two energy 
states of an atom or molecule by exposing a beam of particles to applied radiation at a 
given frequency. When the applied frequency matched the frequency of photons emitted 
or absorbed in the transitions, a resonance effect was produced. The applied radiation 
could then be fine-tuned to produce the maximum resonance effect, and in this way 
function as a standard for the transition frequency.53 
In 1945 the New York Times reported I.I. Rabi’s suggestion that his molecular 
beam resonance method might one day be used to develop a highly accurate clock based 
on the properties of the cesium atom.54 From the early days of Rabi’s research into 
molecular beams, he and his colleagues were aware that the molecular beam resonance 
method could be used to establish a frequency standard as well as a standard for the 
strength of magnetic fields.55 Rabi himself wasn’t interested in building clocks; 
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nevertheless, his work on molecular beam resonance laid out the foundation for all future 
work on atomic clocks.56 This being said, it was not obvious to physicists at the time 
what was needed to happen in to transform a molecular beam resonance device into a 
clock. Frequency is a measure of cycles per second, and so a concept of time was already 
built into the basic notion of a frequency standard. How could this concept be used to 
create a clock, or else a time standard? Was a frequency standard itself a type of atomic 
clock or time standard? Using the techniques involved in molecular beam resonance to 
build a clock was entirely new territory in the late 1940s and 1950s, and there was no 
consensus opinion surrounding what differentiated an atomic clock from a frequency 
standard. As physicists began to think about the possibility of using the molecular beam 
resonance method to build an atomic clock, the notion of a clock was implicitly called 
into question. 
Prior to the development of atomic time standards, physicists had made efforts to 
connect length standards to the characteristic properties of matter. Albert Michelson 
determined the length of the meter in terms of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation 
in the late nineteenth century, using the interferometer he had built to search for the 
“ether drift” in the famous Michelson-Morely experiment.57 In the 1950s, when the first 
atomic clocks were being built, the Bureau International de Poids et Mesures was in the 
process of officially redefining the meter in terms of the wavelength of electromagnetic 
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radiation emitted from Krypton-86, based on Michelson’s technique.58 However, 
establishing a definition of the second in terms of the characteristic properties of atoms 
would prove much more complicated than the analogous task for the meter. The 
molecular beam resonance method appeared best suited to the task, yet fulfilling this task 
involved many complex elements. In the first attempts to build an atomic clock, it was 
not clear how a time standard would be circumscribed within the molecular beam set-up. 
Molecular beam resonance was a new technique, founded on the principles of quantum 
mechanics, and far from perfect in the 1950s. Developing an atomic clock and atomic 
time standard based on molecular beam resonance techniques presented a new set of 
technical and conceptual issues that challenged traditional understandings of timekeeping 
concepts.   
In addition to Lyons’ group at NBS, and Essen’s at NPL, there were many groups 
who worked on the development of atomic clocks during the years following World War 
II, all indebted to Rabi’s molecular beam resonance work, and almost all having 
personally worked with Rabi at some point in their careers. These included groups led 
Jerrold Zacharias at MIT, Charles Townes at Columbia University, and Norman Ramsey 
at Harvard University. Rabi was a prominent figure in 20th century American physics, 
and played a role in creating and disseminating what I have been referring to as the 
pragmatic culture of postwar American physics. John S. Rigden begins his celebratory 
biography of Rabi with the line, “When Isidor Isaac Rabi retired from Columbia 
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University in 1968, he embodied the spirit of American physics.”59 Rigden describes how 
although Rabi was an experimentalist, he also carried out theoretical work, and to a great 
extent exemplified the ideal of the union of theory and experiment in American physics. 
Rigden presents a picture of Rabi as deeply interested in practical applications of his 
work, and committed to contributing to society through science. Further, Rigden makes 
the case that Rabi’s pragmatic sense of professional purpose had a far-reaching impact on 
the culture of postwar American physics. Rigden describes how on the occasion of Rabi’s 
retirement from Columbia in 1967, many prominent physicists spoke of the extent of 
Rabi’s impact on the field. For example, Rabi’s former colleague Jerrold Zacharias 
presented a “Rabi Tree,” which displayed the deep, pervasive lines of Rabi’s influence.60  
Almost all of the physicists involved in early work on atomic clocks and 
standards worked directly with Rabi. They shared a common orientation to physics, 
involving a vision of what it meant to be a physicist embodied by Rabi, who served as a 
mentor and model for many members of the profession. It was within the framework of 
this vision that Lyons, Essen, as well as Markowitz began their efforts to develop an 
atomic clock and atomic time standard. 
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3. Lyons, Essen, and Markowitz 
3.1 Lyons and the Ammonia Clock 
One of the first people to directly apply themselves to the task of building an atomic 
clock was Harold Lyons, working at the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS) during 
and after World War II.  Harold Lyons was trained as a physicist, earning his PhD in 
nuclear physics from the University of Michigan in 1939. After receiving his degree, he 
worked for the Naval Research Laboratories for two years before joining NBS in 1941. 
Upon joining NBS, Lyons worked in the frequency standards division created for radar 
purposes during the war.  As radar frequencies were pushed into the microwave region, a 
specific microwave frequency standards division was created in 1944. Harold Lyons was 
made head of this microwave standards division, which continued to operate after the 
war.61 
 The National Bureau of Standards was founded in 1901, as the US federal 
government’s first physical research laboratory.62 The institution was created to establish 
and provide standards to US science and industry, and function as an adjunct of the 
federal government.63 During the first fifty years of its operation, scientists at NBS 
carried out a wide range of projects, involving standards for electricity and railways, 
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public utilities, industrial materials, radio waves, and many other applications. 64 NBS 
aided the American efforts in both world wars; during World War II, one of its major 
projects involved the standardization of frequencies used in radar, as well as the effects of 
various weather factors on radar signals.65 Radar work carried out in Lyons’ microwave 
standards division of NBS during the war often involved the ammonia molecule, as the 
transition frequency between two polarizations of the molecule fell in the microwave 
region of the frequency spectrum. After the war, Lyons applied himself to the 
development of an ammonia clock based on these microwave transitions, which he 
unveiled to the public in 1948.66  
Lyons’ ammonia clock involved a thirty-foot copper tube filled with ammonia 
gas, with fifty percent of the molecules in one polarization and fifty percent in another.  
Microwaves were sent through one end of the tube and detected by a sensor at the other 
end of the tube.  If the applied frequency corresponded to the transition frequency 
between the two polarizations, the molecules in the lower energy state would absorb a 
photon and jump to the higher state.  If a photon was absorbed, it would not reach the 
other end of the tube.  The resonant frequency thus corresponded to the applied frequency 
that resulted in the lowest photon intensity at the end of the tube.  When the resonant 
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microwave frequency was reached, it was used to tune a quartz crystal oscillator, which 
produced the electrical pulses that counted off seconds.67 
The principle behind Lyons’ clock was similar in many ways to that which 
governed future atomic clocks. It involved the tuning of an applied frequency to the 
frequency of radiation emitted during a quantum change of state, through the 
establishment of a resonance effect. At a basic level it was a frequency standard for 
photons absorbed or emitted during a transition between the two ammonia polarizations. 
The frequency of photons emitted in the ammonia transitions was known to be 23,870 
cycles/second; thus, after resonance was established through the tuning process, the 
applied frequency was known to a high degree of precision.68 In theory, if one could then 
count the number of cycles in the applied radiation in a given time interval, one could 
determine how many seconds had passed. Thus, another tuning process was necessary to 
connect the ammonia device to an object, like a quartz clock, that could count seconds in 
a measurable way. This raises the question: at what point does a device like the ammonia 
clock become a clock? In a process that involves fine-tuning in two instances – first of 
the applied frequency to the transition frequency, and then of the applied frequency to a 
counting device - at what point in the process can time be said to have been measured? 
As we will see in what follows, a further level of complexity was added when this type of 
                                                
67 For technical details on the ammonia clock, see Norman Ramsey, "History of Atomic 
and Molecular Standards of Frequency and Time," IEEE Transactions on 
Instrumentation and Measurement 21 (May, 1972): 90-99. 
68 See “Spectral Lines as Frequency Standards,” Annals of New York Academy of 
Sciences 52 (1952): 831-871.  
 52 
device was tuned to an existing time standard. As will be discussed in greater detail in 
section four, the techniques used in the first atomic devices like the ammonia clock 
complicated questions about the nature of time measurement, as well as the establishment 
and maintenance of a standard unit of time, within the context of a system of resonance 
and fine-tuning.  
Lyons put a great deal of effort into the presentation of his ammonia clock, which 
was unveiled to the public in 1949. The public perception of the clock was important to 
him, as he highly valued the legacy he created as a physicist.69 As Lyons had hoped, the 
clock received a lot of media attention, often involving the iconic publicity photo in 
which the tube containing ammonia was wrapped around a traditional clock face.70 The 
headlines about the ammonia device often presented Lyons’ clock as a triumph over 
nature on the part of scientists, rendering natural time obsolete. For example, on January 
7, 1949 the Chicago Tribune ran the headline “An ‘Atomic Clock’ Promises to Outdo the 
Earth on Accuracy” and the New York Times ran many headlines along the same lines, 
including the December 28, 1948 headline “Atomic Clock Truer than Earth Rotation”. 
Lyons’ clock is often referred to as the first functional atomic clock. It has also 
been described as an “embarrassment” and a “failure”.71 This is because the ammonia 
clock was far less accurate than other already existing clocks, and never ran for more than 
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a few hours. Discouraged with the ammonia clock project, Lyons and his team at NBS 
dedicated all of their future efforts toward building a cesium beam device that would 
function as a clock.72 
 
3.2 Essen and the Cesium Clock 
Louis Essen joined the UK National Physics Laboratory (NPL) in 1928 and worked 
extensively on radio frequency, specializing in microwave synthesis during World War 
II. The British government founded NPL as an attempt to forge a relationship between 
the government and scientific research. At the opening in 1902, the Prince of Wales made 
the following comment, expressing the original mandate of NPL:  
I believe that in the National Physical Laboratory we have the first 
instance of the State taking part in scientific research. The object of the 
scheme is, I understand, to bring scientific knowledge to bear 
practically upon our everyday industrial and commercial life, to break 
down the barrier between theory and practice, to effect a union between 
science and commerce.73 
 
Over the first half of the twentieth century, NPL was involved in many projects, 
including applications of aerodynamics, materials testing, and computing.74 It was a 
vehicle for state funded projects, practical applications of theory, and theoretical research 
with the hope of practical applications.75 In 1935, NPL was involved in the invention of 
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radar, and was home to a frequencies standards division during World War II, in which 
Essen worked.76  
 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Essen became extremely interested in 
Lyons’ atomic clock projects, and traveled to the US several times to learn more about 
the atomic clock programs that were underway at the time. As he wrote in his 
autobiographical notes:  
I was naturally interested in [atomic clock] developments although 
spectroscopy was so far out of my field that I did not expect to take an 
active part, that is, until I visited the USA in 1950 and saw the work at 
MIT and Columbia University. Zacharias at the MIT was quite 
enthusiastic and although he was not interested in clock making 
himself he was confident that his technique could be developed to 
form the basis of a time standard.77 
 
Encouraged by what he learned during his US visits, particularly with the progress being 
made on cesium devices, Essen decided there was no reason why he couldn’t build a 
cesium clock himself.78 In the early 1950s he worked with his colleague Jack Parry to 
build a cesium beam clock, which was successfully running by 1955. Lyons had not yet 
completed a cesium device. 
Essen and Parry’s cesium clock involved a beam of cesium atoms exposed to 
applied radiation at the transition frequency between two energy states of the cesium 
atom, which induced the transition within the atoms. At the end of the beam, a magnet 
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filtered out those atoms that had not undergone transitions and a detector then measured 
how many atoms had changed states. The stronger the signal at the detector, the closer 
the applied radiation to the transition frequency. A signal was then sent from the detector 
to the radiation source, locking it at the frequency that produced the strongest signal.  The 
radiation at the locked frequency could then be used to calibrate another object, like a 
quartz crystal, which could count seconds.79 
 
3.3 Markowitz, Essen, and the First Atomic Second 
William Markowitz, an astronomer by training, joined the time services division of the 
US Naval Observatory (UNSO) in 1936. He become the director of the Time Services 
Department as USNO in 1953 and remained at this post until his retirement in 1966. 
During Markowitz’s tenure, the mandate of the Time Service department at USNO was to 
provide precise time to the United States Department of Defense.80 Although civilian 
scientists ran many of the other major observatories in the world, a team of naval officers, 
to whom Markowitz reported, ran USNO. According to Markowitz, there was never any 
discussion of switching USNO to scientist leadership, and Markowitz found its ties to the 
Department of Defense entirely unproblematic.81 Markowitz understood his job to be the 
keeping of time in the way best suited to benefit the US military and the American 
people. Markowitz’s attitude toward his work was formed in the context of the USNO, 
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which was committed to practical applications of timekeeping. His work involved 
providing standard time to the US military and civilians, and his focus was on the 
usefulness of the time signals he supplied.  
Upon learning of various projects to build an atomic clock in the late 1940s, 
Markowitz became increasingly worried that physicists might develop a time standard 
that would not suit the interests of the astronomical community. He felt physicists did not 
understand the concerns of astronomers when it came to standards and the measurement 
of time, and feared that physicists would invent an entirely new time standard bearing no 
relationship to the astronomical standard. Further, he was worried that this would lead to 
the simultaneous use of multiple time standards, resulting in confusion and error. Finally, 
he felt that astronomical time was too embedded in everyday experience to be discounted 
by physicists when developing an atomic time scale.82 As he later reflected, "We live by 
the sun, we wake up and go to sleep by the sun, and astronomical time wasn't going to go 
out of style very rapidly. It was better to have astronomical and atomic time related as 
closely as possible."83 
 As Lyons and others made progress in their work on cesium clocks, Markowitz 
became increasingly concerned with how physicists would define the atomic second.  In 
the early 1950s Markowitz approached Lyons about the possibility of collaborating, but 
Lyons was not interested.  As Markowitz later recounted: 
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It's very interesting that at that particular time, I couldn't get the interest of the Americans 
on the necessity for getting the frequency of cesium in terms of the [astronomical] 
second. […]  I approached the Bureau of Standards.  Dr. Lyons was in charge of the 
projects on the first atomic clocks.  He just didn't understand and said, ‘Our time is going 
to be so accurate, we don't need the astronomical time.’84 
 
Markowitz approached other physicists as well, hoping to collaborate, but none were 
interested. As he put it, 
Dr. Townes was not interested, he told me, in trying to obtain 
the frequency of cesium. He was a physicist and wanted to make a 
device that was highly accurate and could be used for various purposes 
in physics, and didn't have the time, facilities, or inclination for making 
measurements. Of the people I talked to in the U.S. none had the 
experience with time or frequency and didn't see what the problem was; 
they just knew that the atomic clock was going to be of superlative 
excellence. When I went to MIT and talked to Dr. Zacharias, and saw 
the equipment being made and what was proposed, it seemed to me that 
they were on the verge of making an atomic clock, but again I could not 
get anyone to make measurements once the atomic clock was built.85 
 
After being rebuffed by the American physicists working on clocks, Markowitz 
approached Essen at NPL in 1955, who was eager to collaborate.86 As Markowitz 
describes: 
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Not having had in getting any luck with an American physicist with a 
clock nearing completion who would cooperate with ephemeris time, I 
then tried my luck in Europe. Around June 1955 I heard the news that 
Dr. Essen and Parry had successfully achieved the resonance frequency 
of cesium. In August 1955 the IAU held its triannual meeting in Dublin 
Ireland. I met with Dr. Essen and said "I understand you have a cesium 
oscillator working". He said yes, and I said […] I propose we work 
together jointly, the Naval Observatory and the National Physical 
Laboratory, to get the frequency of cesium in terms of the ephemeris 
second. He agreed and the collaboration of the two institutions started 
then.87 
 
Before Essen finished his cesium device, Markowitz had worked furiously on developing 
a special technique to establish quickly and accurately what is referred to as “ephemeris 
time”, which by the 1950s was the most precise astronomical time standard in use. 
Ephemeris time derives from the motion of the earth in its orbit around the sun, defining 
the second as 1/31 566 925 of the tropical year.88 Over the course of the first half of the 
twentieth century, astronomers had begun to favor ephemeris time over universal time, 
universal time being based on the revolution of the earth about its axis.  This was 
primarily because precise quartz clocks had shown that the rotation of the earth was 
slowing down consistently, speeding up from time to time, and by no means stable. 
Ephemeris time is effectively a measure of the variable “𝑡” in Newtonian mechanics as 
applied to planetary motions, and therefore observations of the motion of any orbiting 
object could be measured to extrapolate the time of the earth’s orbit around the sun. In 
the early 1950s, observations of the motion of the moon around the earth were used to 
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determine ephemeris time, as the moon's relatively high speed allowed for the most 
precise results. Markowitz believed that if the atomic second was to be based on an 
astronomical time standard, it had to be calibrated to the ephemeris second and not the 
universal second.89 
 Markowitz felt the urgency of calibrating any future atomic time standard to the 
ephemeris time standard; however, this first required that the ephemeris time standard be 
sufficiently established. In the early 1950s the process of determining ephemeris time 
was a long and drawn-out process. In order to measure the motion of the moon, 
photographs were taken to determine the moments when particular stars were eclipsed by 
one edge of the moon. However, the techniques used to photograph the moon had serious 
technical limitations, requiring a vast number of photographs in order to produce reliable 
results. It generally took nearly three years from the time of an initial photograph to draw 
any conclusions. Markowitz could not wait that long - he needed a quick and 
transmittable ephemeris time standard before the first highly accurate cesium clock was 
built. In order to solve this problem, Markowitz invented a new type of camera, referred 
to as the ‘moon camera,’ that could take highly accurate pictures of the moon in relation 
to the stars.90 The result was that far fewer pictures were needed to calculate ephemeris 
                                                
89 USNO interview of Markowitz by Dick.  
90 See Figure 1.2 for a picture of Markowitz with his moon camera. The camera allowed 
for a long exposure time without trailing the moon or the stars as they moved through the 
sky.  The long exposure time allowed more distant stars to show up in the pictures.  
Further, the camera was able to filter out some of the light from the moon, which often 
prevented the fainter stars from being showing up in the pictures.  As described by 
William Markowitz in interview Steven Dick, 18 August 1987.  
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time, eliminating the three-year wait. Markowitz invented the moon camera with the 
primary purpose of determining the ephemeris time standard with enough precision and 
consistency to calibrate a cesium clock to ephemeris time. 
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Figure 1.2: William Markowitz with his moon camera 
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 Once Essen’s cesium standard was up and running in 1955, Markowitz and Essen 
applied themselves to the task of calibrating the device to the ephemeris time standard 
established with the pictures taken with Markowitz's moon camera. To do so, Markowitz 
communicated ephemeris time to Essen through radio signals, and Essen used the radio 
signals to determine the fluctuations in the universal second according to ephemeris time.  
Over the same period, Essen determined the fluctuations in the universal second using the 
cesium frequency. Both the cesium frequency and the ephemeris frequency registered 
identical fluctuations in the universal second, which for Essen and Markowitz confirmed 
the stability of the ephemeris second. It was then a matter of calibrating the cesium 
frequency to ephemeris time. In 1958, Essen and Markowitz published their results in 
Physical Review Letters, stating that “a second of ephemeris time was found to equal 
9,192,631,770 cycles of the cesium frequency.”91 With this number, the second of the 
first atomic time standard was defined. It is the standard value of the atomic second still 
in use today.  
 The collaboration between Markowitz and Essen to establish the first atomic 
standard was influenced by Markowitz’s specific agenda with respect to the future of 
astronomy and astronomical time standards in timekeeping. Markowitz believed that the 
atomic time standard needed to be defined in terms of the most current astronomical 
value, and this belief played a role in giving the standard atomic second the precise form 
it has today. Markowitz’s belief was founded in his disciplinary allegiance to astronomy, 
                                                
91 William Markowitz et. al., “Frequency of Cesium in Terms of Ephemeris Time,” 
Physical Review Letters, (August 1, 1958), 106. 
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as well as his belief in the necessary connection between time and human experience. 
This set of beliefs led Markowitz to develop the techniques needed to for an easily 
obtainable and stable ephemeris standard, which ensured that the second was defined in 
accordance of the most current astronomical techniques. For Markowitz, keeping the 
second tied to an astronomical standard meant the second remained in keeping with an 
understanding of time in relation to human experiences of change. While not as 
immediately connected to everyday experience as change between light and dark based 
on the rotation of the earth on its axis, ephemeris time was still tied to the motion of the 
earth. Ephemeris time involved a classical notion of time, based on Newton’s equations, 
which presupposed a fundamental relationship between the Newtonian variable “𝑡” and 
planetary motions. It was tied to the motion of the earth, and thus to human experience of 
change. Atomic timekeeping presupposed a relationship between “𝑡” and electromagnetic 
frequencies. By calibrating atomic time to ephemeris time, the classical notion of time, in 
relation to planetary motion, was kept in harmony with the new atomic notion. 
The establishment of the atomic second involved the tuning of several elements to one 
another. The applied electromagnetic frequency was tuned to the frequency of photon 
emissions from transitions within cesium atoms, through the establishment of resonance 
and a feedback loop. This was in turn tuned to a quartz crystal. Further, this whole 
apparatus was tuned to the radio signals Markowitz used to distribute ephemeris time. 
This process suggests a series of conceptual questions. Is the concept of “time” consistent 
in all of the elements being brought together? Further, at what point in the series of 
calibrations is a measure of time actually determined? These questions will be explored 
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in more detail in section four below, as I draw conclusions about different ways in which 
timekeeping concepts were at stake during these early days of atomic time.  
 
3.4 Institutional Context for Atomic Time 
Lyons, Essen, and Markowitz all conducted their research within institutions supported 
by government agencies. In each case, the institutional mandate involved providing 
society with useful scientific applications. These institutions fostered a particular 
understanding of the purpose of science, which influenced the professional identities of 
the scientists working within them. In addition to the specific mandates of each 
institution, which were established well before World War II, the pragmatic cultures of 
each institution became further entrenched during wartime. Each institution was 
mobilized in the war effort, particularly with respect to radar research, and the success of 
this effort contributed to the pragmatic attitudes of the scientists involved. These 
scientists understood themselves to a certain degree as scientist-citizens, according to the 
example set by Rabi, and in this capacity were not interested philosophical or speculative 
issues surrounding their fundamental concepts.  
Nearly all of the scientists who worked on early atomic timekeeping personally 
worked on radar research during World War II. The MIT Radiation Laboratory was 
turned into the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics following World War II, which 
is where Jerrold Zacharias worked to develop the Atomichron, his compact and 
 65 
transportable atomic clock.92 Atomic clock development at NBS also emerged out of 
research programs developed for frequency standardization for radar purposes during the 
war.93  Further, the National Physics Laboratory, where Louis Essen built his clock, 
played an important role in the invention of radar. 94 All of the physicists working on 
atomic time worked on wartime radar projects that were continuous with atomic clock 
projects. The story of the development of atomic clocks is firmly rooted in postwar 
physics, with atomic clocks developing as a practical extension of wartime radar 
research. The scientists involved in atomic timekeeping belonged to a culture built 
around radar work, which was bound up with the widespread influence of Rabi’s 
approach to physics. As a result, these physicists weren’t interested in philosophical 
puzzles as had been other groups, generations, and communities of physicists.95 
Fundamental theory was important to many of them, but this importance was joined with 
the possibility of practical applications. These physicists did not see speculative questions 
like “what is time?” as belonging to their projects.  Yet as section four below will discuss, 
despite the fact that these physicists weren’t interested speculating about the nature of 
                                                
92 See As described in Paul Forman, “Atomichron ®: The Atomic Clock from Concept to 
Commercial Product,” Proceedings of the IEEE, 73 (1985) 
93 See See David R. Lide, A Century of Excellence in Measurements, Standards, and 
Technology, US: CRC Press, 2002. 
94 See http://www.npl.co.uk/about/history/ 
95 See David Kaiser, How The Hippies Saved Physics, New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2011. 
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fundamental concepts, their work brought about implicit shifts in their discourse about 
the nature of time.  
 
4. Atomic Timekeeping Concepts 
The development of atomic clocks significantly altered the conceptual landscape of 
timekeeping. Atomic clocks were different in kind from older forms of clock, due to their 
potential to simultaneously act as time standards and time measuring devices, as well as 
the principles of resonance and fine tuning on which they were based. Atomic clocks 
blurred the boundary between frequency standards, time standards, and clocks, resulting 
in a change in the how these entities were understood. In what follows, I will focus in on 
the ways in which three timekeeping concepts – “clock”, “second”, and “time” – were 
called into question during this period. By doing so, I will show the different assumptions 
that various physicists and astronomers made about the nature of time and timekeeping in 
the late 1940s and 1950s. Through this, I will reveal a multiplicity of understandings of 
the concepts of “clock”, “second” and “time” in an atomic context, as well as the 
presuppositions that conditioned these timekeeping concepts.  
 
4.1 What is a Clock? 
During the early years of atomic timekeeping, a form of priority dispute unfolded 
surrounding the question of who built the first atomic clock. This dispute was fueled in 
part by the fact that different actors had conflicting ideas about what makes an atomic 
clock a clock, disagreeing over which device counted as the first atomic clock. Lyons and 
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Essen’s devices were only two of many that were described as the first atomic clock: 
candidates included the first established frequency standard, the first frequency standard 
involving a feedback loop, the first frequency standard that could count seconds, the first 
frequency standard that was self-contained and transportable, and the first frequency 
standard that operated as a time standard. Atomic clock technology put the concept of a 
clock in flux, requiring a renegotiation of the meaning of “clock” in an atomic context. 
Lyons and Essen both believed they had built the first atomic clock, and when weighing 
in on the priority question often accused one another of not understanding the stakes. For 
example, Lyons accused Essen of not understanding the difference between a clock and a 
time standard, claiming Essen had built a time standard and not a clock.96 To underscore 
the fact that Essen did not understand the difference between a clock and a standard, he 
described a meeting he and Essen had both attended as follows:  
 
Essen proposed at this meeting that a quartz clock could be developed 
as a primary standard exceeding any other development.  Since this is a 
macroscopic standard whose frequency depends on the particular 
quartz crystal[…] this proposal betrays a lack of understanding of what 
a standard should be.97  
 
Essen himself spoke as though he had built the first clock, describing his completion of 
clock as “the birth of atomic time, because much to our surprise it was another year 
                                                
96 Harold Lyons to Paul Forman, 6 May 1985. Harold Lyons Atomic Clocks Collection, 
Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, 
Washington, D.C. 
97 Ibid. 
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before any [atomic] clocks were working in the USA.”98  Further, historian of science 
Paul Forman, who spent many years researching the history of atomic clocks, believed 
that neither Lyons nor Essen’s devices counted as clocks.  In a survey paper of the history 
of atomic clocks, Forman wrote,  
 
Never was the NPL cesium-beam apparatus – any more than the NBS – 
operated as an atomic clock.  Nonetheless, it is not without some reason 
that it is commonly cited as the first cesium clock.  By establishing a 
value for the cesium frequency with all the precision of the most 
advanced astronomical time scales, Essen met the first pre-condition 
for the establishment of an atomic standard of time interval that could 
challenge and displace the astronomical.99 
 
The question of who invented the first atomic clock illustrates the lack of consensus over 
the nature of a clock during this period. The idea of an atomic clock was still novel, and 
whether or not a particular atomic device counted as a clock was up for debate. The 
blurred boundaries between clocks, frequency standards, and time standards partially 
resulted from the fact that atomic clocks did not function like other clocks; with multiple 
levels of tuning, resonance, and feedback, it was unclear which components were 
necessary for a clock to exist, or where the essence of a clock lay within the system. 
There was no clear answer to the question of who invented the atomic clock, because at 
                                                
98 Essen, Time For Reflection. 
99 Forman, “Atomichron ®: The atomic clock from concept to Commercial Product,” 
1189.  Forman believed Jerrold Zacharias’ clock to be the first atomic clock, because it 
was compact and transportable.  Harold Lyons disagreed in 1985 correspondence with 
Paul Forman, arguing that Zacharias had made an advance engineering but not physics. 
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the time when the first atomic clocks were being built, there was no definitive concept of 
what an atomic clock was. This being said, the physicists and astronomers involved did 
not ask the question “what is a clock”, even though the instruments they used for their 
most basic and precise measurements were being called into question. This was partially 
due to their pragmatic professional identities, in the postwar context of the government 
institutions in which they worked. As a result, they accused one another of being 
misguided, and often spoke past one another. As opposed to thinking about how the 
concept of a clock needed to be reconsidered, they accused one another of not properly 
understanding the nature of timekeeping.  
 
4.2 What is a Second? 
Along similar lines, debates over how to define the atomic second complicated the way 
physicists and engineers understood the nature of the basic unit of time. What factors 
needed to be taken into account when developing a new definition of the second, and 
why? What, if anything, is essential and/or universal about the second? Are time 
measures inherently linked to the cycles of days and seasons as experienced on earth? As 
this chapter has shown, Markowitz believed it was important to keep the definition of the 
second connected to the astronomical second, which was tied to the contingent human 
experience a of time on Earth. Lyons, on the other hand, was less concerned with such 
contingencies, believing accuracy to be the only major concern when developing a time 
standard. For a physicist like Lyons, time standards could be decoupled from contingent 
human experiences and could be established solely through resonance effects. Lyons and 
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Essen’s positions on this point reveal two different visions of how a time standard could 
and should be defined. The nature of a second, and the meaning and purpose of a time 
standard, needed to be renegotiated in the context of these two positions. 
 The development of atomic clocks transformed the concept of a time standard, 
and in turn the concept of a second. Atomic clocks combined time standards and time 
measuring devices together in a single physical object, blurring the line between a time 
standard and a clock. Further, these devices functioned as time standards through the 
establishment of resonance, feedback loops, and the fine-tuning of an applied frequency 
to a known frequency. This system was different in kind from the processes used to 
extrapolate a time standard from astronomical observations. To what extent were the two 
processes continuous, and to what extent did an atomic time standard represent an entire 
new concept of a measure of time? This question was at stake in the 1950s and 60s, as 
physicists and astronomers forged out a new atomic definition of the second. 
 There were several novel interfaces out of which the atomic definition of the 
second emerged. First, there was the interface between the different elements of the 
clock: the applied radiation, the cesium atoms, and then the traditional quartz crystal 
clock. It was through the process of coordinating of these elements that the atomic second 
came into being, and this process continues to define the second. This type of 
coordination now lies at the heart of a time standard, and has come to define what it 
means to determine a time measure. Further, there was the interface between the Essen’s 
cesium device and the ephemeris time Markowitz transmitted through radio signals. This 
process of coordination involved the calibration of the ephemeris and cesium standards to 
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a third time standard, universal time, in order to demonstrate the consistency of the 
cesium and ephemeris standards. Finally, atomic time brought the Newtonian variable 
“𝑡”, which was presupposed in ephemeris time, together with the variable “𝑡” that was 
presupposed in the definition of the frequencies established in the cesium device. Thus, 
the establishment of the atomic second emerged out of a series of co-ordinations at a 
variety of interfaces, all of these interfaces novel to timekeeping. 
 The concept of a second, as a standard unit of time measurement, was in flux 
during the early years of atomic timekeeping for a variety of reasons. The notion of a 
time standard was destabilized because atomic devices blurred the boundaries between a 
clock and a standard; further, the relation between time measures and the human 
experience of change was up for debate. Finally, the coordination process involved in the 
development of an atomic time standard brought together various understandings of a 
measure of time at a variety of interfaces. All of this contributed to the novel way in 
which the atomic second came into being.  
 
4.3 What Is Time? 
What does a clock measure? What does a second capture? The concept of time is bound 
up with clocks and time standards; thus, changes in the ways physicists understood clocks 
and time standards affected how they understood time in general. The changes that took 
place in timekeeping during 1940s and 1950s reveal how heterogeneous and multifaceted 
the concept of time was during this period. During the early days of atomic timekeeping 
it was common to refer to different types of time, for example astronomical time or 
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physical time, and each type of time brought with it a particular set of meanings and 
associations. Time was and a heterogeneous concept, used by different people for 
different purposes. For some it was bound up with the cycles of human experience, while 
for others it was deeply bound to resonance frequencies. Time did not have a fixed 
meaning or set of meanings, yet time was nevertheless a foundational concept 
presupposed in the multiplicity of other timekeeping concepts.  What, if anything, held all 
of these concepts together? 
 The development of the atomic second brought together two different theoretical 
understandings of time – the Newtonian variable “𝑡”, which was tied to intuitive 
understandings of motion, including the orbits of the planets, and the variable “𝑡”  as it 
was understood in terms of electromagnetic frequencies. Prior to atomic timekeeping, the 
more intuitive notion of “𝑡” from Newtonian physics had defined the second; with the 
atomic definition, a less intuitive “𝑡” took over. And while there was some objection, by 
those like Markowitz, who felt the “𝑡” associated with planetary motions was the more 
practical standard, everybody involved, including Markowitz, took for granted that these 
concepts of “𝑡” were commensurable. Decisions had to be made about how to define the 
time conventions used by scientists and disseminated internationally; nevertheless, these 
decisions presupposed a truth of time, underlying all of physical theory and measurement, 
which was more fundamental than the conventions up for debate. Time was a 
heterogeneous concept, and multiple understandings of time were at play during this 
period; nevertheless, the scientists involved upheld a basic presupposition about the truth 
and commensurability of the multiplicity of “𝑡”’s of physical theory. In chapter two of 
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this dissertation I will look more closely to physicists’ presuppositions about time as a 
physical variable “𝑡”. After the present analysis of time as a unit of measure, which 
reveals the contingencies, values, and agendas at work in the development of atomic 
timekeeping, I will look to changes in understandings of time as a physical variable, the 
truth of which was presupposed by the scientists considered in this chapter. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The efforts of Markowitz, Lyons, and Essen to develop atomics clock and time standards 
belonged a new era of atomic time that complicated traditional timekeeping concepts. 
Neither of these three men, nor others involved in the early days of atomic timekeeping, 
explicitly asked questions about the meaning of timekeeping concepts, for to do so would 
have fallen outside of the professional boundaries they set for themselves. Nevertheless, 
the clocks and standards they developed were different in kind from those that had come 
before, and fundamental questions about basic concepts were implicitly raised in their 
work. The meanings of these concepts were at stake in the priority dispute over who 
invented the first atomic clock, as is revealed through the lack of consensus surrounding 
which device counted as the first atomic clock. In addition, the question of how to define 
the second -  in terms of the relationship between the astronomical second and the atomic 
second, as well as the changes in the specific techniques used to establish the atomic 
second - showed how the concept of the second was by no means fixed. While the 
physicists and astronomers involved were not concerned with fundamental questions, and 
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did not speculate about the nature of time per se, conceptual changes and multiplicities 
arose out of their work. 
 The fact that scientists didn’t discuss the nature of time keeping concepts can be 
partially explained by the pragmatic culture within the institutions that supported atomic 
clock research during this period, as well as the tone set by influential physicists in the 
field such as Rabi. The institutions in which these physicists worked fostered a pragmatic 
approach to physics, due both to government involvement and the wartime legacy of 
radar research. This was in addition to the continuity between the wartime work of the 
physicists involved and their work on atomic clocks. The fact that these physicists did not 
speculate about the nature of time adds contour to the nature of the pragmatic, postwar 
culture of atomic timekeeping. It shows that these physicists felt that deep probing into 
the nature of their basic concepts was beside the point of their work, and did not consider 
speculating about such questions. In chapters two and three, I will contrast this attitude 
with other communities of postwar physicists who had more expansive visions of the role 
of the physicist, and allowed some room for philosophical speculation within their 
profession.    
 Atomic time came into being within the context of several historical 
contingencies, particularly the tensions between astronomy and physics and between 
universality and contingency. Human agendas and values went into the definition of the 
atomic second, which should not be taken for granted as objectively true. Further, the 
status of the ideal of the universality of time measures in relation to the contingency of 
time, as well as the disciplinary role of astronomers in relation to physicists with respect 
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to timekeeping, was at stake during this period. Timekeeping concepts were in flux 
within the context of these contingencies; nevertheless, the physicists and astronomers 
involved presupposed that there was a truth about time that conditioned the various 
devices and standards they built. The time of physics theory – the variable “𝑡”, and the 
connection between this variable, different theories, and time keeping conventions - was 
taken for granted throughout this period. Chapter two will consider the notion of time as a 
physics variable per se, considering developments that complicated this further layer of 
the concept of time. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Discovery of CP Violation: Physics, Fundamentality, and the Arrow of Time 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1964, high-energy particle physicists Val Fitch and James Cronin conducted an 
experiment for which they won the 1980 Nobel Prize in Physics. In the years following 
the experiment, both men described insight into the nature of time as one of the reasons 
their results were significant. The relevance of their experiment to the concept of time 
pertained to time-reversal symmetry in physics (T-symmetry), a symmetry principle 
stating that physical laws are not affected by a change in the direction of time. Before 
Fitch and Cronin’s experiment, particle physicists assumed that T-symmetry was 
universally valid; however, the experiment implied that T-symmetry is violated during 
certain rare physical processes. According to Fitch and Cronin, the implied violation of 
T-symmetry offered deep insight into the nature of time, one of the most fundamental 
concepts in physics. Val Fitch opened his Nobel Prize acceptance speech by stating that 
the violation of T-symmetry “touches on our understanding of nature at its deepest 
level.”100 Or, as James Cronin wrote in a 1982 article for Physics Today, the violation of 
                                                
100 Val Fitch, “The Discovery of Charge-Conjugation Parity Asymmetry,” 1980 Nobel 
Lecture in Nobel Lectures in Physics: 1971-1980 (New Jersey: World Scientific, 1992). 
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T-symmetry “matter[s] because it relates to one’s fundamental understanding of space 
and time.”101 
 The asymmetry of physical systems under time reversal has been a source of 
discussion among physicists and philosophers since the nineteenth century, primarily 
with respect to the second law of thermodynamics.102 An asymmetry under time reversal 
is built into second law of thermodynamics, which describes the tendency of the entropy 
of a system to increase in time. At the time of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment, there was a 
consensus within the scientific community that this asymmetry was attributable to the 
contingent boundary conditions of a system, and particularly to the low entropy state of 
the universe at the time of the big bang.103 However, the asymmetry implied by Fitch and 
Cronin’s experiment was of a fundamentally different nature than that associated with 
increasing entropy. Fitch and Cronin’s experiment implied that the direction of time 
affects physical processes even when the initial and final conditions are reversed. This 
meant that questions about the direction of time in relation to physical processes, which 
physicists had generally agreed was resolved, could be reopened.   
                                                
101 James Cronin, “CP Symmetry Violation,” Physics Today (June, 1982): 38. 
102 For an overview of this topic, see for example Huw Price, Time’s Arrow and 
Archimedes’ Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sean Carroll, From Eternity 
to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Thoery of Time (New York: Dutton, 2010); or David 
Albert, Time and Chance (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
103 This idea was first proposed by Boltzmann. For a discussion of boundary conditions in 
thermodynamics, see Craig Calendar, “Thermodynamic Asymmetry in Time," Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-thermo/ . 
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Debates surrounding time reversal symmetry in relation to thermodynamics have 
involved a wide range of philosophical issues. For example, debates about the nature of 
time in the nineteenth century, catalyzed by issues surrounding time reversal in 
thermodynamics, involved questions ranging from determinism to free will to 
conceptions of God. Further, philosophical thinkers who have discussed time reversal in 
the context of thermodynamics in the twentieth century have identified connections 
between time reversal symmetry and philosophical questions about consciousness, 
experience, and the nature of reality.104 However, the violation of T-symmetry implied by 
Fitch and Cronin’s experiment has not been the subject of the same types of 
conversations among physicists and philosophers as the asymmetry associated with 
thermodynamics. There has been a small amount of philosophical attention to the 
violation of T-symmetry among analytic philosophers of science, although such 
discussion has been marginal among larger philosophical debates about the physics of 
time.105 Further, questions about how the violation of T-symmetry provides insight into 
the nature of time, and why such insight is profound, have neither been asked nor 
answered by the physicists involved in the discovery. In several articles and interviews, 
Fitch and Cronin have explained what time-reversal asymmetry literally means – ie. that 
                                                
104 See, for example, Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Mineola, New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc.,1956).  
105 For example, Craig Callendar, “Is Time ‘Handed’ in a Quantum World?” Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 100 (2000): 247. 
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certain physical process behave differently when the direction of time is reversed.106  
However, they have never offered any reflection on how this asymmetry can provide 
insight into the concept of time. When asked how their work sheds light on the concept of 
time, both Fitch and Cronin dismissed the question as “philosophy,” a domain with which 
they had little to do.  Fitch responded by saying, “That’s a question for a philosopher.  
I’m not a philosopher. […]  It would be somewhat pretentious of me to start thinking 
such […] thoughts; I’m more of a nuts and bolts person.”107  Along similar lines, Cronin 
responded, “I wouldn’t know how to answer that question; I’m a physicist not a 
philosopher”.108  While Cronin and Fitch invoked the concept of time to explain why 
their results were important and profound, they never engaged in any explicit discussion 
of how T-violation affected the concept of time, a discussion they believed to fall outside 
the boundaries of their work and expertise. 
 In this chapter, I will situate Fitch and Cronin’s experiment, along with its 
implications for the concept of time, within the professional boundary between particle 
physics and philosophy in the postwar United States. Beginning with a brief overview of 
the experiment and the implied violation of T-symmetry, I will argue that the manner in 
which Fitch and Cronin discussed the concept of time in relation to their experiment can 
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107 Interview with Val Fitch by the author, March 4, 2011. 
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provide insight into how these physicists understood the boundaries of their discipline. I 
will further argue that these boundaries reflect the way particle physicists understood 
their professional identities during this period, in particular by illuminating a defining 
tension between, on the one hand, asking the deepest and most profound questions about 
the universe, and on the other hand carrying out no-nonsense, practically-minded science.  
Looking at how Cronin and Fitch conceived of the boundary between physics and 
philosophy with respect to the question of time, I will shed light on how these physicists 
understood the nature and purpose of their discipline in relation to philosophical 
questioning. 
 Further, in this chapter I will situate the ways in which postwar particle physicists 
conceptualized time within the theoretical and experimental practices of their 
communities. Drawing upon works in the history of science that have analyzed these 
practices – including Constructing Quarks by Andrew Pickering, How Experiments End 
and Image and Logic by Peter Galison, and Drawing Theories Apart by David Kaiser – I 
will show how variables like time in particle physics were not taken up as objects of deep 
philosophical investigation. This will explain not only why particle physicists themselves 
did not investigate the philosophical implications of Fitch and Cronin’s result, but also 
why this result has not yielded much in the way of philosophical insight by other thinkers 
with more expansive professional identities.   
 
*** 
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Building on chapter one of this dissertation, chapter two adds a further dimension to the 
landscape of professional identities of postwar physicists. While the physicists in chapter 
one were firmly pragmatic in their orientation toward physics, partially due to the 
institutional context in which they were working and the example set by prominent 
physicists within the field, the physicists I consider in chapter two were more open to 
philosophical insights. Fitch and Cronin’s work was technically and empirically-minded 
regarding physics, and yet it raised profound questions about the concept time; thus, it 
inadvertently spoke to a more expansive, philosophical discourse about the nature of 
time. Although not explicitly intended, Fitch and Cronin did not ignore the potential 
philosophical implications of their work, and used fundamental questions about the 
nature of time to explain for the significance and importance of their experiment. This 
being said, Fitch and Cronin never actually engaged in philosophical lines of questioning. 
In this chapter I will suggest a distinction between, on the one hand, how these physicists 
justified the importance of their work, and on the other hand, how they approached their 
work in practice. I will argue that for Fitch and Cronin, the tension between 
fundamentalism and pragmatism in postwar American physics, outlined in the 
introduction to this dissertation, took the form of a distinction between justification and 
practice.109 That is, Fitch and Cronin saw relevance to deep, philosophical questions as a 
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American physics, see Silvan S. Schweber, “The Empiricist Temper Regnant: Theoretical 
Physics in the United States, 1920—1950,” Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, Vol. 17 (1986): 55-98; Alexi Assmus, “The Americanization of 
Molecular Physics,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 23, 
No. 1 (1992):1 – 34; Nancy Cartwright, “Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory”, 
in The Probabilistic Revolution, V2, ed. Lorenz Kruger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
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justification for their work, and yet in practice they embodied the pragmatist tradition in 
which they were trained.  
 Further, in this chapter I will build on the discussion in chapter one of the 
contingencies and presuppositions that conditioned the concept of time during the 
postwar period. In chapter one I looked to the concept of time in the context of 
timekeeping, showing the values and agendas that went into physicists’ understandings of 
the concepts of “clock”, “second”, and time”, revealing the multiplicity of changing 
understandings of these concepts. Further, I noted how despite these changing 
understandings, physicists presupposed that there existed a variable “𝑡”, consistent 
throughout various physical theories, and capable of being captured by clocks. In chapter 
two I will consider this variable “𝑡” directly, in the context of postwar particle physics, to 
understand the way it was at stake during this period. In this way, this chapter will 
contribute to the second line of argumentation that runs through this dissertation, 
concerning the ways American physicists’ concepts of time changed during the postwar 
period, the multiplicity of contingencies and presuppositions that conditioned these 
concepts, and the role that fundamental concepts like time played within physics during 
this period.  
In section two of this chapter I will discuss the details of Fitch and Cronin’s 
experiment, along with some of the major concepts in particle physics required to 
                                                                                                                                            
1990); Peter Galison, How Experiments End (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987); Peter Galison, Image and Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); 
and David Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, and the 
Quantum Revival  (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011). 
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understand these details. I believe it is important to work through these details for several 
reasons. First, they offer a to sense of the type of technical, experimental work Cronin 
and Fitch were doing, which is important when considering the nature of their mix of 
philosophy and pragmatism. Second, these details are necessary to understand the initial 
context and motivations for the experiment, which differed from the way the experiment 
was discussed and justified in the years that followed.  
Following the technical discussion in section two, section three will briefly 
discuss historical debates surrounding question of time reversal symmetry in physics, in 
order to understand the relationship between these debates and the T-violation implied by 
Fitch and Cronin’s experiment. Here I will emphasize the continuity and discontinuity of 
discussions about T-violation in Fitch and Cronin’s experiment with historical 
conversations about time symmetry in physics. In section four I will discuss the perceived 
significance of the CP violation experiment among particle physicists, particularly in 
relation to “deep”, fundamental questions. Section five looks more deeply to the concept 
of time as a variable in the context of the CP violation experiment, as understood within 
the context of theoretical and experimental practices within postwar particle physics. By 
way of conclusion, I will discuss what this episode reveals about the identity of this 
subgroup of postwar particle physicists, and how they are situated within the larger 
context of pre-war and post-war theoretical physics. Further, I will discuss how this 
episode builds on chapter one to reveal a further dimension to the understandings and 
assumptions about the nature of the concept time in the postwar period. 
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2. The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation: Technical Details 
2.1 Discrete Symmetries in Particle Physics 
Within physics, a symmetry principle requires that the laws of physics be the same before 
and after a given change to a system. For example, “space translation” symmetry requires 
that if an experimental apparatus is moved to a different location in space, the results of 
the experiment will remain the same. Similarly, “time-reversal” symmetry (T-symmetry) 
requires that the results of an experiment be the same before and after the direction of 
time is reversed. In addition to T-symmetry, there were two other important symmetry 
principles relevant to Fitch and Cronin’s 1964 experiment. One of these was “space-
inversion symmetry” which requires that an experimental set-up obey the same physical 
laws as its mirror image. Another was “charge-conjugation” symmetry, which requires 
that the laws of physics remain the same when matter is replaced with antimatter. Space-
inversion symmetry and charge-conjugation symmetry are referred to respectively as “P-
symmetry” and “C-symmetry.”110 Prior to 1956, particle physicists assumed that P-
symmetry, C-symmetry, and T-symmetry were universally valid for all physical 
processes. In addition, the prevailing physics theory at the time required that the 
combination of all three symmetries – CPT symmetry –be universally valid.111  
                                                
110 “P” stands for Parity, the quantity that is conserved when space-inversion symmetry is 
valid. Every symmetry principle in physics is associated with a conserved quantity, 
according to “Noether’s Theorem”.  For a discussion of the relationship between 
symmetry principles and conservation laws, see David Griffiths, Introduction to 
Elementary Particles (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 2008), 116-117. 
111 CPT is a direct implication of quantum field theory, and can be traced to the work of 
Julian Schwinger, Wolfgang Pauli, and Gerhart Luders. For a detailed discussion of the 
principles involved, see R. Streater and A. Wightman, PCT, Spin Statistics, and All that 
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The validity of C, P, and T symmetries was first called into question in 1956, 
when Chen Ning Yang and Tsung Dao Lee pointed out that no experiment had ever 
directly tested for the validity of P-symmetry.112 Upon the urgings of Yang and Lee, 
Chien-Shiung Wu carried out an experiment at Columbia University to test for P-
symmetry later that year. The results of the experiment were quickly viewed as definitive 
from within the particle physics community: under certain conditions P-symmetry is 
violated, which is to say the mirror image of an experimental set-up does not always yield 
a mirror image of the results.113 Following the experimental demonstration of the 
violation of P-symmetry by Wu, particle physicists explained the effect in terms of 
properties of the specific particles used in the experiment, referred to as the helicity or 
handedness of particles.114 The phenomenon of P-violation was construed as a result of 
an asymmetry belonging to specific particles; however, the same type of particle-based 
explanation was not possible in the case of Fitch and Cronin’s discovery of CP 
violation.115  
                                                                                                                                            
(New York: W.A. Benjamin, 1964); or S. Schweber, An Introduction to Relativistic 
Quantum Field Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1961). 
112 As described in Chen Ying Yang, “The Law of Parity Conservation and Other 
Symmetry Laws of Physics,” 1957 Nobel Lecture in Nobel Lectures in Physics: 1942-
1962, (New Jersey: World Scientific, 1998). 
113 C.S. Wu et al.  “Experimental Test of Parity Conservation in Beta Decay,” Physical 
Review, 105, (1957): 1413; For an overview of Wu’s experiment, see Allan Franklin, The 
Neglect of Experiment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7-72. 
114 Helicity is can be determined by the relation between direction of motion to the spin 
of a particle. See Griffiths, Introduction to Elementary Particles, 136-142. 
115 See Franklin, The Neglect of Experiment. 
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In response to Wu’s discovery of P-violation, Murray Gell-Mann and Abraham 
Pais proposed that while P-symmetry may not always hold by itself, the combination of 
P-symmetry and C-symmetry – CP symmetry - is never violated.116 Through the proposal 
of the invariance of CP symmetry, Gell-Mann and Pais accomplished several things. 
First, they created a way to preserve the underlying principles of a theory they had 
proposed in 1955, regarding the behavior of certain particle systems under the weak 
interaction.117 Their theory had been founded on the assumption of P-symmetry 
invariance; however, they were able to show how the invariance of CP symmetry would 
be able to preserve the structure of these ideas.118 Second, in combination with the 
requirement that CPT symmetry always be valid, the universal validity of CP symmetry 
was able to preserve the universal validity of T-symmetry. That is, if CPT symmetry is 
always valid, then the invariance CP symmetry implies the validity of T-symmetry. 
Conversely, if CP were to be violated, then T-symmetry would necessarily be violated as 
well. Gell-Mann and Pais believed the invariance of T-symmetry to be a fundamental 
principle; therefore, by proposing CP symmetry invariance, this principle would be 
preserved. In the early 1960s, when Fitch and Cronin conducted their famous experiment, 
                                                
116 As explained in T. D. Lee, R. Oehme, and C. N. Yang, Phys. Rev. 106 (1957): 340. 
117 M. Gell-Mann and A Pais, Physics Review, 97, (1955): 1387. A description of Gell-
Mann and Pais’ original theory can be found in James Cronin, “The Experimental 
Discovery of CP Violation,” Nishina Memorial Lecture, in Lect. Notes Phys. 746 (2008): 
261–280. 
118 For a detailed explanation of how Gell-Mann and Pais used CP invariance to their 
explanation of their theory and predictions, see Cronin, “The Experimental Discovery of 
CP Violation,” 263. 
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CP, T, and CPT were all thought to be universally valid symmetries. Physicists accepted 
that P-symmetry was occasionally violated, and thus C-symmetry was violated in the 
same instances; however, these symmetry violations were attributed to the helicities of 
specific particles.  
 
2.2 The Experiment 
In 1963, both Val Fitch and James Cronin were Princeton professors, conducting 
experiments at the Brookhaven National Physics Laboratory in Upton, New York.119 
James Cronin had received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1955, and soon 
after had joined a group of Princeton physicists working at a new Brookhaven particle 
accelerator, known as the Cosmotron.120 During WWII Fitch had worked on the 
Manhattan project for three years, before finishing an undergraduate degree at McGill 
University. He went on to complete his Ph.D. in Physics at Columbia University in 1954. 
He took a position at Princeton late 1954, which brought him to Brookhaven. During the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, Fitch and Cronin got know each other at Brookhaven, often 
discussing physics over lunch in the Brookhaven cafeteria.121 
In 1963, Cronin and Fitch began to discuss the possibility of conducting an 
experiment to search for an anomaly that another group of physicists had reported, 
                                                
119 For more detail on the history of the Brookhaven laboratory, see Robert Crease, 
Making Physics: A Biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
120 James Cronin, “Autobiography,” Nobelprize.org . 
121 Val Fitch, “Autobiography,” Nobelprize.org . 
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involving particles called neutral kaons. Fitch and Cronin’s primary motivation for the 
experiment was to test for this anomaly, which had been detected in a newly established 
effect called “regeneration.”122 Cronin had an experimental set-up that would be able to 
test for this anomaly, with which he was already working with at Brookhaven. This 
apparatus involved spark chambers detectors that he built himself. Fitch was interested in 
the anomalous effect due to its potential relevance to a set of experiments he had been 
conducting at Brookhaven.123 Fitch and Cronin’s secondary objective in conducting the 
experiment was to test what they referred to as “CP invariance”, and determine the extent 
to which CP symmetry was known to be valid to a greater degree of accuracy. Their third 
and final objective was look for the presence or absence of “neutral currents” in their 
apparatus. As stated in their proposal for funding for the experiment: 
The Present Proposal was largely stimulated by the recent anomalous 
results of Adair et al, on the coherent regeneration of the K10 mesons. 
It is the purpose of this experiment to check these results with a 
precision far transcending that attained in the previous experiment. 
Other results to be obtained will be a new and much better limit for [CP 
invariance] [and] a new limit for the presence (or absence) of neutral 
currents […].124 
 
In their proposal, Fitch and Cronin described the part of their experiment as that dealt 
with CP symmetry as involving CP “invariance”, although the experiment is now always 
                                                
122 The anomalous effect was published in L. B. Leipuner, W Chinowsky, R. Crittenden, 
R. Adair, B Musgrave, and F. T.  Shively, Phys. Rev. 132 (1963): 2285. 
123 James Cronin, “The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation,” 265. 
124 J. W. Cronin, V.L. Fitch, R. Turlay, “Proposal for K20 Decay and Interaction 
Experiment,” April 10, 1963. As printed in Appendix to: Cronin, “The Experimental 
Discovery of CP Violation”. 
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referred to as the discovery of CP “violation”.125 According to their accounts, they had no 
expectation that they would find evidence of CP symmetry violation.126 As a secondary 
objective, they hoped to use the apparatus, already running to find the anomaly, to test the 
certainty with which CP symmetry invariance was known to be valid. At the time, CP 
invariance was established to an accuracy of two decimal points; Fitch and Cronin 
intended to use their experimental set up to increase this accuracy to three decimal 
points.127  
 Fitch and Cronin’s experiment involved the production of neutral kaons in a 
particle accelerator, and the analysis of the decay products. Neutral kaons exist in two 
states, one with a lifetime on the order of 10-10 seconds, and another with a longer 
lifetime of   10-8 seconds.128 If CP symmetry obtains, kaons in the shorter-lived state will 
always decay to two pions, while kaons in the longer-lived state will decay to three pions.  
The experimental set-up involved a beam of neutral kaons that were allowed to decay in 
the apparatus below. By the time the kaons entered the apparatus, all of the short-lived 
                                                
125 Ibid. 
126 See, for example, Cronin, “The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation”. 
127 Technically the accuracy is referred to as the “upper limit” of the branching ratio for 
the decay of kaons into pions. The upper limit previous known was 1/300 (see D. Neagu 
et. al, “Decay Properties of K20 Mesons” Physical Review Letters, B (1961): 552-553). 
Fitch and Cronin were hoping to extend the upper limit to greater than 1/1000. 
128 The idea that there are two different neutral kaon states, with different lifetimes, 
behaving behave differently under the weak interaction, and superpositions of the 
particles acted on by the stronger interaction, was proposed by Pais and Gell Mann in 
their famous paper, “Behavior of Neutral Particles under Charge Conjugation” Phys. Rev. 
97 (1955): 1387–1389. 
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kaons had decayed. The long-lived kaons decayed in a helium bag, and the decay 
products were tracked in Cronin’s spark chambers, which were located in the arms of the 
apparatus.129 Fitch and Cronin recorded their data in a series of notebooks. Figure 2.3 
below shows the first page of data entry for the portion of the experiment devoted to CP-
symmetry. Note that the section is entitled “CP invariance” as opposed to “CP 
violation”.130  
 The experiment did not immediately run smoothly. As Cronin described in later 
accounts of the experimental process, “This was not a smooth run – it was the real 
world!”131 The notebooks that Cronin and Fitch used to record their data over the course 
of the experiment chart many of the setbacks Fitch and Cronin encountered.132 These 
included technical errors that rendered entire sets of data meaningless, external effects 
unaccounted for that invalidated results, and one occasion during which their apparatus 
was struck by lightening. There were also several instances of human error on the part of 
the various technicians monitoring the experiment, described by Cronin or Fitch in their 
notebook entries.133 
                                                
129 Evidence for the 2π Decay of the 
€ 
K20 Meson,” Physical Review Letters 13 (1964): pp. 
138-140; and James Cronin, The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation, Lect. Notes 
Phys. 746, 261-280 (2008). See figure 2.1 for schematic diagram of the apparatus, and 
figure 2.2 for the only surviving photograph of the apparatus. 
130 Val Fitch and James Cronin, Laboratory Notebooks, 1963, from personal collection of 
Val Fitch.  
131 Cronin, “The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation”. 
132 Fitch and Cronin, Laboratory Notebooks. 
133 Ibid. 
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After running their experiment for several weeks, and spending several more 
analyzing the results, Fitch and Cronin observed that approximately 1/500 neutral kaons 
in the longer-lived state decay to two pions, as opposed to the expected three pions.134  
This was determined by measuring the pion momentum, using the principles of 
conservation of mass and conservation of momentum to determine whether the decay had 
resulted in two charged pions or two charged and one neutral pion. Finally, Fitch and 
Cronin compared their results to Monte Carlo simulations of the expected results, if 3-
pion decay were not admitted. Their results shows that around 1/500 kaons had decayed 
to 3 pions, which was a statistically relevant.135 This implied that CP symmetry was 
occasionally violated, and due to CPT theorem, T-symmetry must be violated in these 
instances as well.  
 
 
 
                                                
134 Ibid. 
135 See figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6; also see Evidence for the 2π Decay of the 
€ 
K20 Meson,” 
Physical Review Letters 13 (1964): pp. 138-140. For a more detailed description of the 
results, see James Cronin, “The Experimental Discovery of CP Violation”. 
 92 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic Diagram of Apparatus, taken from James Cronin et. al.,  “Evidence 
for the 2π Decay of the 
€ 
K20 Meson,” Physical Review Letters 13 (1964): pp. 138-140. 
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Figure 2.2: Photograph of a portion of the apparatus used in the discovery of CP violation 
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Figure 2.3: Page from Fitch and Cronin’s notebooks, from the portion of the experiment 
devoted to testing CP “Invariance”. 
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Figure 2.4: Drawings by James Cronin to explain calculations used to determine CP 
invariance/violation. If the angles of the momenta of the two observed pions added to 
zero, this suggested a 2 pion decay. If the angles did not add to zero, it suggested a 3 pion 
decay. 
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Figure 2.5: Number of Events Versus Cosθ, Compared to Monte Carlo Calculation 
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Figure 2.6: Number of events versus Cosθ for different parent masses. 
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2.3 Reception 
Fitch and Cronin’s results were published in Physics Review Letters a few months after 
they carried out their analysis showing evidence of CP violation.136 The results attracted a 
great deal of attention from within the particle physics community. CP violation was not 
immediately accepted, and several groups proposed alternate explanations for the 
findings, as well as attempted to replicate the experiment.137 In his Nobel lecture, James 
Cronin recalls that  
Upon learning of the discovery in 1964, the natural reaction of our 
colleagues was to ask what was wrong with the experiment. Or, if they 
were convinced of the correctness of the measurements, they asked 
how could the effect be explained while still retaining CP symmetry. I 
remember vividly a special session organized at the 1964 International 
Conference on High Energy Physics at Dubna in the Soviet Union. 
There, for an afternoon, I had to defend our experiment before a large 
group of physicists who wanted to know every detail of the 
experiment.138 
 
After several different groups replicated the results, and eventually all of the alternate 
theories were dismissed, a consensus was reached in the physics community that CP 
symmetry, and indirectly T symmetry, is occasionally been violated.139  
                                                
136 Ibid. 
137 For example, A. Abashian et al, Physics Review Letters, 13 (1964): p. 243. 
138 James Cronin, “CP Symmetry Violation – The Search of Its Origin”. 
139 For a review of replications, see A. Abashian et. al, “Search for CP nonconservation in 
K20 decays,” PRL, 13 (1964), 143-146. For a description of how consensus was achieved, 
See Allan Fraklin, “The Discovery and Acceptance of CP Violation,” Historical Studies 
in the Physical Sciences, 13 (1983): 207-238. 
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 After it was agreed upon that CP violation occasionally occurs in the decay of 
neutral kaons, the question remained whether CP violation occurs in other systems as 
well. Physicists at several labs began searching for CP violation in systems other than the 
neutral kaon system, for example in the decay of B-mesons under the weak interaction. 
CP violation was eventually observed in the B-meson system in experiments conducted 
with accelerators in both the United States and Japan in 2001.140 At the present time, all 
evidence of CP violation has involved the decay of particles involving the weak 
interaction, and it is still an open question whether CP symmetry obtains under other 
forces, particularly the strong force.141 
 In addition to the implied T-violation, there have been other intriguing 
implications of CP violation discovered over the years – for example the possibility that 
CP violation could explain the matter/antimatter asymmetry in the universe.142  The 
possibility that CP violation could be used to explain matter/anti-matter asymmetry was 
first pointed out by Andrei Sarakhov in 1967; however, it was not taken seriously by the 
physics community until the 1980s when the field of cosmology, and questions about 
matter, anti-matter, and the big bang, became a major field of physics research. 143 Yet, as 
                                                
140 A. Abashian et al. Physical Review Letters, 86 (2001): 2509; B. Aubert et. al, Physical 
Review Letters, 86 (2001): p. 2515..  
141 See Griffiths, Introduction to Elementary Particles, 148-149. 
142 F. Wilczek, Scientific American, (December 1980): p. 82. 
143 A.D. Sakharov, "Violation of CP Invariance, C asymmetry, and Baryon Asymmetry of 
the Universe," in Journal of Experimental Theoretical Physics 5 (1967): 24-27; for a 
description of the rise of particle cosmology in the 1980s, see David Kaiser, “Whose 
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we shall see, at the time Fitch and Cronin’s experiment was carried out and during the 
immediate years afterward, Fitch and Cronin referred to bearing on the concept of time as 
one of the major sources of their discovery’s significance. 
 
3. Time Reversal Asymmetry 
What does it mean for T-symmetry to be violated? The idea of time reversal symmetry in 
physics is a technical concept.  It has nothing to do with travelling back in time; nor does 
it refer to the subjective experience of time.144 Time symmetry in physics requires that 
the laws of physics take the same form when the direction of time is positive as opposed 
to negative. Consider an analogy often used to illustrate this point: imagine a film 
recording of a physical system, played first in the forward direction and then in reverse. If 
this system is “time-symmetric,” then the physical laws governing the system will be the 
same in the forward and backward versions of the film – the objects in the film would all 
obey the same laws in both directions. If the system is not time symmetric, then the film 
in reverse would display a system behaving according to a different set of laws. In a 
system that is asymmetric with respect to time, the form of the laws governing a physical 
system could be used to determine whether the film was being run forward or backward. 
                                                                                                                                            
mass is it anyway? Particle cosmology and the objects of theory,” Social Studies of 
Science 36 (August 2006): 533-564. 
144 The fact that human beings experience an asymmetry with respect to time, insofar as 
the ‘remember’ the past and ‘expect’ the future, is beyond the scope of the technical time 
asymmetry, to which CP violation is relevant. 
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In a time symmetric system, the form of the laws of physics would not be able to 
distinguish between the two scenarios. 
 Time reversal symmetry in physics was a controversial issue in the nineteenth 
century field thermodynamics, particularly involving the concept of entropy and the 
second law of thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics is not symmetrical 
under time reversal, insofar as it describes the way in which entropy tends to increase in 
the positive time direction. The time asymmetry of thermodynamics means that one could 
determine whether or not a film of a physical system was running forward or backward 
by observing whether the system progressed to a state of greater or lesser entropy. This 
asymmetry did not apply to Newton’s laws of motion, which would not change form 
when the film was played backward in the backward direction. The discrepancy between 
the time asymmetry of thermodynamics and the symmetry of Newtonian physics was a 
serious cause of concern for many nineteenth century thinkers interested in the nature of 
time in physics. 
 The significance of thermodynamics, and its relationship to the concept of time 
reversal symmetry, was been the subject of lively debate among physicists and 
philosophers alike, in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much of the focus of 
these debates in the nineteenth century was on how to interpret the apparent arrow of 
time built into the second law of thermodynamics, as well as how to reconcile this with 
the seeming time reversibility of laws of mechanics. As mentioned in the introduction, 
these debates also touched upon questions about determinism, free will, consciousness, 
and the nature of reality. However, by the 20th century there was a strong consensus 
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within the physics community that the microscopic laws governing the motion of 
individual particles are time symmetric, and that the apparent time asymmetry of 
macroscopic thermodynamic laws are a product of the statistical behavior of particles at 
the microscopic level, in combination with specific boundary conditions.145 T-violation in 
the kaon system, as indirectly implied by CP violation in 1964, was unique in that it 
appeared to be a product of physical laws, and not contingent boundary conditions. 
Nevertheless, there have not been the same type of debates about the nature of time 
surrounding the T-symmetry violation implied by CP violation as there have been for the 
time-asymmetry of thermodynamics. Why did the conversation surrounding CP violation 
and time take the form that it did?  
 
4. Perceived Significance of CP violation 
Physicists have described the discovery of CP violation, which won Fitch and Cronin the 
1980 Nobel Prize in physics, as an important and groundbreaking result for a variety of 
reasons. One such reason has been the relevance of the discovery for insight into the 
nature of time, particularly relating to time reversal symmetry, although there have been 
many others as well. In most cases, however, the relevance of CP violation has been 
explained in terms of a deep insight into nature at the fundamental level. In sections 4.1 
and 4.2 below, I will describe some of the ways in which physicists have explained the 
                                                
145 For more detail on the role of boundary conditions for the thermodynamics arrow of 
time see Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time. 
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importance of CP violation, with the aim of showing that this group of physicists 
understood profound, fundamental questions about nature to be vital to their work. I will 
then use this fact to situate the attitudes of postwar particle physicists within the spectrum 
of orientations toward the professional boundaries of physics. I will show how they saw 
their work as relevant to deep, philosophical questions about nature at a fundamental 
level, even though direct speculations about such questions was outside of their notions 
of what it meant to practice of physics. 
 
4.1 Time Asymmetry 
As described above, relevance to fundamental notions of space and time was one of the 
primary explanations Fitch and Cronin gave for the importance of their famous 
experiment. This relevance sprang from the implications of their results for time-reversal 
symmetry as a basic principle. While they did not explore the implications of their result 
for understandings of the directionality of physical laws with respect to time, the fact that 
their results impacted the concept of time was enough to justify its relevance. For Fitch 
and Cronin, CP violation was significant because it concerned time, and time is a 
fundamental concept. As Fitch put it, “[…] showing as it does a lack of charge-
conjugation parity symmetry and, correspondingly, a violation of time-reversal 
invariance, it touches on our understanding of nature at its deepest level.”146 Or, as 
similarly expressed by James Cronin, “Well, you might shrug your shoulders and say, 
“OK, it’s a little anomaly and doesn’t matter.”  But it does matter because it relates to 
                                                
146 Fitch, “The Discovery of Charge-Conjugation Parity Asymmetry”. 
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one’s fundamental understanding of space and time.”147 Both Fitch and Cronin 
understood insight into the nature of time to be of the utmost significance for physics. 
While these physicists didn’t explore this implication in any concrete way, Val Fitch 
elaborated slightly further:  
  
But for the first time we have in the neutral K mesons a physical 
system that behaves asymmetrically in time as a result of an interaction, 
not a boundary condition. […] Since the microscopic physical laws had 
always been thought to be invariant under time reversal, this discovery 
opens up a wide range of profound questions.148 
  
Cronin and Fitch never addressed these “profound questions”. Further, they never 
formulated the questions in a well-defined way. Unlike in quantum mechanics, for 
example, where interpretative questions have taken well-defined forms such as the 
measurement problem, or else in discussions of time-asymmetry in the context of 
thermodynamics, CP violation never led to well-defined interpretive questions. The 
physicists involved in the discovery of CP violation described T-violation as raising deep 
questions in general, without articulating any specific questions along these lines.  
 How can we explain the fact that Cronin and Fitch saw deep, fundamental 
questions about basic concepts such as time as one of the reasons their experiment was so 
important, and yet didn’t formulate, ask, or answer any questions that would access this 
deep fundamentality? Fitch and Cronin’s concern with fundamental questions, like those 
concerning the nature of time, arose in continuity with European physics traditions from 
                                                
147 James Cronin, “CP Symmetry Violation”. 
148 Fitch, “The Discovery of Charge-Conjugation Parity Asymmetry” 
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the earlier twentieth century, which saw philosophical investigation into the nature of 
basic concepts as central to the project of physics. However, the postwar, pragmatic, 
engineering influenced culture of physics didn’t have much space for such speculation.149 
The justification of the CP violation experiment, in terms of its impact on fundamental 
concepts like time, was tied to an impulse connected to a previous subculture of 
physicists, that didn’t perfectly align with the pragmatist, experimental culture in which 
Fitch and Cronin were largely immersed. In the introduction to this dissertation, I 
described postwar American physics as caught between the competing pulls of 
philosophy and pragmatism. While the physicists described in chapter one were firmly at 
the pragmatic end of the spectrum, Cronin and Fitch justified their experiments in a way 
that had much in common with the philosophical sensibility, while remaining thoroughly 
pragmatic in practice. 
 However, even if Fitch and Cronin had been interested in speculating about the 
philosophical implications of their results for the concept of time, they would have had a 
difficult time knowing where to start. As I will discuss in section five below, the 
theoretical and experimental practices of postwar particle physics, and the specific ways 
in which a variable such as “𝑡” was conceptualized within this structure, did not lend 
themselves to philosophical investigations into the nature of fundamental concepts. 
Together with the fact that philosophical questioning was not part of Fitch and Cronin’s 
understanding of professional boundaries of experimental physics, this lack of conceptual 
                                                
149 For description of philosophical sensibilities among early twentieth century European 
philosophers, as well as the pragmatic character of postwar American physics, see Kaiser, 
How the Hippies Saved Physics, xiii. 
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resources to ask profound questions about the nature of time in the context of particle 
physics meant that Fitch and Cronin only pointed to the profundity of their results, 
without articulating or exploring it. 
 
*** 
 
Many twentieth century physicists, philosophers, and popular science writers have 
written about time reversal symmetry in physics. In general, the thinkers and writers who 
have discussed this topic in the decades following Fitch and Cronin’s discovery have 
been dismissive the T-violation implied by CP violation, describing it as exotic and 
irrelevant. For example, physicist Paul Davies’ 1974 popular book The Physics of Time 
Asymmetry in 1974 is often cited in technical material on CP violation as an authority and 
reference point on time reversal in physics.150 Davies, a theoretical physicist by training, 
has written many popular books on physics, particularly on the physics of time; The 
Physics of Time Asymmetry was his first such book. In this book, Davies discusses issues 
surrounding time symmetry and asymmetry in thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, 
electromagnetism, cosmology, and quantum mechanics. In the section on quantum 
mechanics, he has a small, two-page section on T-violation, as implied by CP violation. 
In this section he concludes that although a T-violating law of physics is of the greatest 
                                                
150 P. C. W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974). Davies is cited as an authority on time reversal in physics in, for example, 
several of the papers included in Proceedings of  the Blois Conference on CP Violation in 
Particle Physics And Astrophysics, ed. J. Tran Thanh Van (Gif-sur-Yvette, France: 
Editions Frontières, 1990). 
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significance from a fundamental point of view, it is not clear that the properties of K 
mesons really have any relevance to the type of asymmetric processes that have been 
under discussion in this book [thermodynamics, etc.].”151 Davies then moves on to other 
topics. Like Fitch and Cronin, Davies recognizes the potential significance of T-violation 
for fundamental understandings of time and the laws of physics; however, also like 
Cronin and Fitch, he merely notes this, without articulating any questions or ideas about 
the nature of this significance. 
 Davies statement about T-violation is typical of the physicists, philosophers and 
popularizers who have mentioned it in relation to discussions about the arrow of time. If 
they do mention CP violation, they generally dismiss it as obscure or irrelevant to the 
questions at hand, despite its potential fundamental importance. For example, popular 
science writer Brian Green devotes an entire chapter of his book The Fabric of the 
Cosmos to time-reversal symmetry; however, he confines his discussion to 
thermodynamics and cosmology, mentioning particle physics and T-violation only in a 
dismissive footnote:  
There are examples, involving relatively esoteric particles, which show 
that the so-called weak nuclear force does not treat past and future fully 
symmetrically. However, in my view and that of many others who have 
thought about it, since these particles play essentially no role in 
determining the properties of everyday material objects, they are 
unlikely to be important in explaining puzzle of time’s arrow (although, 
I hasten to add, no one knows this for sure.)152 
 
                                                
151 Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry, 176.  
152 Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 495. 
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 As will be discussed in section five below, the framework of postwar particle physics did 
not provide an apparatus or mechanism by which thinkers could ask or answer questions 
about nature of time raised by implied T-violation; nevertheless, when confronted with T-
violation, they gestured to the possibility of its profound significance for understanding 
the direction of time in relation to physical laws. The work of particle physics involved 
such narrow, technical concepts that it was difficult for these ideas to be picked up in 
larger discourses about the nature of time. Popular works exploring philosophical issues 
surrounding time and time symmetry, such as the above-mentioned works by Davies and 
Greene, acknowledged that T-violation technically went against currently held ideas 
about the arrow of time. Nevertheless, these thinkers had no idea how to approach the 
question of how T-violation challenged the concept of time and its directionality. 
 
4.2 Other Sources of Significance 
Many other reasons have been given for the significance of CP symmetry, in addition to 
its relevance for the concept of time, all of which point to a notion of fundamentality. 
Each of these reasons provides further evidence that particle physicists during this period 
believed fundamental questions about basic concepts to be central to their work at the 
level of justification, while regarding engagement with these questions as beyond the 
professional scope of physics.  
 One reason why particle physicists believed Fitch and Cronin’s CP violation 
experiment to be of great importance was its relevance to symmetry principles, which at 
the time were considered to be among the most fundamental principles in particle 
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physics. Wu’s experiment, and the discovery of the violation of parity, set the stage for an 
understanding of the discovery CP violation as an “overthrowing” of a fundamental 
principle. Wu’s experiment energized the particle physics community for this reason, and 
the discovery of CP violation occurred in the wake of this energy. The physicists 
involved in these developments saw this period, during which fundamental principles 
were being challenged and reconceptualized, as an extremely exciting time for their 
field.153 The postwar particle physics community viewed insight into a fundamental 
concept as being of the utmost importance, revealing that a deep probing of fundamental 
concepts and principles fell firmly within this community’s understandings of the 
purpose of physics. Even though physicists like Fitch and Cronin were for the most part 
pragmatic experimentalists, they regarded the probing of fundamental properties of the 
universe to be one of the higher tasks of their profession.  
 Further, the particle physics community regarded the violation of CP symmetry as 
important because the effect couldn’t be explained. CP violation went against a 
fundamental tenet of theoretical particle physics, and could not be easily explained by its 
theoretical apparatus. This opened up many new avenues of research, motivating new, 
more fundamental theoretical developments. As mentioned earlier, CP violation could not 
be explained in terms of a simple attribution of a physical property, like helicity, to the 
                                                
153 This sense of excitement is described, for example, in R. K. Adair, “CP Non 
Conservation - The Early Experiments,” in Proceedings of  the Blois Conference on CP 
Violation in Particle Physics And Astrophysics, ed. J. Tran Thanh Van, (1990): 37; A. 
Pais,“CP Violation- The First 25 Years”, ibid, 3; and Allan Franklin, “The Discovery and 
Acceptance of CP violation” in Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 13 (1983): 
207-238. 
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particles involved; the explanation would have to go much deeper than the properties of 
particles.154 For example, physicists have proposed altering the standard model of physics 
in order to explain CP violation.155 The fact that CP violation required a more 
fundamental explanation was itself a reason why physicists described it as an important 
result. This explanation of the significance of CP violation is interesting for several 
reasons. First, it again shows a concern with fundamentality in terms of the way 
physicists justified the importance of the experiment. Further, it provides insight into 
what was considered to be a fundamental explanation within this community, as well as 
which effects count as fundamental and which required a further, more fundamental 
explanation. 
 As briefly mentioned above in section 2.3, another justification physicists gave 
for the importance of CP Violation lay with the fact that it has been used to explain the 
asymmetry in the universe between matter and antimatter. The possibility of using CP 
violation to explain this asymmetry was first noted by Andrei Sakharov, a few years after 
Fitch and Cronin’s experiment; however, the idea didn’t gain much traction until the 
1980s, with the rise of cosmology as a major field of physics research.156 In this line of 
                                                
154 Griffiths, Introduction to Elementary Particles, 148. 
155 Ibid., 409-410. 
156 For original suggestion, see A. D. Sakharov, "Violation of CP Invariance, C 
asymmetry, and Baryon Asymmetry of the Universe," in Journal of Experimental 
Theoretical Physics 5 (1967): 24-27. For an overview of more recent research in the 
connection between CP violation and matter/antimatter asymmetry, see John Ellis, “Why 
Does CP Violation Matter to the Universe?” in Cern Courier, 1999, available at 
http://cerncourier.com/cws/article/cern/28092. 
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justification, CP Violation is treated as a fundamental principle that explains a derivative 
effect, as opposed to an effect that requires a more fundamental explanation. This 
displays interest in fundamentality on behalf of particle physicists once again; however, 
here CP violation is taken as a fundamental explanation of another phenomenon. The 
potential to explain matter-antimatter asymmetry is now one of the major reasons both 
Val Fitch and James Cronin have claimed their result was significant, although this 
potential did not appear in their initial discussions of the experiment immediately 
following their discovery.157   
 In each case made for the justification of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment, including 
but not limited to the significance for the concept of time, physicists have appealed to 
profound, fundamental stakes. However, physicists such as Fitch and Cronin saw 
themselves as “workbench” physicists, who did not deal with speculative, philosophical 
ideas.158 This being said, their concern with fundamentality, and the particular way it 
played out in the justification of the significance of CP violation, betrays a certain form 
of philosophical sensibility. This combination of this concern with fundamentality, 
independent of application, with their version pragmatism, provides insight into the 
complex contours of the ways in which these physicists understood the meaning and 
purpose of their work. 
 
                                                
157 For example, Cronin explained for the significance of CP violation in terms of its 
relevance to matter/antimatter asymmetry in, “The Experimental Discovery of CP 
Violation.”  
158 Interview with Val Fitch by the author, March 4, 2011. 
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5. Time as a fundamental concept in postwar particle physics  
In this section I will consider the concept of time at stake in Fitch and Cronin’s 
experiment, drawing on a body of scholarship in the history of science that considers the 
nature of theoretical entities in postwar particle physics. I will explore this scholarship 
with the aim of of gaining a stronger grasp on the assumptions about time built into Fitch 
and Cronin’s experiment. I will then use this to consider the reasons why Fitch, Cronin, 
and others used insight into the nature of time to justify the significance of the CP 
violation experiment, but did not engage in any concrete articulation about the specific 
possibilities for this type of insight. I will conclude that the concept of time in postwar 
American particle physics was a complex, multifaceted, and highly technical entity that 
was not easily transportable into other discourses more accommodating of philosophical 
investigation. Further, there was no mechanism or interface for which time in the context 
of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment could be brought into conversation with other fields of 
physics, in which philosophical questions about time reversal symmetry have been 
discussed. This made it difficult to formulate philosophical questions about the 
implications of Fitch and Cronin’s result for the concept of time. 
In his 1984 book Constructing Quarks, Andrew Pickering discusses the nature of 
theoretical entities in postwar particle physics, focusing his attention on the theoretical 
construction of the quark. Pickering describes theoretical entities as largely the product of 
judgments on the part of scientists, emphasizing that they are not passive elements of 
nature as many scientists take them to be. As he writes, “Theoretical entities like quarks 
[…] are in the first instance theoretical constructs: they appear as terms in theories 
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elaborated by scientists.”159 More specifically, he situates these constructs at the interface 
of theory and experiment, describing them as mediating between the two. It is only after 
this mediation takes place that scientists come to view them as passive elements of 
reality. He claims that “theoretical constructs […] serve to mediate the symbiosis of 
theoretical and experimental practice (and hence to make realist discourse retrospectively 
possible).”160 Can time in the context of particle physics be understood as the type of 
theoretical construct described by Pickering, gaining the appearance of reality at the 
interface of theory and experiment? The concept of time at stake in Fitch and Cronin’s 
experiment was part of the theoretical framework of quantum field theory, which was 
presupposed in the construction of the experiment. The experimental run and subsequent 
analysis then complicated the concept time in this theoretical context, questioning but 
also reinforcing its meaning. However, a description of time in Fitch and Cronin’s 
experiment in Pickering’s terms would be overly simplistic. Several different 
presuppositions about time were built into the experiment at multiple levels, and there 
was not one concept of time that could perform this mediating function. Time was the 
background against which the experiment unfolded, a variable in the equations that 
described the particle system, a relationship between boundary conditions, and the basis 
of the time reversal symmetry principle. Taking all of these presuppositions together, the 
                                                
159 Pickering, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 7. 
160 Ibid., 14. 
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concept of time, at the interface of theory and experiment in Fitch and Cronin’s 
experiment, becomes difficult to delineate. 
 In his 1987 How Experiments End and 1997 Image and Logic, Peter Galison 
complicates Pickering’s view of the theoretical entities of particle physics by arguing that 
a variety of material, mathematical, and technical constraints affect the way scientists 
come to understand theoretical entities. These constraints, in addition to the judgments 
and decisions of physicists described by Pickering, produce the objects of theory. As 
Galison writes in direct reference to Pickering’s position, “mathematical and physical 
constraints are not easily brushed aside.”161 Galison describes changes in particle physics 
as occurring at the non-uniform interfaces of the subcultures of theory, experiment, and 
instrumentation; further, he details the way shared understandings have been forged out 
at these heterogeneous interfaces. The case of the discovery of CP violation involved 
many such interfaces, bringing together experimental and detection apparatuses, analysis 
techniques including Monte Carlo simulations, as well as cutting edge theoretical 
developments in quantum field theory and the standard model of physics. Negotiations 
occurred at all of these interfaces, ultimately leading to Fitch and Cronin’s conclusion 
that T-symmetry is occasionally violated. How did the concept of time take shape among 
these interfaces? As described above, time entered into the experiment on multiple 
registers, and there was no cleanly circumscribed concept of time within this arrangement 
that could be easily offered to philosophical interrogation. Time was a messy concept, 
                                                
161 Galison, How Experiments End, 11. 
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and particle physics did not have obvious resources for describing it in such a way that it 
could become a clearly defined object of philosophical investigation.  
 In his 2005 book Drawing Theories Apart, Kaiser continues the conversation 
about the nature of theoretical entities in postwar particle physics.162 Kaiser emphasizes 
the practical situations in which theoretical constructs have been put to use, 
demonstrating the various ways in which theories gain meaning through the specific sets 
tools, practices, and objectives belonging to subgroups of particle physics. Further, 
Kaiser shows how these tools have been transmitted through pedagogical means, such as 
textbooks and the training of postdocs. He claims that theoretical entities cannot be 
understood separately from the practices in which they are embedded and the pedagogical 
traditions through which they are transmitted. How did the concept of time gain meaning 
in terms of the specific practices of Fitch and Cronin’s experiment and analysis? Further, 
could this meaning be transmitted to different discourse about physics, for which 
philosophical questions about time were germane? In practice, time in particle physics 
was at once a variable written down in equations, an observable entity emerging from 
statistical analyses like Monte Carlo simulations, and a relationship between boundary 
conditions. Due to the messy nature of the concept of time within particle physics, it 
could not easily be transported between contexts, nor was there a pedagogical tradition to 
facilitate its movement to discourses in which philosophical questions were more freely 
asked and answered. Without a mechanism for transportation of the concept of time, as 
presupposed in the experimental and theoretical practice of particle physics, into to a field 
                                                
162 David Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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more amenable to philosophical speculation, the possibility for philosophical insight into 
time, deriving from CP violation, remained vague.  
 Time, as an object at stake within the context of the discovery of CP violation, 
existed at the interface of many elements, including experimental techniques, 
instruments, and theoretical principles. Further, time did not exist as a singular entity at 
this intersection, but was a messy composite conditioned by a variety of presuppositions. 
From the technical standpoint of the concept of time-reversal symmetry, time could not 
easily be transported into other discourses. It lacked the coherency, as well as the 
mechanism, to be transported into more philosophical discourses about time reversal in 
other fields of physics. Nevertheless, as in chapter one, the physicists involved in the 
discovery of CP violation presupposed that time was a consistent conceptual entity, 
commensurable between contexts, and capable of being understood in profound ways. 
This helps explain why the implications of CP violation for the concept of time never 
became a well-articulated line of research, but was nevertheless identified as one of the 
major sources of significance of Fitch and Cronin’s result. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The experimental discovery of CP violation, and the way in which physicists such as 
Fitch and Cronin justified its significance, reveals several interesting aspects of the 
identity of particle physicists in the postwar period, as well as the concept of time as they 
understood and used it. The technical nature of the experiment, when combined with the 
justification of the result in terms of fundamental insights, shows that during this period 
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the boundaries between a more speculative, “philosophical” understanding of physics and 
an experimental, technical, and pragmatic culture of physics, were shifting. 
 Fitch and Cronin both spoke of the discovery of CP violation as deeply profound 
for a variety reasons, high among them the fact that it impacted the concept time. 
However, they did not themselves delve into the profound questions raised, nor did they 
have a clear sense of what form these questions could take. They were still very much a 
part of the pragmatic mainstream of particle physics, which did not incorporate a form of 
philosophical engagement within the boundaries of physics. To be openly philosophical 
would have placed them outside of the pragmatic culture of particle physics within which 
they were firmly rooted. However, traces of a philosophical sensibility existed in the 
ways in which they discussed the stakes of their work. These physicists had a 
complicated sense of their professional identities with respect to philosophy and 
pragmatism. While highly pragmatic in practice, the concern with fundamentality that 
came with the field of particle physics created a place within their conceptions of physics 
for philosophical insight into the nature of basic concepts, at the level of justification. 
 Further, the framework of particle physics, and the ways in which multiple 
understandings of time came together at interfaces between technical, conceptual, 
mathematical, and experimental practices, made it difficult for thinkers to frame 
speculative questions about the nature of fundamental concepts. Without a means for 
interfacing the stakes of the experiment with other discourses surrounding time, physics, 
and symmetry, there was no context available for probing implications for the nature of 
time. Nevertheless, by going against accepted notions of the behavior fundamental laws 
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under time reversal, considered among particle physicists in the early 1960s to be 
fundamental, CP violation placed the concept of time as a variable in the laws of particle 
physics at stake. 
 In chapter one I considered developments in physics that challenged the concept 
of time cast as a unit of measure. I drew attention to many of the contingencies that 
conditioned the concepts of a “clock” and a “second” in the postwar period, showing how 
instrumental advances in atomic clock technology implicitly changed physicists’ 
understandings of these concepts. I showed time to be a heterogeneous concept within the 
context of atomic timekeeping; however, the chapter also noted that alongside these 
various and changing timekeeping concepts was a presupposition about the nature of time 
as a consistent and unproblematic physical variable. While timekeeping concepts were 
challenged in the episodes discussed in chapter one, this presupposition about time as a 
variable was not overtly at stake. In chapter two, I have considered an experiment, carried 
out only a few years after the development of the first atomic clocks, which explicitly 
challenged accepted notions about the time as a physical variable. Prior to the 
experiment, physical laws were thought to treat the two possible orientations of “𝑡” 
symmetrically; the experiment showed this was not always the case. Thus, the theoretical 
variable “𝑡” was itself at stake. Fitch, Cronin, and others identified the profound stakes of 
the experiment, including insight into the concept of time; however, they did not pursue 
any related lines of questioning. This can be explained by the particular identities of this 
group of physicists in relation to philosophical and pragmatic sensibilities; further it can 
be attributed the nature of these physicists’ many presuppositions about time. Chapter 
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two builds on chapter one to reveal a further dimension to the ways physicists 
conceptualized time during the postwar period, in this case within the complex 
framework of experimental and theoretical practices of particle physics. 
 The direction of time is arguably one of the most fundamental characteristics of 
time, and often described as the characteristic that differentiates time from space. In this 
chapter I have unpacked some of the presuppositions that condition the concept of time in 
relation to its directionality, showing how the nature of time’s directionality was called 
into question in postwar American physics. Further, I show how, like in chapter one, 
physicists still upheld a presupposition about a truth of time, as well as a presupposition 
about time as a consistent concept. At an even more basic level, Fitch and Cronin 
presupposed that the time of theory exists, whatever the nature of its directionality with 
respect to physical laws. The directionality of time was called into question by the 
discovery of CP violation, however vaguely, but the existence of time as a meaningful 
concept was never at stake. Chapter three looks to a group of physicists, much more open 
to philosophical speculation, who explicitly questioned the presupposition that time exists 
in the first place. This will add further granularity to the landscape of professional 
identities of physicists in the postwar United States, as well as a further dimension to the 
heterogeneous concept of time as understood by physicists during this period. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Time and Quantum Gravity: Wheeler, DeWitt, and the “Equation of the Universe” 
 
 
1. Introduction 
For a few hours during an afternoon in the mid-1960s, Bryce DeWitt and John Wheeler 
met in the Raleigh Durham airport to discuss gravity. At the time DeWitt was director of 
the Institute of Field Physics at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, a 
position Wheeler had helped him secure. Wheeler, a renowned Physics professor at 
Princeton University, had for some time been occupied with the question of how to unite 
gravity and quantum theory. Wheeler had arranged for the meeting, hoping to use a 
layover at Raleigh Durham to discuss his ideas about quantum gravity with DeWitt. 
While at the airport, DeWitt scribbled an equation on a piece of paper to facilitate the 
discussion. When Wheeler saw the equation he immediately became excited, believing it 
to be the equation of quantum gravity.163 Wheeler presented the equation at several talks 
in the following years,164 and DeWitt published it in the first of a trilogy of papers on 
                                                
163 See Interview of Bryce DeWitt by Kenneth W. Ford on 02/28/1995, Niels Bohr 
Library & Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA, 
http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/23199.html . 
164 See for example, John Wheeler, “Superspace and the Nature of Quantum 
Geometrodynamics,” Battelle Rencontres: 1967 Lectures in Mathematics and Physics, 
Eds. Cecile Dewitt and John Wheeler (New York: Benjamin, 1968).  
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quantum gravity that appeared in Physical Review in 1967.165 Due to the circumstances in 
which it was first written down, it came to be known as the “Wheeler-DeWitt” equation. 
However, it has also been referred to as the “Einstein-Schrodinger equation,” the 
“Equation of the Universe,” or as DeWitt later came to call it, “that damned equation.”166 
  In DeWitt’s 1967 paper, the equation takes the form: 
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At the most general level it is a quantum wave equation, describing the evolution of a 
quantum system in time, applied to the spacetime manifold given by Einstein’s 
gravitational field equations. The premise of the equation already suggests a potential 
difficulty concerning the concept of time in a quantum theory of gravity.  That is, what 
does it mean for “spacetime” to evolve in “time”? In order to apply a quantum wave 
equation to spacetime, time needs to be singled out for special treatment as the 
background for the time-evolution of the system. The Wheeler-DeWitt equation gets 
around this difficulty by describing the time-variation of a 3-dimensional cross-section of 
4-dimensional spacetime, as indicated by the terms (3)R and (3)g; further, the Latin indices 
ijkl convey that this 3-dimensional cross-section is “space-like”. In this equation time and 
space have been separated from one another as distinct elements of spacetime, with time 
                                                
165 Bryce S. DeWitt, “Quantum Theory of Gravity. I. The Canonical Theory,” Physical 
Review 160 (1967): 1113-1148 
166 See Bryce DeWitt, “The Quantum and Gravity: The Wheeler-DeWitt Equation”, 
Proceedings of the Eighth Marcel Grossmann Conference, The Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem (Singapore: World Scientific, 1997). 
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serving as the background for variation within the system; however, such a separation is 
problematic for the traditional concept of spacetime in relativity.167 This issue occupied 
Wheeler, DeWitt, and the community of physicists working on quantum gravity in the 
1950s and 60s, leading them to grapple with questions such as: what is the relationship 
between time and space in general relativity? What is “time-evolution” in quantum 
mechanics? Does the concept of time have any meaning in the context of the universe as 
a whole? Can efforts to unify quantum theory and general relativity provide new insights 
into the nature of time in physics?  
 Explicitly ontological questions about the nature of time were central to Wheeler 
and DeWitt’s work on quantum gravity in the late 1960s. Such questions were seamlessly 
integrated into the 1967 paper in which DeWitt first published the equation, appearing 
directly alongside highly technical mathematical derivations. For example, in a section of 
the paper entitled “A Wave Packet for the Universe; The Concept of Time,” DeWitt 
derives an equation for a “wave packet for the universe”. Immediately following his 
technical derivation he draws the conclusion that “‘time’ is only a phenomenological 
concept, useful under certain circumstances.”168 He goes on to discuss the meaning of 
                                                
167 The idea that space and time cannot be treated as having independent realities, but 
rather belong to a unified 4-dimensional “spacetime,” was central to Hermann 
Minkowski’s 1908 interpretation of Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Further, 
Einstein’s 1916 publication of the theory of general relativity placed 4-dimensional 
curved spacetime at the center of the physical understanding of gravity. See Hermann 
Minkowski, “Space and Time,” in The Principle of Relativity, ed. H. Lorentz et. al, 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1952), p. 75; Albert Einstein, “The Foundation of 
the General Theory of Relativity,” in The Principle of Relativity, ed. H. Lorentz et. al, 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 1952), p. 109. 
168 DeWitt, “Quantum Gravity. I. The Canonical Theory,” 1137. 
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this claim about time, moving between mathematical analyses and speculative 
interpretation.169 Similarly, in a 1967 talk in which Wheeler makes one of his first 
recorded mentions of the equation (he refers to it as the Einstein-Schrodinger equation), 
Wheeler makes overtly interpretive, ontological claims about time.  For example, after a 
discussion of how to define the background in a theory of quantum gravity, he claims: 
[O]ne has to forgo that view of nature in which every event, past, 
present, or future, occupies its preordained position in a grand catalog 
called “spacetime.” There is no spacetime, there is no time, there is no 
before, there is no after. The question what happens “next” is without 
meaning.170 
 
Wheeler and DeWitt’s interpretive work in the 1960s led both to the conclusion 
that time does not have a precisely defined “reality” in a universe described by the 
Wheeler-DeWitt equation. While their interpretive pathways differed, and Wheeler’s 
ontological claims about time were stronger than DeWitt’s, both came to similar 
conclusions about time. In their work leading to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, both opted 
to treat space and time as distinct in their formulation of Einstein’s field equations. In 
doing so, they defined what they meant by “time”. DeWitt defined time in relation to the 
contents of the universe, and Wheeler in terms of the relationship between 3-dimensional 
space and a 4-dimensional spacetime. When each physicist applied quantum principles to 
their definitions of time, they interpreted the result as implying that time was an 
approximate and secondary concept. DeWitt’s calculation resulted in an apparently 
                                                
169 Ibid., 1134. 
170 Wheeler, “Superspace and the Nature of Quantum Geometrodynamics”, 253. 
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motionless universe described by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, leading him to the 
conclusion that time is a “phenomenological concept”. Wheeler found that when taken in 
the context of a quantum mechanical universe, the relation between 3-dimensional space 
and 4-dimensional spacetime became poorly defined, rendering the concept of spacetime 
itself meaningless. This led him to the conclusion that “there is no time”. 
Speculative and interpretive engagement with fundamental concepts such as time, 
particularly in relation to quantum gravity, occupied Wheeler and DeWitt well beyond 
the 1960s. For example, in a 1988 paper published by Wheeler in the IBM Journal of 
Research and Development, Wheeler makes the argument that time is an “illusion,” 
largely based on insights drawn from his quantum gravity work from decades earlier.171  
Further, Wheeler and DeWitt were both major players in debates surrounding the Everett 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, which was put forward in Hugh Everett’s 1957 
dissertation, completed under Wheeler’s supervision, and championed by DeWitt largely 
due to connections DeWitt saw between the Everett interpretation and quantum 
gravity.172 This type of interpretive engagement with fundamental concepts has also been 
a feature of quantum gravity research programs that revisited the Wheeler-DeWitt 
equation in the decades following its conception, such as efforts in loop quantum 
                                                
171 John Archibald Wheeler, “World as System Self-Sythesized by Quantum Networking,” 
IBM Journal of Research and Development, 32 (1987): 4-15.  
172 Hugh Everett III, On the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Ph.D. thesis, Princeton 
University ; Bryce DeWitt, “Quantum Mechanics and Reality,” Physics Today, 23(9) 
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gravity.173 This chapter will trace this line of interpretive and speculative thinking, 
primarily concerning the nature of time in relation to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, from 
the original publications and talks in which Wheeler and DeWitt derived and interpreted 
the equation, through Wheeler and DeWitt’s later work, to its legacy in contemporary 
quantum gravity research. 
 
Interpretive thinking about basic concepts such as time was not unusual among the small 
subgroup of physicists working on quantum gravity in the 1960s. However, this was not 
the case for all subgroups of physicists during this period, for example the experimental 
physicists, engineers, and astronomers working on atomic clocks discussed in chapter one 
of this dissertation and the experimental particle physicists working on time asymmetry 
discussed in chapter two. These other physicists were also working on topics directly 
related to the concept of time, and the meaning of “time” was implicitly at stake in their 
work; however, they did not explicitly question the nature of time per se. Wheeler and 
DeWitt identified themselves as theoretical as opposed to experimental physicists, which 
is one feature that distinguishes them from the subgroups discussed in the preceding 
chapters; however, even among theoretical physicists Wheeler and DeWitt’s attitudes 
toward speculative thinking were far from typical. As physicists, they understood their 
roles as involving deep engagement with the nature of fundamental concepts, straddling 
the boundary between physics and philosophy. In autobiographical reminiscences 
composed later in life, Wheeler wrote:  
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I have not been able to stop puzzling over the riddle of existence. From 
the calculations and experiments that we call the nitty-gritty of our 
science to the most encompassing questions of philosophy, there is one 
unbroken chain of connection. There is no definable point along this 
chain where the truly curious physicist can say, “I go only this far and 
no farther.174   
 
How did Wheeler and DeWitt understand their professional identities, as postwar 
American physicists, in relation to a perceived “chain of connection” between physics 
and “philosophy”? How did these professional identities relate to the questions they 
pursued in their work on quantum gravity, in particular surrounding the concept of time? 
How did they stand in relation to the professional identities of other subgroups of 
physicists from the same period?  
 Several historians of science have commented on Wheeler’s tendency toward 
philosophically inflected physics, which was not typical among mainstream American 
physicists during the postwar period.175 These scholars have largely attributed this 
tendency to Wheeler’s relationship with Niels Bohr, which developed during a formative 
post-doctoral year Wheeler spent with Bohr in Copenhagen from 1934-35.176 Further, 
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historians have attributed the more typically “American” facets of Wheeler’s work – for 
example his interest in engineering, machines, and practical applications of theory –to 
Wheeler’s American upbringing and training, as well as his work on the Manhattan 
project and the Hydrogen bomb.177 Wheeler’s experiences, training, and mentors go a 
long way toward explaining his identity as an American physicist who was, 
“quintessentially, the scientist who insistently cycled philosophical questions of meaning 
throughout the technical work.”178 As for DeWitt, he chose to work on quantum gravity 
in the late 1940s, as the subject of his PhD research under the supervision of Julian 
Schwinger, and devoted his entire career to the topic.  As a researcher interested in 
general relativity, DeWitt experienced hostility from the physics community early in his 
career.179 DeWitt had difficulty securing a position within a physics department in the 
United States following his graduate work, and found himself as somewhat of an 
outsider. It was only with the help of Wheeler that DeWitt eventually obtained a faculty 
position at UNC Chapel Hill and established himself within the mainstream of physics. 
Wheeler’s sponsorship of DeWitt’s career, as well as his general promotion of general 
relativity research in the postwar period, helped carve a path for DeWitt as a quantum 
gravity researcher interested in questions about the meaning of fundamental concepts. 
Wheeler helped define the questions DeWitt asked about quantum gravity, as well as 
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created a space within the physics community for Dewitt’s interest in questioning the 
meaning of fundamental concepts.  
Wheeler became interested in general relativity, quantum gravity, and the attendant 
ontological questions about time in the early 1950s, after having already earned a strong 
reputation within the American physics community. He had a secure position at 
Princeton, a philosophical sensibility nurtured by his relationship with Bohr, and was 
well situated to be bold in his lines of questioning. His set of experiences allowed him to 
carve out an identity for himself as a serious American physicist interested in 
fundamental questions about the meaning of time. Further, he helped create a space for 
other physicists, like DeWitt, to share in aspects this identity and flourish within the 
mainstream American physics community. One of the primary objectives of this chapter 
will be to unpack this vision of what it meant to be a philosophically engaged postwar 
American physicists, as exemplified by Wheeler and DeWitt’s engagement with the 
concept of time. 
This objective is part of the broader line of questioning, central to this dissertation, 
which asks how postwar American physicists carved out their professional identities in 
relation to interpretive and speculative engagement with fundamental concepts in 
physics, particularly the concept of time. During the postwar period subgroups of 
physicists assumed a variety of attitudes toward fundamental concepts. This was partly 
due to the different ways each subgroup took up particular aspects of the physics legacies 
they inherited, as well as the social and political contexts in which each group moved. 
The result was a multiplicity of understandings of what it meant to be a physicist, 
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each corresponding to a different way of questioning and thinking about the nature of 
fundamental concepts such as time. By tracing questions about time surrounding the 
Wheeler-DeWitt equation, this chapter will shed light on one piece of the history of 
physicists’ varied, complicated, and changing relationship to their fundamental concepts 
and their discipline.  
The central question of how and why physicists questioned the nature of 
fundamental concepts, and what this reveals about their professional identities, builds on 
many interesting works in the history of science by thinkers such as Sam Schweber, 
Alexi Assimus, Nancy Cartwright, Peter Galison, and David Kaiser.180 As discussed in 
the introduction to this dissertation, these scholars give various historical explanations for 
the existence of a tension in American physics between pragmatism and a more 
expansive approach to physics and its fundamental concepts, as well as track various 
incarnations of this tension over the course of the twentieth century. For example, David 
Kaiser argued in his 2011 book How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, 
and the Quantum Revival, that the speculative, interpretive impulse was largely absent 
from mainstream American physics during the postwar period, but nevertheless stayed 
alive in fringe and countercultural moments, to eventually reenter the mainstream. This 
project builds on Kaiser’s work by focusing on mainstream physicists during the same 
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period, and how they grappled with the tension between engaging deep fundamental 
questions and a form of postwar pragmatism. 
The subjects of this chapter - Wheeler, DeWitt, the equation that bears their name 
and its legacy – provide an excellent point of entry to the set of questions that motivate 
this project. Wheeler and DeWitt’s explicit engagement in interpretive questioning about 
the concept of time stands in contrast to other more pragmatic attitudes of physicists 
during this period. With an eye to understanding and unpacking the interpretive and 
speculative features of their work and its legacy, this chapter will take a close look at 
DeWitt and Wheeler’s thinking about time in relation to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation 
and quantum gravity, as continuation of this line of thinking among later physicists. 
Section two will provide a brief outline of the quantum gravity research program up until 
the point of DeWitt’s publication of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in 1967, as well as a 
short biographical sketch of Wheeler, DeWitt, and their professional relationship. Section 
three will look to DeWitt’s approach to time and quantum gravity, including a close look 
at the first installment of the 1967 trilogy and DeWitt’s engagement with the Everett 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Section four will look to Wheeler, the 1967 lecture 
in which he introduced the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, and a sample of his later writings 
dealing with time and quantum gravity. The fifth section will consider how Wheeler and 
DeWitt’s thinking about time was taken up in later quantum gravity research programs, 
looking particularly to Lee Smolin and Julian Barbour’s work on loop quantum gravity. 
After analyzing how Wheeler, DeWitt, and those who followed in their footsteps asked 
questions about the nature of fundamental concepts such as time, I will look to how this 
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questioning informed and was informed by these physicists’ conceptions of what it meant 
to be a physicist.  Set in relation to how other groups were asking and answering 
questions about time, a heterogeneous picture of the identity of physicists in the post war 
United States, as well as the multifaceted nature of the concept of time in physics, will 
emerge. 
 
2. Background   
2.1 Quantum gravity research 1930-1967 
Prior to 1967, most attempts to develop a quantum theory of gravity fell into one of two 
camps, each corresponding to a particular approach to defining the background for 
gravitational dynamics. The first, termed the “canonical approach,” singled out time for 
special treatment, considering how a space-like cross-section of spacetime evolves in 
time. The second, termed the “covariant approach,” designated a particular spacetime 
background – often a flat Minkowskian spacetime – against which to represent the 
dynamics of quantum gravity. DeWitt and Wheeler contributed to both approaches in the 
1950s and 60s, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation belonging to the canonical tradition. The 
first paper in DeWitt’s 1967 trilogy, in which the Wheeler-DeWitt equation appears, is 
devoted to the canonical approach, while the second and third papers of the trilogy focus 
on the covariant approach and its applications. At the time of the publication of the 
trilogy DeWitt did not see any formal connection between the two approaches. As he 
wrote in the introduction to the first paper, “the so-called manifestly covariant theory […] 
differs utterly in its structure from the canonical theory, and so far no one has established 
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a rigorous mathematical link between the two.”181 This being said, he noted that among 
some “it is believed that the two theories are merely two versions of the same theory, 
expressed in different language, but no one knows for sure.”182 
The canonical and covariant approaches to quantum gravity have been 
characterized in variety of ways. For example, in the 1967 trilogy DeWitt characterized 
the canonical theory as “describing the quantum behavior of 3-space regarded as a time-
varying geometrical object, and the covariant [as] describing the behavior of real and 
virtual gravitons propagating in this object.”183 Further, he differentiated the two 
approaches according to the types of questions they asked and insights they produced, 
claiming that “the canonical theory leads to conclusions about “amplitudes of different 3-
geometrics or ‘the wave function of the universe’. The covariant theory, on the other 
hand, concerns itself with ‘micro-processes’ such as scattering, vacuum polarization, 
etc.”184 In 2001, Lee Smolin described the two traditions in his popular book Three Roads 
to Quantum Gravity, characterizing the canonical approach as starting with “the essential 
principles of Einstein’s theory of General Relativity and seek[ing] to modify them to 
include quantum phenomena,” and the covariant approach as starting from “quantum 
theory, in which most of the ideas and methods were developed first in other parts of 
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quantum theory.”185 The two approaches thus differ in their points of departure and the 
questions they ask, in addition to the choice of background. The choice of background, 
however, is the most important distinction for the purposes of this chapter, due to its 
direct relevance to the interpretation of time and spacetime. The fact that the canonical 
approach singled out time for special treatment was deeply troubling to DeWitt, who 
wrote in 1967 that this aspect of the canonical approach “run[s] counter to the spirit of 
any relativistic theory.”186 
 The first canonical efforts to develop a quantum theory of gravity were 
undertaken by Leon Rosenfeld, who applied quantum mechanical equations to a 
linearized form of Einstein’s relativistic field equations in the 1930s.187 Rosenfeld 
encountered many difficulties while undertaking this effort, and defined many of the 
problems with which future physicists working on quantum gravity would grapple. In 
particular, Rosenfeld articulated the problems associated with defining “observables” in a 
quantum theory of gravity, coming to the conclusion that such observables would only be 
present at extremely high energies.188, After Rosenfeld’s pioneering work, not many 
physicists worked on canonical quantum gravity until the 1950s, when work by physicist 
Peter Bergmann launched a new period of activity in the field.  Bergmann, along with a 
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group of colleagues and graduate students, began a concerted program to define the 
observables of quantum gravity, as well as to quantize the non-linearized equations of 
general relativity.189  
Meanwhile, advances in non-quantized general relativity and its classical 
canonical structure, particularly a Hamiltonian formulation of the equations of general 
relativity by Arnowitz, Deser, and Misner (ADM),190 showed promise to move the field 
of gravitation physics forward. It was based on work in non-quantized general relativity, 
and particularly a reformulation of ADM written down by Asher Peres,191 that served as 
the basis for the equation DeWitt wrote down for Wheeler at the Raleigh-Durham airport 
in the 1960s. 
As for the covariant approach, developments also began in the 1930s, with the 
work of physicists such as Rosenfeld, Bronstein, Fierz and Pauli.192  Major advances 
were made in covariant quantum gravity in the 1960s, particularly with the work of 
DeWitt and Feynman on the Feynman rules for general relativity.193 Although the history 
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of the covariant approach is a rich one, the canonical approach, and the way time has 
been conceptualized within it, will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Wheeler, DeWitt, and Gravity 
John Wheeler was born in Jacksonville Florida in 1911. He became interested in physics 
and engineering early in life, and enrolled as an engineering student at Johns Hopkins 
University at the age of 16.194 After his first semester Wheeler transferred his major to 
physics, which he found more inspiring than engineering.195 He was “enchanted” with 
physics and pursued a PhD in atomic physics at Johns Hopkins under the supervision of 
Karl Herzfeld.196 Following his graduate work, Wheeler completed a postdoctoral year at 
New York University (NYU), under the supervision of Gregory Breit; following his time 
at NYU, Wheeler spent a second postdoctoral year in Copenhagen under the supervision 
Niels Bohr. Breit and Bohr had markedly different approaches styles of doing physics, 
and each left their mark on Wheeler. Wheeler reflected in his autobiography: 
Working with Bohr and working with Breit were complementary 
experiences. […] Breit taught me new mathematical and calculational 
techniques. Bohr taught me a new way of looking at the world, a new 
way of raising questions. […] I have always loved pushing the 
mathematics beyond formalism, to get numerical results that can be 
turned into pictures and compared with experiments. At the same time, 
I have had a lifelong fascination with the meaning of the quantum and 
                                                
194 See AIP interview of Wheeler by Ford. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
 136 
the urge always to think about what physics might be like twenty years 
hence, not just the day after tomorrow.197 
 
After completing his year in Copenhagen, Wheeler joined the physics department 
at UNC Chapel Hill in 1935 as an assistant professor, where he remained until 1938 when 
he took a position at Princeton. During World War II Wheeler worked closely with 
engineers and physicists at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, as well as at the 
Hanford reactor site in Washington. Wheeler returned to Princeton after the war, but left 
again to spend a year at Los Alamos working on the Hydrogen bomb from 1950-1951. 
After leaving Los Alamos, he continued his H-bomb work at Princeton for several 
years.198  
During the early 1950s, as his work on the hydrogen bomb was winding down, 
Wheeler began to take an interest in general relativity. He had little experience with 
general relativity at the time, but it was a field which had long fascinated him.199 Wheeler 
decided to teach a class on the subject in 1952, as well as compose a textbook on the 
material.200 As he explored relativity, he became particularly interested in possible 
relationships between quantum theory and general relativity. As he later reminisced, “I 
had been so enthusiastic for the sum-over-histories way of describing quantum mechanics 
and the transition from quantum mechanics to classical mechanics that I couldn't help 
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looking for a similar transition in the case of relativity.”201  Upon taking interest in the 
subject, Wheeler became aware of DeWitt’s work on quantum gravity, in particular 
DeWitt’s 1949 doctoral thesis on the subject. Wheeler went to visit DeWitt to discuss the 
thesis and the topic in general, which began their personal and professional friendship.202 
  
DeWitt was born in Dinuba California in 1923. His family moved to Massachusetts when 
he was 12, and he enrolled at Harvard at the age of 16. DeWitt graduated from Harvard 
with a degree in physics in 1943, after which he briefly worked on the Manhattan project 
at the Calutron at Berkeley. However, after seven months at the Calutron he asked to be 
released from the Manhattan project and enlisted in the navy. Following the war he 
returned to Harvard to complete his Ph.D. under the supervision of Julian Schwinger. He 
chose the quantization of the gravitational field as his topic, which defined his research 
for the remainder of his career.203 Quantum gravity was an uncommon choice of topic for 
a young physicist. DeWitt later reflected that “at the beginning my goal was regarded by 
colleagues as [] indecent: not what ‘real’ physicists do.”204  
 Upon completion of his Ph.D., DeWitt spent time as a postdoctoral fellow at the 
Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton, the ETH in Zurich, and the Tata Institute of 
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Fundamental Research in Bombay. DeWitt’s time in Bombay was interrupted by illness, 
but he eventually completed his final post-doc in 1952. Upon returning to the United 
States, DeWitt struggled to find a job, partially due to the unpopularity of general 
relativity research at the time, as well as his time spent abroad.  As he recalls, it was 
difficult for him to begin his career as an American physicist, considering “how hostile 
the physics community was, in [the 1950s], to persons who studied general relativity.”205 
Unable to find an academic appointment, DeWitt took a job at the nuclear weapons 
laboratory in Livermore in 1952, while his wife Cecile DeWitt-Morette, a physicist and 
mathematician, worked in Europe.206  
In the meantime, Wheeler had taken a notice in DeWitt’s work. Wheeler became 
a sponsor for DeWitt and was instrumental in securing positions for both DeWitts at the 
University of North Carolina (UNC) in Chapel Hill.207 Bryce came on as a visiting 
research professor and director of the Institute of Field Physics at UNC, and was later 
promoted to full professor. Cecile also began as assistant visiting professor but was later 
demoted to lecturer.208 Largely due to UNC’s unwillingness to give Cecile a full position, 
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the DeWitts began looking for other opportunities in the 1970s.209 They decided to move 
University of Texas (UT) Austin in 1972, which had a vibrant group working on 
relativity and a tenured position for Cecile. Bryce was eventually instrumental in bringing 
Wheeler to UT Austin in 1976, after Wheeler retired from Princeton.210   
The relationship between Wheeler and DeWitt had a great influence on DeWitt’s 
thinking about quantum gravity, particularly his work on the canonical approach. He later 
reminisced that all of his thinking about the canonical theory of quantum gravity, and 
particularly the first part of the 1967 trilogy, was a direct result of his conversations with 
Wheeler.211 
 
3. DeWitt 
3.1 The 1967 Trilogy: the road to publication 
DeWitt’s 1967 trilogy was intended as a review of the state of progress in quantum 
gravity at the time, as well as an application of current theory to specific scenarios.212 It 
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was a project to which DeWitt devoted a great deal of time and effort, and in which he 
was personally invested. In a letter to Wheeler in dated June 17, 1966, DeWitt confessed, 
“The article has been a year and a half in preparation and this has meant long nights spent 
in my office rather than at home, and a neglected wife and children can testify that this 
project was not undertaken lightly.”213 It was thus disheartening to DeWitt when he 
encountered some resistance to the publication of the piece from editors and reviewers, 
including Wheeler himself, who reviewed the publication when it was originally 
submitted. Nevertheless, the piece was eventually published and heralded as a 
masterpiece. In 1975 Wheeler described the three papers as “Bible references in the 
field.”214 
 The publication was not initially intended as a trilogy for Physical Review, but 
was first submitted as a single long paper to the Review of Modern Physics.  However, 
the editor of Review of Modern Physics at the time, E.U. Condon, had major concerns 
with DeWitt’s submission in its original form. Condon contacted Wheeler, requesting 
that he review the paper and evaluate whether Condon’s concerns were justified. In a 
letter to Wheeler dated May 17, 1966, Condon wrote of DeWitt’s submission: “I find it 
extremely difficult to read and, although I am getting very, very old, admittedly, I doubt 
if it is intelligible to anyone except real specialists in this game like yourself.”215 Further, 
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Condon was concerned that the paper was not a literature review but constituted original 
research, based primarily on the grounds that a title-page footnote stated “this research 
was supported by […]”.216 Further, Condon was concerned that the Institute of Field 
Physics at UNC Chapel Hill had already published it.217 Despite these concerns, Condon 
wrote to Wheeler: “there are always borderline cases so I would not be rigid (despite my 
own inability to understand it!) if it would be of such great value to physics that we 
should publish it.” Further, he added: “I like the title and wish I could publish a paper on 
the subject that could really be read by the laity.”218 
Wheeler was sympathetic to Condon’s concerns about DeWitt’s submission, and 
contacted DeWitt by phone to discuss.219 In response to the phone conversation, DeWitt 
wrote Wheeler a long letter in defense of his publication.  In the letter DeWitt went 
through each section of his article, pointing out which portions constituted “review” and 
which “original contribution”; further, he did the same for several recent Review of 
Modern Physics articles, showing the ratio of review to original contribution in his 
submission to be similar to that of other articles the journal had published.220 After 
presenting his case on this point, DeWitt made it clear that he was disappointed Wheeler 
                                                
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Bryce DeWitt to John Wheeler, 17 June 1966. Wheeler papers, American 
Philosophical Society. 
220 Ibid. 
 142 
wasn’t more receptive to the publication, and upset at the suggestion that it was too 
technical. He wrote passionately to Wheeler,  
Should I really take my work, chop it into pieces, jazz it up with 
speculative gimmicks, and feed it to the public in a steady stream of 
advertising copy? […] I would be very happy if you would take an 
item from my article --- any item – and pick it to pieces, showing why 
you think it is wrong and in what way it might be corrected. Then I 
could write a better article. But to have you reject the article on 
grounds which I really have not understood, while implying that 
pressure of time prevents you from taking more than a cursory look at 
it, is unfair. Crackpots are treated in this fashion. It will indeed be 
nice to have a chance to go over parts of it with you next fall. But that 
will be next fall, and the article was submitted in May.221 
 
Wheeler eventually suggested that, with a bit of reworking, the article would be suitable 
for publication in Physical Review as opposed to Review of Modern Physics. In 
particular, he recommended the paper be divided into three installments, arguing that the 
canonical and covariant theories were so different that their inclusion in a single 
publication compromised its coherence. Wheeler felt this division would make the paper 
accessible to readers and suitable for publication. 222  DeWitt followed this advice, and 
the trilogy was accepted for publication in Physical Review in three installments in 
1967.223  
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3.2 Quantum Theory of Gravity I: The Canonical theory 
The first installment of the trilogy is devoted to canonical quantum gravity, and contains 
the equation that has come to be referred to as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. It should be 
noted that DeWitt believed the canonical approach to be a less promising route to a 
theory of quantum gravity than the covariant approach. In 1967 DeWitt claimed that, 
because the canonical approach singled out time for special treatment, it was not in 
keeping with the spirit of general relativity.224 Further, he wrote later in life that he had 
primarily been interested in the canonical approach in the 1960s because of “the bizarre 
logical pathways one has to follow in interpreting it,” rather than due to a belief that it 
was a viable path forward in developing a quantum theory of gravity.225 However, 
DeWitt’s interpretive pathway is of great interest for the purposes of this chapter. In this 
section I will analyze the canonical paper, paying close attention to the elements DeWitt 
described as the “bizarre features of the formalism […] which are of possible 
cosmological and even metaphysical significance.”226 
  The first paper of the trilogy, which DeWitt describes in the introduction as “the 
direct outcome of conversations with Wheeler,” is organized into ten sections. The first 
section constitutes a historical introduction to quantum gravity, focusing on the canonical 
tradition, with emphasis on the work of Rosenfeld in the 1930s and Bergmann in the 
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1950s.227 Sections two and three develop Einstein’s gravitational field equations in the 
classical canonical representation, building on the work of physicists including Arnowitz, 
Deser, Misner, Peres, and Wheeler.228 This involves an equation to describe the 
“curvature of the hypersurface as viewed from the 4th dimensional space-time in which it 
is embedded,” which is the space-like cross-section central to the canonical approach.229 
DeWitt introduces “quantum constraints” in section four, immediately noting that these 
constraints are “often a source of puzzlement and confusion.”230 The issue he is referring 
to lies with the fact that when the constraints are applied, the equations appear to imply 
that there is no time-evolution in the universe. This could lead to the “conclusion that 
nothing ever happens in quantum gravidynamics, that the quantum theory can never yield 
anything but a static picture of the world.”231 This possibility – that the quantum universe 
is static and timeless – is unattractive to DeWitt, who makes efforts throughout the 
remainder of the paper to show that there is a role for time in a quantum universe, even if 
this involves a new interpretation of what time “is”. 
DeWitt first addresses the issue by suggesting the seeming timelessness of the 
quantum universe is an artifact of the arbitrary choice of coordinates, particularly and the 
space-like cross-section x0=constant. He writes:  
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instead of regarding this […] as implying that the universe is static 
we shall interpret it as informing us that the coordinate labels xµ are 
really irrelevant. Physical significance can be ascribed only to the 
intrinsic dynamics of the world, and for the description of this we 
need some kind of intrinsic coordinization based either on the 
geometry or the contents of the universe.232  
 
In other words, the seemingly static nature of the universe is due the arbitrary designation 
of space-like and time-like coordinates, which assumes that time is external to the 
system. DeWitt goes on in section five to develop the quantized gravitational field 
equations, leading to the “functional wave equation” of the universe that has come to be 
referred to as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.  Returning to the issue of the apparently 
static universe, he suggests the possibility of reintroducing a time-like coordinate. This 
would support the idea that an “intrinsic time” exists, and that the universe “does have 
dynamic content.”233 
In section six, DeWitt discusses the phenomenon of “gravitational collapse.”234 In 
sections seven, eight, and nine, he applies the Wheeler-DeWitt equation to the Friedmann 
universe. DeWitt chooses the Friedmann model for these final sections because it is “the 
simplest classical model which exhibits the collapse phenomenon.”235 Further, the 
Friedmann universe allows DeWitt to find solutions to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, 
using approximation techniques. Although greatly simplified, the approximate equations 
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describing the Friedmann universe provide a point of entry for DeWitt to discuss some 
features of a universe described by a “universal wave function,” including the nature of 
time. 
 In section seven, after solving the Wheeler-DeWitt equation for the Friedman 
universe using approximate techniques, DeWitt introduces the idea that within the 
universe “the collective internal motion permits the particle ensemble to be used as a 
clock.”236 This idea is developed further in section eight, in which DeWitt considers three 
possible wave-packets to describe such a universe.  He describes these wave-packets as 
providing “three distinct mathematical windows from which to view the Friedmann 
world.”237 He goes on: 
From one window the material content of the universe is seen as a 
clock for determining the dynamical behavior of the world 
geometry. From another it is the geometry which appears as a 
clock for determining the dynamical behavior of the material 
content. From the third the geometry and the material content 
appear on equal footing, each one correlated in a certain manner 
with the other. 
 
DeWitt concludes, “The third window is to be preferred as most accurately revealing the 
physics of the quantized Friedmann model.”238 This is firstly because the time variables 
in the first two windows “are not rigorously observable and hence cannot yield a measure 
of proper time which is valid under all circumstances.”239 However, DeWitt notes that 
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even in the third window the concept of time is problematic. This is due to “the fact that 
the wave packets [in the first two windows] spread in ‘time,’ whereas the packet [in the 
third window] does not.”240 This allows DeWitt to draw the final conclusion that, due to 
the absence of spreading, “we may say that ‘time’ is only a phenomenological concept, 
useful under certain circumstances.”241 
DeWitt continues: “it is not necessary to drag in the whole universe to argue for 
the phenomenological character of time.”242 He writes, “If the principle of general 
covariance is truly valid, […] the only time which a covariant theory can admit is an 
intrinsic time defined by the contents of the universe itself.”243 He finally concludes that 
“when the whole universe is cast in the role of a clock, the concept of time can of course 
be made fantastically accurate (at least in principle) because of the enormity of the 
masses and quantum numbers involved. But as long as the universe is finite, a theoretical 
limit to the accuracy nevertheless remains.”244 DeWitt argues that time is a convergent 
property of the universe, limited by the finite extent of the universe. He arrives at his 
intrinsic definition of time from the consequences of applying quantum constraints to the 
equations of general relativity, as well as from the general principle of covariance. This 
definition of time leads him to the conclusion that time is an approximate concept, due to 
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features of a universe described by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, as well due to the 
finitude of the universe. The formalism of canonical quantum gravity, along with other 
considerations, suggests to DeWitt that, when considered in the context of the universe as 
a whole, time cannot be a precisely defined concept.245 
In section ten, DeWitt explicitly engages in speculative and interpretive questions 
resulting from the formalism he has developed for canonical quantum gravity. He notes 
that much interpretive work has already been carried out in earlier portions of the paper, 
and that “the economy of quantum gravidynamics is […] revealed in the manner in which 
the formalism determines its own interpretation.”246  Here he is referring to the notion of 
intrinsic time he introduced earlier, as well as the way in which the seemingly static 
nature of the universe “forces us to abandon all use of externally imposed coordinates (in 
particular x0) and to look instead for an internal description of the dynamics.”247 He then 
uses the relationship between formalism and interpretation to transition to a discussion of 
the work of Hugh Everett, whom DeWitt describes as believing that formalism and 
interpretation should be one and the same in quantum mechanics.248 This is followed by a 
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brief description of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the idea that the 
“wave functions which undergo repeated fission, corresponding to the many possible 
outcomes of a given physical process,” accurately represent reality.249 DeWitt believes 
canonical quantum gravity naturally lends itself to the Everett interpretation, where the 
wave function is literally interpreted as the wave function of the universe. He writes that 
“[a]ccording to Everett, the wave function […] provides a faithful representation of 
reality; it is the universe itself which splits.”250 This is well suited to canonical quantum 
gravity, in which “one is accustomed to speak without embarrassment of the “wave 
function of the universe.”251 DeWitt takes this one step further, claiming “Everett’s view 
is not only natural [to canonical quantum gravity] but essential.”252  
DeWitt then uses the Everett interpretation to explain the strange nature of time in 
the Friedmann universe; that is, the fact that wave packets don’t “spread” in time, which 
led him to the conclusion that time is a “phenomenological” concept.  After asserting that 
“the same must be true for the real universe,” he draws the conclusion that the appearance 
of change in time in human experience is due to the multiplicity of Everett “branches”, 
and that the universe itself repeats a single, monotonous “motion”.  He writes that the 
motion of the universe would be “repeated over and over again, like a movie film, 
throughout eternity, the monotony of which would be alleviated only by the infinite 
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variety to be found among the multitude of simultaneous parallel worlds all executing the 
cycle together.”253 He thus sees the implications of canonical quantum gravity, with 
respect to time, to be deeply connected to interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
 Interestingly, this line of thinking leads DeWitt to a discussion of entropy in the 
final paragraphs of his paper. He writes that entropy’s increase in time is a relative to a 
specific branch in the Everett interpretation. However, “for every Everett branch in which 
entropy increases with time there must be another in which entropy decreases with time. 
To an observer in the second branch “time” in fact appears to be “flowing” in the 
opposite sense.”254  DeWitt explains the apparent arrow of time as branch-dependent, 
with time-reversal invariance obtaining for the universe as a whole as described by the 
universal wave equation. This being said, he acknowledges recent experiments that 
suggest the violation of time-reversal invariance, likely the work of Cronin and Fitch on 
CP violation. He writes:  
it is difficult to say how these conclusions must be modified if, as 
recent experiments suggest, the real world is not invariant under 
time reversal. However, the world being as complicated as it is, it is 
still quite possible that there is no preferred direction in time. The 
ensemble of Everett branches in which time has given direction of 
flow may very well be balanced by another ensemble in which time 
flows oppositely, so that reality as a whole possesses no over-all 
time orientation despite the absence of time-reversal invariance.255 
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DeWitt contemplates the nature of time at several points throughout the paper. His 
treatment of quantum constraints and the Wheeler DeWitt equation leads him to an 
understanding of time as “intrinsic,” and his later analysis of a wave-packet in the 
Friedman universe results in the conclusion that time is a “phenomenological” concept. 
Further, in the concluding section DeWitt directly connects these implications about time 
to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, further developing his interpretive 
line of thinking about time in a quantum universe. Section 3.3 below will further explore 
the connections DeWitt draws between the Everett interpretation, quantum gravity, and 
time, bringing the nature of his interpretive engagement with time into sharper focus. 
 
3.3 The Everett Interpretation 
DeWitt’s thinking about canonical quantum gravity was deeply connected to his views on 
interpreting quantum mechanics, particularly the Everett interpretation, as is clear from 
the concluding section of his 1967 paper. Hugh Everett had been a graduate student of 
Wheeler’s at Princeton, completing his PhD thesis in March of 1957. The thesis was 
almost identical to a paper by Everett published in Reviews of Modern Physics in July 
1957.256 The edition of Review of Modern Physics in which the paper appeared was 
dedicated to a gravitation conference at Chapel Hill organized by the DeWitts, and Bryce 
DeWitt was one of the editors.257 DeWitt later commented that when he first read the 
                                                
256 Hugh Everett III, “‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics,” in Review of 
Modern Physics, 29 (July, 1957), 454 - 462. 
257 AIP interview of DeWitt by Ford. 
 152 
paper, as part of the editorial team for the journal, he was “stunned” and “shocked” by the 
ideas.258 In the paper Everett presented an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has 
since been controversial among physicists and philosophers alike, although it didn’t 
became widely known among academic circles until the 1970s. DeWitt played a major 
role in gaining visibility for Everett’s views by publishing an article in Physics Today in 
1970, advocating for the interpretation. In this article DeWitt coined the term “many-
worlds,” which has come to be associated with Everett’s ideas. DeWitt wrote the Physics 
Today article because he felt the physics community was neglecting Everett’s ideas. He 
later commented: “[Everett] was being completely ignored. So I decided to write an 
article, a popular article, for Physics Today, which really put Everett on the map.”259 
The history of Everett’s thesis and its reception is well documented in a paper 
published by Osnaghi, Feitas, and Freire in 2009. In this paper, the authors unpack early 
debates over the Everett interpretation that took place within Bohr’s Copenhagen group 
in the late 1950s, as Wheeler tried to convince Bohr of the merit of his student’s work. 
The paper includes extensive discussion of the context and genesis of Everett’s thesis, as 
well as the content of the ideas. The authors summarize Everett’s interpretation, using 
quotations from Everett’s thesis and manuscripts, as follows:  
The ‘‘conceptual model of the universe’’ that Everett proposed 
‘‘postulates only the existence of the universal wave function which 
obeys a linear wave equation.” […] Everett put it as follows: ‘‘The 
physical ‘reality’ is assumed to be the wave function of the whole 
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universe itself.’’260 
  
They go on to recount the debates that ensued following the publication of the thesis, 
particularly among Bohr’s Copenhagen circle, revealing how deeply Bohr and his group 
adhered to the orthodoxy of the Copenhagen interpretation. When discussing DeWitt, 
they note that he was particularly amenable to Everett’s ideas because he “had no 
sympathy for the Copenhagen interpretation.”261 They also note the connection DeWitt 
drew between Everett’s ideas and his own work on quantum gravity, claiming that 
“DeWitt’s interest in Everett’s ideas was at least partly due to the role that they could 
play in the framework of his own research programme on quantum gravity.”262 DeWitt 
was an early champion of Everett’s work, well before his ideas were discussed more 
widely within the physics community. He was excited by Everett’s paper due to 
connections he drew to his own work on canonical quantum gravity, but also felt that 
interpretive question about fundamental concepts were of great importance for physics. 
The remainder of this section will consider DeWitt’s views on Everett, as presented in his 
1970 Physics Today article, to further develop a picture of DeWitt’s interpretive 
engagement with concepts of time, quantum mechanics, and the universe. 
 
*** 
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DeWitt begins his 1970 Physics Today article by presenting his view on the measurement 
problem in quantum mechanics, followed by a description of three possible solutions, one 
of which is the Everett interpretation. In the article he refers to this interpretation as the 
“EWG metatheorem”, describing it as an “assertion first given in 1957 by Hugh Everett 
with the encouragement of John Wheeler and has been subsequently elaborated by R. 
Neill Graham.”263 He uses the majority of the article to unpack the EWG metatheorem, 
which he believes to be the most promising of the three options. He writes: 
Of the three main proposals for solving this dilemma, I shall focus 
on one that pictures the universe as continually splitting into a 
multiplicity of mutually unobservable but equally real worlds, in 
each one of which a measurement does give a definite result. 
Although this proposal leads to a bizarre worldview, it may be the 
most satisfying answer yet advanced.264  
 
DeWitt continues: 
The obstacle to taking such a lofty view of things, of course, is that 
it forces us to believe in the reality of all the simultaneous worlds 
represented in the superposition [...], in each of which the 
measurement has yielded a different outcome. […] The universe is 
constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches, all 
resulting from the measurement-like interactions between its 
myriads of components.265  
 
Recognizing this difficulty with the interpretation, he nevertheless believes that it is 
possible and likely, as Everett suggests, that the universe in reality splits. He directly 
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comments on this, demonstrating his willingness to engage in questions about the 
ontology of the universe and its relation to human experience. 
It is clear throughout the article that DeWitt sees Everett’s universal wave 
equation as akin to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. He believes such an equation is 
unavoidable, writing: “If I am part of the universe, how does it happen that I am able, 
without running into inconsistencies, to include as much or as little as I like of the real 
world of cosmology in my state vector? Why should I be able, in practice, to avoid 
dealing with the state vector of the universe?”266  DeWitt sees a line of connection 
between his work on canonical quantum gravity – and the Wheeler-DeWitt equation that 
is its centerpiece – and explicitly interpretive questions about the nature of the universe. 
DeWitt makes it clear in this paper that he places a great deal of importance on 
questions of interpretation. He writes that despite the fact that the EWG interpretation 
does not yield experimental predictions, it has the “merit of bringing most of the 
fundamental issues of measurement theory clearly into the foreground, and hence of 
providing a useful framework for discussion.”267 He explicitly makes a claim for the 
importance of “philosophy of science”:  
[T]he EWG interpretation of quantum mechanics has an important 
contribution to make to the philosophy of science. By showing that 
formalism alone is sufficient to generate interpretation, it has 
breathed new life into the old idea of a direct correspondence 
between formalism and reality. The reality implied here is 
admittedly bizarre. To anyone who is awestruck by the vastness of 
the presently known universe, the view from where Everett, Wheeler 
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and Graham sit is truly impressive. Yet it is a completely causal 
view, which even Einstein might have accepted. At any rate, it has a 
better claim than most to be the natural end product of the 
interpretation program begun by Heisenberg in 1925.”268 
 
DeWitt is explicitly engaged in what he sees as the “philosophical” side of physics, to 
which he attributes great importance. While he never strays far from technical 
discussions, he sees fundamental, ontological questions as central to his work as a 
physicist.  
DeWitt saw a particular approach to interpreting in physics – that is, interpreting 
formalism literally - as embodied by Everett’s ideas. He adopted this approach in his 
thinking about canonical quantum gravity and time, which helped him give meaning to 
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, its implications for time, as well as shape his general ideas 
about interpretation in physics.  
 
3.4 DeWitt, Physicist-Philosopher 
Later in life, DeWitt distanced himself from the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and canonical 
quantum gravity. In a talk delivered in 1997, he explained: “Some of you here have heard 
me refer to [the Wheeler-DeWitt equation] as ‘that damned equation.’” He attributed this 
to the fact that his “heart wasn’t really in it,” as even in 1967 he found the covariant path 
to quantum gravity much more promising than the canonical theory.  He went on: “[the 
Wheeler-DeWitt equation] has played a useful role in getting physicists to frame 
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important and fundamental questions, but otherwise I think it is a bad equation.”269 Even 
as DeWitt distanced himself from the equation, it is clear that he valued the fundamental 
questions it raised. 
 Interpretive questions about the meaning of fundamental concepts were highly 
valued by DeWitt, as is clear from his engagement with time in his 1967 paper, as well as 
his championing of Everett’s work. Such questions were central to his canonical quantum 
gravity work, which was highly technical in tone. How did he come to this philosophical 
sensibility, uncommon during this period of American physics, in which he injected 
philosophical questions about fundamental questions into highly technical work? First, by 
selecting general relativity and quantum gravity as his primary research topic, and 
working exclusively on the problems involved, he began career on the fringes of 
mainstream physics. Yet his relationship with Wheeler, and Wheeler’s work in promoting 
general relativity and quantum gravity research in general in the 1950s, helped DeWitt 
establish himself, and his style of doing physics, within the larger physics community. 
DeWitt’s exposure to Everett’s ideas further helped him develop his thinking about 
fundamental questions of interpretation.  
 Questions about time in the context of quantum gravity were also of great 
importance to Wheeler. In section four below I will look to Wheeler’s early work 
involving the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, as well as his later views on time and quantum 
gravity, to further unpack the way this subgroup of physicists working on quantum 
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gravity in the post-war United States questioned the meaning of fundamental concepts 
like time. 
 
4. Wheeler  
4.1 Superspace and Geometrodynamics 
In the summer of 1967, Wheeler delivered a talk at the first Battelle Rencontres meeting 
in Seattle, organized by Cecille DeWitt and Wheeler himself.  The proceedings of that 
meeting contain one of Wheeler’s first recorded mentions of the “Einstein-Schodinger” 
equation. Throughout the published version of the lecture, Wheeler’s tone is figurative 
and expansive. For example, in the opening paragraph he writes: 
one needs only to mount to this point of view to have the whole 
content of Einstein’s theory spread out before his eyes, as in the 
outlook from a mountain peak. […] What is the nature of the 
landscape that we see from this height? What structures can we hope 
to build upon this landscape? And what kinds of mysteries are 
hidden in the mists beyond?270 
 
Beginning on this lofty note, it is not surprising that Wheeler freely speculated about the 
nature of fundamental concepts, including the nature of space and time, in what followed.  
The “mysteries hidden in the mists beyond” are explicitly at stake for him as he discusses 
quantum gravity. 
Geometrodynamics is a word Wheeler coined, based on the notion that, “the 
geometry of three-dimensional space is something that can undergo change as time 
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passes, and propagate from one place to another, just as electromagnetic fields do.”271 
Wheeler used the term “Superspace” to describe the background against which 
geometrodynamics takes place, writing: “geometrodynamics takes place in the arena of 
superspace.”272 In the introductory section of the lecture, Wheeler makes it explicit that 
the object he is interested in is three-dimensional space, changing against the backdrop of 
superspace, and not four-dimensional spacetime. He writes: “Here the dynamic object is 
not spacetime. It is space.”273 He does not find this surprising, noting that “in particle 
dynamics the dynamical object is not x and t, but only x.”274 He recognizes that this goes 
against the grain of current thinking in general relativity, and that it will be difficult for 
physicists to “change their minds and take back one dimension.”275 Nevertheless, he 
believes that “a decade and more of work” in the fields of general relativity and quantum 
gravity “has taught us through many a hard knock that Einstein’s geometrodynamics 
deals with the dynamics of geometry: of 3-geometry, not 4-geometry.”276 While DeWitt 
is more nuanced on this point in his 1967 paper – singling out a 3-dimensional cross-
section of spacetime, but ultimately avoiding external designation of space-like and time-
like coordinates – Wheeler enthusiastically singles out space as distinct from time. 
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Wheeler’s lecture begins with a discussion of classical geometrodynamics and the 
formulation of Einstein’s equations by Peres. He refers to this as the “Einstein-Hamilton-
Jacobi” equation, and notes some interesting features with respect to time.277 That is, he 
believes that time, in the context of this classical equation, “means nothing more or less 
than the location of the (3)g in the (4)g,” with (3)g and (4)g standing for three-dimensional 
space and 4-dimensional spacetime, respectively. In this sense “3-geometry is a carrier of 
information about time.”278 Wheeler then comments on the meaning of time as he turns 
his discussion to quantum geometrodynamics, in which he believes the concept of 4-
dimensional spacetime is no longer meaningful. Here he writes that, in quantum 
geometrodynamics, “the (3)g’s that occur with significant probability amplitude do not fit 
and cannot be fitted into any single (4)g. [One cannot] organize the (3)g’s of significance 
into a definite relation to another.” He concludes from this that the “time ordering of 
events is a notion devoid of all meaning.”279 He speculates further: 
Spacetime and time itself are not primary but secondary ideas in the 
structure of physical theory. These concepts are valid in the classical 
approximation. However, they have neither meaning nor application 
under circumstances when quantum-geometrodynamical effects 
become important. Then one has to forgo that view of nature in 
which every event, past, present, or future, occupies its preordained 
position in a grand catalog called “spacetime.” There is no 
spacetime, there is no time, there is no before, there is no after. The 
question what happens “next” is without meaning.280 
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Wheeler goes beyond DeWitt’s claim that time is “intrinsic” or “phenomenological”, 
directly asserting that “there is no time.” He devotes several paragraphs to this 
speculative point about the nature of time, which he sees as one of the important 
conclusions to be drawn from quantum geometrodynamics. 
 Wheeler goes on to consider particular issues – the Planck length, gravitational 
collapse, and quantum fluctuations – in the context of quantum geometrodynamics. He 
then discusses the specific problem of the structure of superspace, at which point he 
introduces the “Einstein-Schrodinger equation.” Of this equation he writes, “In 
geometrodynamics the structure of superspace is to be considered as defined entirely 
internally; that is to say, by the very form of the “Einstein Schrodinger equation” 
itself.”281  Unlike DeWitt, who first derives the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, and then draws 
interpretive conclusions from the equation concerning time, Wheeler begins his lecture 
with interpretive conclusions about time and space, which he then describes with the 
equation. While the two physicists differed in their paths and approaches, both Wheeler 
and DeWitt saw the “equation of the universe” in quantum gravity as deeply connected to 
interpretive questions about the nature of time. While Wheeler may have gone farther in 
drawing conclusions about the nature of time –and speculated more freely on the topic – 
both were engaged in questions about the meaning of fundamental concepts.  
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4.2 World as System 
By the 1980s Wheeler’s research interests had gradually shifted from general relativity to 
information theory, yet his interest in the meaning of the concept of time in the context of 
quantum gravity persisted. In his autobiographical reminiscences Wheeler described the 
shift in his interests in terms of his desire to understand the universe on the most 
fundamental level. He wrote: 
I think of my lifetime in physics as divided into three periods. In the 
first period, extending from the beginning of my career until the 
early 1950s, I was in the grip of the idea that Everything Is Particles. 
I was looking for ways to build all basic entities – neutrons, protons, 
mesons, and so on – out of the lightest most fundamental particles, 
electrons and photons. […] I call my second period Everything Is 
fields. From the time I fell in love with general relativity and 
gravitation in 1952 until late in my career, I pursued the vision of a 
world made of fields, in which the apparent particles are really 
manifestations of electric and magnetic fields, gravitational fields, 
and spacetime itself. […] Now I am in the grip of a new vision, that 
Everything Is Information.282 
 
While in the grips of his “Everything is Information” period in 1988, Wheeler published 
an overtly philosophical paper in which he directly commented on the meaning of time. 
In this paper he discussed many ideas that he had first raised in the early 1970s, drawing 
philosophical conclusions that had come to be characteristic of his work. However, in this 
1988 paper Wheeler places particular emphasis on the nature of time and its connection 
to earlier work in quantum gravity, which is why I have selected it for close attention. 
This following section will unpack Wheeler’s ideas in this 1988 paper, looking to how 
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his engagement in philosophical thinking manifested itself in his later work, and the way 
in which questions about time and quantum gravity persisted in his thinking.  
Wheeler’s paper, entitled “World as system self-synthesized by quantum 
networking,” is explicitly concerned with philosophical questions about “the secret of 
existence” and the “structure of the world”.283 The motivating idea behind the paper, 
which he first proposed in lecture in Oxford in 1974,284 is that the “system of shared 
experience which we call the world [builds] itself out of […] elementary acts of observer-
participancy.”285 Wheeler believes that the questions observers ask of the world, and the 
ways in which they communicate their findings, generate “that whole great system which 
to a superficial look is time and space, particles and fields.”286  The system, in turn, 
generates the observers. He illustrates this notion of a self-synthesizing system with the 
following illustration: 
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Figure 3.1, from “World as System,” p. 5 
MEANING 
^^r Communicators 
World viewed as a self-synthesi/mg system of existences Phvsics gives light and sound and pressure-tools, to query and to communicate Physics 
also gives chemistry and biology and, through them, observer-participators They, by way ol the devices they employ, the questions they ask, and 
the registrations that they communicate, put into action quantum-mechanical probability amplitudes and thus develop all they know or ever can 
know about the world. 
In a double-slit electron-interference experiment of the type proposed by Aharonov and Bohm, the interference fringes experience a phase shift 
proportional-so it is customary to say-to the flux of magnetic field through the domain bounded by the two electron paths. We reverse the 
language when we turn to the idea interpretation of nature. We speak of the magnetic field-and, by extension, spacetime and all other fields, and 
the whole world of particles built upon these fields-as having no function, no significance, no existence, except insofar as they affect wave phase, 
affect a 2-slit interference pattern, or, more concretely, affect the counting rate of elementary quantum phenomena. Fields and particles give 
physics and close the loop. 
It is a strange business to report about what we don't 
know. It is no stranger, however, than recounting the first 
half of a detective story of which the second half is missing. 
We know how difficult it is to pick out the clues, let alone 
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Wheeler structures his paper around four “clues” that “bear on the suspicion the 
quantum is the foundation of physics, that the world is a self-synthesizing system.”287 
The clues are “no-continuum”, “observer-participancy”, “austerity”, and 
“timelessness”.288 Regarding “timelessness” Wheeler writes: 
The deepest insights we have on time today come out of Einstein's 
1915 and still standard theory of general relativity in its quantum 
version. This quantum geometrodynamics tells us that the very 
concepts of spacetime and of before and after break down at ultra-small 
distances. In tomorrow's deeper dispensation, we know that time cannot 
be an entity primordial and precisely supplied - as elasticity once 
seemed to be - free of charge from outside physics. Like elasticity, the 
very concept of time must be secondary, approximate, derived: derived 
from profound considerations of a quantum flavor.289 
 
He concludes, “We must consider time as myth.”290 We see here that Wheeler’s ideas 
about the nature of time stem from his understanding of quantum geometrodynanics. He 
brings implications about time, drawn from his earlier research program on quantum 
gravity, to bear on his new ideas about the universe. 
He continues, with regard to timelessness: 
The concept of time was not handed down from heaven. Neither was it 
supplied free of charge from outside for the benefit of physics. The 
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very word is a human invention, and the problems that come with it are 
of human origin. The miracle is only this, that a notion with so little 
undergirding has managed to stretch, without snapping, to encompass 
so much. Einstein's 1915 geometrodynamics continues to serve as the 
generally agreed authority for all that time now means and measures.291  
 
 
Finally, he concludes: “Today time is in trouble. […] [T]here is no such thing as 
spacetime.”292  He understands this conclusion, which is similar to one he drew 20 years 
earlier with respect to geometrodyanics, as a clue to understanding “mysteries of 
existence.” 
Wheeler goes on to explicitly discuss the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, criticizing 
the whole quantum gravity project for presupposing that the universe exists in the first 
place: 
It is not enough in dealing with these difficulties to quantize Einstein's 
geometric theory of gravity according to the pattern for quantizing any 
other standard field theory; not enough to write down the resulting 
often-discussed wave equation […] not enough—despite all the 
fascination and instructiveness of the work of Everett, De Witt, Hartle, 
and Hawking towards interpreting the result—to calculate in this way 
the probability amplitude […] for this, that and the other 3-geometry. 
This whole line of analysis presupposes that there is such a thing as 
"the universe””293  
 
For Wheeler, the “universe” does not exist, and neither does “time.” Neither have 
meaning or existence outside of the self-synthesizing interaction between observers and a 
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system. 
 Wheeler became increasingly comfortable and interested in making ontological 
claims regarding space, time, and the universe in the decades following his work 
involving the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in the late 1960s. Further, even when he moved 
on to pursue fields other than general relativity and quantum gravity, the work from that 
field in the 1960s – to which the Wheeler-DeWitt equation belongs – continued to 
influence the way that he thought about the nature of time and the universe.  
 
4.3 Wheeler, physicist-philosopher 
John Wheeler was well known for being a particularly expansive and speculative 
physicist. In an obituary in Physics Today published not long after Wheeler’s death in 
2008, Misner, Thorne, and Zurek put forward the view that Wheeler had “earned” the 
right to be speculative and bold due to the many successes he’d had in physics, and the 
overall respect he had garnered among the physics community in the process. As they 
wrote: 
Wheeler's many successes entitled him to examine crazy-sounding 
ideas without fear, one by one, aiming to discover which ones must be 
discarded and whether any of them should be taken seriously. [….] 
Wheeler's poetic imagination—with its deep, almost philosophical 
questions such as How come the quantum? and How come 
existence?—combined with his engineering common sense that brought 
many of his lofty ideas down to earth was his trademark way of doing 
physics.294 
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Along similar lines, in an obituary published in the Proceedings Of The American 
Philosophical Society Freeman Dyson described Wheeler as: “ a conservative 
revolutionary, a prosaic poet, a calculating dreamer.”295 Dyson continues, describing the 
“poetic Wheeler,” 
Who asks outrageous questions and takes nothing for granted. The 
poetic Wheeler writes papers and books with titles such as “Beyond the 
Black Hole,” Frontiers of Time, and Law without Law. His message is 
a call for radical revolution. “As surely as we now know how tangible 
water forms out of invisible vapor, so surely we shall some- day know 
how the universe comes into being. We will first understand how 
simple the universe is when we recognize how strange it is. The 
simplicity of that strangeness, Everest summit, so well directs the eye 
that the feet can afford to toil up and down many a wrong mountain 
valley, certain stage by stage to reach someday the goal. Of all strange 
features of the universe, none are stranger than these: time is 
transcended, laws are mutable, and observer-participancy matters.”296 
 
Wheeler came to exemplify the philosophically minded American physicist of the post-
war period, who thought cosmologically about physics, engaged with fundamental 
ontological questions in his interpretations of physics, and drew speculative conclusion 
about the nature of time throughout his career.  Questions about the meaning of time 
occupied him throughout his life. As he reminisced in his autobiographical notes: “Time 
is, in fact, an immensely complex idea that sits at the core of critical unanswered 
questions about the universe and existence, questions I can’t stop pondering.”297  
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 From his speculation about time and quantum gravity in the 1960s to his later 
discussions of observer participancy and timelessness in the 1970s and 80s, Wheeler was 
among the most visible physcists during the postwar period interested in fundamental and 
philosophical questions. Historians of science have attributed this characteristic to 
Wheeler’s relationship with NIels Bohr. For example, David Kaiser wrote in How the 
Hippies Saved Physics, that Wheeler 
came of age in the 1920s and 1930s, a time when Americans who 
wanted to become theoretical physicists still had to travel to Europe to 
[…]. Wheeler studies with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in the 1930s and 
often hosted his mentor during Bohr’s many extended visits to 
Princeton after the war. These contacts hoped to stoke Wheeler’s 
continuing philos[ohical engagement with quantum theory.298 
 
Wheeler exemplified the American physicist who was technical, pragmatic, and 
speculative all at once.  
 
5. Legacy in Quantum Gravity 
In the years following its introduction in 1967, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation was viewed 
as a major achievement among the small group of physicists working in the field. 
Scholars such as Peres, Misner, Hawking, Kuchar, and Wheeler often cited the first 
installment of DeWitt’s trilogy as the authority on canonical quantum.299 Renewed 
                                                
298 Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics, 75. 
299 Asher Peres, “Canonical Quantization of Gravitational Field,” in Physical Review 171 
(July, 1968): 1335-1344; Charles W. Misner, “Quantum Cosmology .1.” in Physical 
review 186 (July, 1969), 1319-1327; Stephen Hawking, “Conservation of Matter in 
General Relativity,” Communications in Mathematical Physics 18 (June, 1970): 301-306; 
 170 
attention was given to the Wheeler-Dewitt equation in the late 1980s, when Ted Jacobson 
and Lee Smolin, working in the field of loop quantum gravity, found exact solutions to 
the equation, along with a more robust way of formulating it.300 Loop quantum gravity is 
now one of the major alternatives to string theory, although it still represents a minority 
of researchers working on unification efforts, and a very small minority of physicists.301 
Like Wheeler and DeWitt before them, researchers working on loop quantum 
gravity have used the equation, and the ideas about quantum gravity that accompany it, to 
ask deep questions about the nature of time.  For example, in Lee Smolin’s popular book 
Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, in which he describes his work on loop quantum 
gravity and the central role the Wheeler-DeWitt equation played in this work, Smolin 
directly discusses his understanding of the concept of time in physics. Early in the book 
he writes: “We now know that time also has no absolute meaning. There is no time apart 
from change. There is no such thing as a clock outside of the network of changing 
relationships.”302 Soon after, Smolin addresses the issue of whether “time exists” in the 
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context of the universe as a whole, and particularly whether quantum gravity implies a 
“static universe” in which nothing happens. He writes, “It is absurd […] to speak of a 
universe in which nothing happens. Time is nothing but a measure of change – it has no 
other meaning.”303 He continues:  
One reason why it has taken so long to construct a quantum theory 
of gravity is that all previous quantum theories were background 
dependent. It proved rather challenging to construct a background 
independent quantum theory, in which the mathematical structure of 
the quantum theory made no mention of points, except when 
identified through networks of relationship. […] the theory that 
resulted is loop quantum gravity.304  
 
Thus, according to Smolin’s account of the history of quantum gravity, the question of 
how to understand time has been central to the field.  He believes that the merit of loop 
quantum gravity lies with its interpretation of time. Further, he addresses questions that 
have historically occupied researchers in the field of quantum gravity – such the issues of 
the “static” universe – by leveraging his understand of what time “is”. Ontological 
questions about time are central to his project, as well as the way he interprets the history 
of the field. 
 Similarly, physicist Julian Barbour, who has also worked on loop quantum 
gravity, has used the ontological interpretation of the concept of time as a lens through 
which to understand the history of the field. He explicitly believes the Wheeler-DeWitt 
equation implies that time doesn’t exist, writing, “If one takes [the Wheeler-DeWitt 
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equation] seriously and looks for its simplest interpretation, the picture of the universe 
that emerges is like the contents of the Timeless Theory bag.”305 He believes that this 
provides profound insight into the nature of time. He writes, “We can go on to ask what 
this tells us about time. The implications are as profound as they can be. Time does not 
exist. […]  I see it as the only simple and plausible outcome of the epic struggle between 
the basic principles of quantum mechanics and general relativity.”306 
 Questioning and interpreting the meaning of “time” has been central to loop 
quantum gravity, a research program that has taken up the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, and 
has been a central motivation for the physicists involved. Smolin, like DeWitt, saw 
quantum gravity as necessitating a new definition of time, while Barbour, like Wheeler, 
was comfortable with the bolder claim that “time does not exist.”  Regardless, the 
differences between these positions are largely attributable to semantics and style; all of 
these physicists believe quantum gravity provides a framework for ontologically 
complicating the concept of time.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The question of what time “means” has been of great importance in the history of 
attempts to unify quantum mechanics and gravity. Physicists have had to grapple with the 
fact that the fields of quantum mechanics and general relativity have historically 
conceptualized time differently, and that the concept of spacetime in general relativity 
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could not be uncomplicatedly translated into a quantum theory of gravity. Questions 
about the nature of time have therefore taken a primary role in unification efforts, 
including the canonical quantum gravity research program that has been the subject of 
this chapter. Different physicists within the canonical quantum gravity tradition have 
treated the issue in multiple ways. For example, DeWitt dealt with it by introducing his 
ideas of “intrinsic time” and “phenomenological time” and Wheeler addressed with it 
with bolder claims about the non-existence of time. Similarly, among a later generation 
of physicists, Smolin defined time in terms of the changing relationships within a system, 
and Barbour made bolder declarations that “time does not exist”. Regardless of the subtle 
differences among these conclusions, it is clear the nature and ontology of time has been 
at stake in this work.  
 Among the physicists treated in this chapter, there has been a range in how bold 
or overtly speculative they have chosen to be in their discussions of time; nevertheless, 
all engaged in interpretive work, and saw insight into the nature of time as central to their 
projects. In this way, all of their understandings of what constitutes “physics” included 
philosophical interpretation. This is not to say that they had no sense of the boundaries 
between what they perceived as “science” and “non-science”. For example, Wheeler 
wrote in his autobiographical reminiscences that he was upset when he learned that his 
work had been appropriated by what he termed “pseudoscientists.”307 He wrote: 
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To my discomfort and distress […] I found myself being 
increasingly cited by the pseudoscientists who were looking for 
scientific underpinnings for their moonshine. […] I didn’t mind that 
some of my respected colleagues in science though that I myself had 
gone a little bit around the bend. They were entitled to remain more 
conservative, as I tried to be daring, But is did bother me greatly 
when I found my work cited as supporting the paranormal.308  
 
This being said, the case of Wheeler, DeWitt, their quantum gravity equation, and its 
legacy shows that this small group of physicists included philosophical thinking within 
the boundaries of their discipline.  
 The type of interpretive thinking that characterized the subgroup involved with 
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation was exemplified by John Wheeler, who combined a 
pragmatic, typically American style of doing physics with an interest in philosophical 
questions inspired by his relationship with Niels Bohr. Further, Wheeler came to this 
mode of doing physics after having established himself in the physics community with 
his achievements in nuclear physics and his weapons work. Wheeler championed general 
relativity at a time when the physics community was generally hostile to the field, and 
helped carve out a space for other physicists to adopt his model of a philosophically 
interested, technically oriented physicist. DeWitt was part of this group, and brought a 
philosophical sensibility to his work on canonical quantum gravity, as well as his 
engagement with the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. This type of 
engagement with fundamental concepts, like time, carried on in the work of loop 
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quantum gravity researchers who took up the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in the 1980s and 
90s.  
Unlike other more pragmatically minded physicists – such as those discussed in 
chapters one and two of this dissertation, who differentiated their work strongly from 
philosophy and more closely aligned themselves with engineering and applied physics – 
these physicists were more than willing to engage in speculative, interpretive questioning. 
They understood the question “what is time” to be central to the project of physics, while 
other physicists – both theorists and experimentalists –felt such an ontological question to 
be beyond the scope of their discipline. Physicists adopted a wide variety of attitudes 
toward fundamental concepts during this period, revealing a range of understandings of 
what it meant to be a postwar American physicist.  
Further, this chapter reveals an additional dimension to the question, explored in 
chapters one and two of this dissertation, about how the concept of time in physics 
changed in the postwar United States, as well as the assumptions and presuppositions that 
have conditioned various physical concepts of time. Chapter one revealed contingency 
and heterogeneity at the level of timekeeping concepts and conventions, while also noting 
the presupposition of the consistency of time understood as an experimental variable. 
Chapter two showed how, in the context of postwar particle physics, time as a physical 
variable was itself at stake, while part of a multifaceted set of interfaces between 
theoretical and experimental practices, as well as a variety presuppositions about the role 
of time in physics. However, chapter two also revealed a basic presupposition about the 
consistency of time in theory and practice, and time’s existence was never called into 
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question. Chapter three has looked to questions about the existence of time, calling into 
question presuppositions about the ontology of the concept. Nevertheless, basic 
understandings about time in physics, and the culture of postwar physics in which they 
still largely participated, constrained these claims.  
Following the Wheeler-DeWitt equation reveals one slice of a heterogeneous 
picture of how physicists in the postwar United States understood the concept of time, as 
well as the role of interpretive questions in physics in general. For the group of physicists 
who developed and worked with the equation, philosophical questioning was central to 
the project of physics, and time’s very existence was at stake. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
1. 
Each chapter of this dissertation considered an episode in the history of postwar 
American physics in which the concept of time was at stake. Chapter one looked to the 
physicists and astronomers involved in the development of atomic clocks and atomic time 
standards in the late 1940s and 1950s, whose work complicated physicists’ definitions of 
basic timekeeping concepts. Chapter two looked to particle physicists in the early 1960s, 
whose worked challenged physicists’ understandings of the direction of time in relation 
to physical laws. Chapter three looked to physicists working to unite general relativity 
and quantum mechanics in the late 1960s, whose work altered physicists’ notions of 
time’s ontological status in the context of the universe as a whole. In each of the three 
chapters time was cast in a variety of roles, for example as a unit of measure, a symmetry 
relation, or an element of spacetime. In addition, in each chapter different properties of 
time were at stake, including its universality, directionality, and ontology.   
As the dissertation has shown, the subgroups of physicists discussed in all three chapters 
understood time differently; further each subgroup responded to the implications of their 
work for the concept of time in a variety of ways. When taken together, the chapters 
expose the diversity of understandings of and approaches to time among American 
physicists during the postwar decades, as well the variety of ways in which the concept of 
time was at stake during this period. 
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 Two complementary lines of questioning run through the dissertation. The first 
asks about the professional identities of postwar American physicists in relation to their 
openness to philosophical investigation into the meaning of fundamental concepts like 
time. My argument here is premised on the idea that physicists’ modes of engagement 
with time can offer insight into how they conceived of the boundaries of their discipline 
in relation to philosophical investigation. The second line of questioning concerns the 
role and status of the concept of time in postwar American physics. This line asks how 
subgroups of postwar American physicists understood time, how these understandings 
changed, and which assumptions and presuppositions physicists upheld along the way. In 
both lines of questioning I have used various elements of context as explanatory tools, 
including but not limited to institutional culture, instrumental and experimental 
techniques, intellectual traditions, disciplinary allegiances, and ideological values. 
 In this conclusion, I will set the findings of each chapter in relation to one 
another, in order to gain more general insight into the professional identities of postwar 
American physicists and their concepts of time. While doing so, I will draw on a set of 
philosophical tools – specifically from a line of thinking in continental philosophy - to 
help make sense of these insights, as well as extrapolate more general conclusions about 
the relation between postwar American physicists and their most fundamental concepts.    
 
 
 
 
 179 
2. 
2.1 Identity 
The first line of argumentation, concerning physicists’ professional identities, is set 
against the background of a tension between opposing sensibilities in twentieth century 
physics. The first sensibility, which many scholars have described as characteristic of 
European physicists in the first half of the twentieth century such as Albert Einstein and 
Niels Bohr, places investigation into the nature of fundamental concepts at the center of 
the practice of physics. Throughout the dissertation I have loosely referred to this as a 
“philosophical” approach to physics. The second sensibility, described by many scholars 
as prevalent among postwar American physicists, places a high priority on the production 
of useful results, to the exclusion of philosophical investigation. I have loosely referred to 
this as a “pragmatic” sensibility”.309 Each subgroup of physicists I have considered had a 
different relationship to this tension, as exemplified by how they approached questions 
about the nature of time raised in their work. At the most general level, the physicists 
considered in chapter one were firmly on the pragmatic side, the physicists in chapter two 
were in the middle of the spectrum, and those in chapter three were closest to the 
philosophical side. By looking more closely at each subgroup in question, the chapters 
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present a nuanced account of the orientation of each subgroup to this tension, offering 
insight into the way each subgroup understood the meaning and purpose of their work.  
 The physicists considered in chapter one were firmly situated within the 
pragmatic professional culture that largely characterized postwar American physics. They 
worked primarily in government institutions that emphasized practical applications of 
their work. Further, many of the techniques in which they were trained were pioneered by 
the prominent physicist I.I. Rabi, whose pragmatic vision for American physics – as a 
union of theory and experiment, generating good “citizen-scientists” – was transmitted to 
these physicists through direct lines of mentorship. Finally, the work of this subgroup 
was directly continuous with the frequency standardization research they conducted as 
part of wartime radar projects. The sense of practical purpose from radar was, to a degree, 
carried over to atomic timekeeping. Atomic clocks and standards complicated 
timekeeping concepts, blurring the boundaries by which they were circumscribed. 
However, the physicists involved in the development of these devices did not directly 
pose questions about these changes, due to their pragmatic understandings of their 
profession. Instead, they accused one another of failing to grasp basic principles, never 
grappling with the fact that their timekeeping concepts were in a state of flux. To engage 
in philosophical questioning of time would not have occurred to them as a professional 
possibility; conceptual questions about the meaning of concepts like time were not at 
stake for them.  
 The particle physicists considered in chapter two had a more complicated 
relationship to the tension between philosophical and pragmatic approaches to physics. 
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Fitch and Cronin identified insight into the nature of time as one of the implications of 
their famous 1964 experiment; further, they used this implication as one explanation for 
why the experiment was significant. In this way, insight into the nature of basic concepts, 
which was central to the philosophical sensibility, influenced how they conceived of and 
justified their work. Nevertheless, they never articulated concrete insights into the nature 
of time, nor did they engage in interpretive work about the concept of time in the context 
of their experiment. The philosophical sensibility was absent from their practice of 
physics, even though it was present at the level of their own explanations of the import of 
their work.  
The physicists in chapter two displayed a hybrid sensibility toward physics, 
borrowing from both sides of the tension between philosophy and pragmatism. This 
hybrid sensibility can partially be explained by the position of postwar particle physics at 
the interfaces of experimental and theoretical practices emerging out of WWII physics, as 
well as newly forged relationships among physicists, machine culture, and 
instrumentation.310 The work of this subgroup continued the project of wartime physics in 
many ways, working with many of the same machines, tools, and institutional structures 
developed during the wartime years. To an extent, this subgroup inherited a pragmatic 
sense of purpose alongside these machines, tools, and institutional structures. Yet, on the 
theoretical side, postwar particle physicists like Fitch and Cronin defined their project in 
terms of the search for the basic building blocks of nature. Their general mandate was to 
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uncover fundamental truths about nature, which placed insight into the concept of time 
well within their scope. Thus, particle physicists like Fitch and Cronin did not fit neatly 
within either side of the tension between philosophical and pragmatic sensibilities in 
physics; rather, their understandings of the meaning and purpose of physics were 
informed by both. 
 Finally, the physicists in chapter three, who were working on the unification of 
general relativity and quantum mechanics, approached physics with a largely 
philosophical sensibility. This group explicitly pointed out difficult conceptual issues 
concerning time arising from their work and directly engaged with these issues. In their 
published work and unpublished correspondence, they openly speculated about how to 
interpret basic concepts, like time, in the context of quantum gravity. While their 
discourse was constrained by their understandings of the boundaries of physics  – for 
example, they drew clear lines between science and “pseudoscience” – interpretive 
questions about basic concepts fell within the practice of physics as they understood it. 
This more expansive view of physics can be partially attributed to the small size of the 
community of physicists working on general relativity in the 1950s and 60s, its often 
marginalization during this period, as well as the relation of many of its prominent 
members, such as John Wheeler, to the mainstream of physics. Further, the intellectual 
inheritance of this community - from the legacies of an older generation of physicists 
including Albert Einstein - made interpretive, philosophically inflected work easily 
palatable. 
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 At a superficial level, this first line of questioning suggests physicists became 
increasingly open to philosophical questioning in physics as the postwar years unfolded. 
The physicists working in the late 1940s and 1950s did not see any place for 
philosophical questioning in their work, those working in the early 1960s were in the 
middle of the spectrum, and those working in the late 1960s were the most open to 
philosophical lines of thought. Yet each group’s set of attitudes extended forward and 
backward from the episodes at stake in this dissertation. One conclusion to be drawn 
from this first line of questioning is that there were multiple identities available to 
postwar American physicists, each with contextually specific contours. There was no 
single way in which postwar American physicists circumscribed their discipline, and the 
boundaries they drew around their discipline were continually changing. This dissertation 
has described the particular ways in which several sets of professional boundaries took 
shape, by analyzing how different subgroups of physicists engaged with the concept of 
time. 
 
2.2 Concepts of Time 
The second line of investigation concerns the various ways time was conceptualized in 
physics during the postwar period, how concepts of time were challenged in this context, 
and what this can reveal about fundamental concepts in general in postwar physics. 
Chapter one described how the development of atomic clocks and atomic time standards 
placed the notions of a “clock,” a ”second,” and “time” in flux. This was due in part to 
the fact that the mechanism of atomic timekeeping devices blurred the line between a 
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clock, a frequency standard, and a time standard. Atomic timekeeping devices involved 
systems of resonance, feedback, and calibration that were novel to timekeeping; the 
conceptual boundaries of clocks and seconds within such systems were not yet worked 
out. The changes in timekeeping concepts during the late 1940s and 1950s were 
influenced by several contingencies, belonging to the agendas of the specific scientists 
involved. For example, William Markowitz’s disciplinary allegiance to astronomy 
affected the way the atomic second eventually took form. Further, Harold Lyons’ values 
surrounding accuracy and universality in timekeeping affected the way he approached 
building an atomic clock. The changes that took place surrounding understandings of 
timekeeping concepts - such as a “clock”, “second”, and “time” - in the wake of the 
development of atomic clocks, were bound up with the specific agendas and values of the 
scientists involved.  
Chapter two described how Fitch and Cronin’s experiment and analysis called 
ideas about the direction of time, and the role it plays in the laws of physics, into 
question. The experiment showed that in certain instances, the laws of physics yield 
different predictions in the forward and backward directions in time, challenging the 
consensus view of the nature of time as physical variable. Fitch and Cronin arrived at 
their result within the context of particle physics, at the intersection of accelerator 
experimentation and particle theory. It involved a highly technical concept of time 
reversal invariance in physics, along with several understandings of time carried over 
from different subcultures of physics. While the concept of time as a physical variable 
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was challenged by Fitch and Cronin’s experiment, it did not result in concrete changes in 
the way time was used and understood by the particle physics community. 
 In chapter three, physicists working on the unification of quantum theory and 
relativity asserted that the ontological status of the concept of time needed to be 
reevaluated. For example, due to the absence of the variable “𝑡” in an equation they 
derived as a universal equation of quantum gravity, they suggested that time does not 
exist. Further, in this context they pointed out several other reasons why the application 
of quantum principles to general relativity rendered the concept of time poorly defined or 
arbitrary. Their understandings of time were bound up with a specific notion spacetime 
originating from general relativity, which explicitly cast time as an object of 
investigation. Within this tradition, the concept of time was overtly at stake, and 
physicists called its existence into question. 
 This second line of questioning reveals a variety of changing concepts of time 
among postwar American physicists. Further, these concepts were all grounded in a range 
of assumptions, each influenced by specific institutional, cultural, and technical contexts. 
Yet were there any assumptions or presuppositions common to the multiplicity of 
concepts of time at stake during this period? In chapter one I noted that despite the 
multiplicity of timekeeping concepts involved, physicists assumed that the concept of 
time as it appears in the equations of physics – the variable “𝑡” - was consistent and 
commensurable among theories and practices. Nevertheless, a close look at 
understandings and uses of variable “𝑡” in chapter two revealed a multiplicity of further 
concepts, assumptions, and presuppositions. Thus, that which was presupposed as unified 
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in the context of chapter one was revealed to be deeply heterogeneous in the context of 
chapter two. However, the consistency of  “𝑡” was taken for granted on certain levels in 
the context of chapter two as well, even though it was a composite of many concepts and 
assumptions, different from those at work in chapter one. At the level of basic 
presuppositions, the physicists in chapters one and two took the consistency of  “𝑡” for 
granted, even if these “t”’s were different among the different subgroups. Further, on an 
even more basic level, the physicists in chapters one and two presupposed the “existence” 
of time. Chapter three’s physicists directly challenged the assumption that time exists. 
Yet were there any unexamined presuppositions about time taken for granted by the 
physicists in chapter three? Even if they questioned whether time existed, within a 
specific and idiosyncratic notion of “existence”, they presupposed that, in discussing 
time, they were speaking about a meaningful concept. Thus, all three groups shared in the 
basic presupposition about the meaningfulness of the concept of time. 
 This second line of questioning reveals a heterogeneous picture of the concept of 
time in postwar American physics. This picture involves a range of assumptions and 
presuppositions at multiple levels, as well a shared, unexamined presupposition about the 
meaningfulness of the concept of time. This shared presupposition did not contain 
concrete content about the nature of time; rather, it asserted the conceptual existence and 
coherence of time as such. This presupposition about the meaningfulness of time was 
built into the ways these physicists formed and used the concept, although it did not 
attribute any well-defined qualities to the concept of time itself. 
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 Can the heterogeneity the concept of time, and the assumptions and 
presuppositions that have conditioned this heterogeneity, including the presupposition of 
time’s meaningfulness as such, be used to develop an understanding of how the concept 
of time has historically gained meaning? What, if any, is the relationship between the 
presuppositions that have conditioned the understandings and uses of time in postwar 
American physics, and the concept of time itself? This type of question – about the 
relationship between a concept and the presuppositions that condition it – has many 
elements in common with a variety of twentieth century intellectual traditions.  One such 
tradition is a line of continental philosophy that builds upon the work Martin Heidegger, 
which has influenced the ideas presented in this dissertation. At this point I would like to 
analyze the value of the structures offered by this Heideggerian line of thinking for 
understanding the physical concept of time, as understood by the physicists discussed in 
this dissertation.  I will not be looking to how Heideggerian thinkers have treated the 
philosophical concept of time itself; rather, I will consider the way this tradition has 
understood concepts in general, along with the role of presuppositions in 
conceptualization, to provide further nuance and contour to my own thinking about the 
nature of time as a fundamental concept in postwar American physics.  
 
3. 
I would like to consider a specific philosophical structure, concerning a form of 
“negativity” that runs through Heidegger’s thinking. On a basic level, this Heideggerian 
negativity is the opposite, or absence, of “positive presence”; at the same time, for 
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Heidegger it is an essential component all that is positively present. Heidegger describes 
this negativity in the introduction of his influential Being and Time.311 Here, he identifies 
his methodology as “phenomenology,” going on to describe a phenomenon as 
“something that lies hidden […]; but at the same time […] something that belongs to 
what shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its 
ground.”312  Phenomenology, for Heidegger, is directed toward the determination of that 
which lies hidden in what shows itself. Ultimately, Heidegger’s phenomenological 
project in Being and Time seeks to reveal that which lies hidden as hidden: concealment 
as such. Even in Heidegger’s later works, in which he does not explicitly describe his 
method as “phenomenology”, the structure whereby the conditions of possibility of that 
which is present can only be concretely understood as hiddenness, or concealment, 
remains.    
In every phase of his work, Heidegger draws attention to that which is hidden in 
that which is positively present.313 He describes such hiddenness as the condition of 
possibility for all positively present concepts or entities; further, he claims that all 
positive modes of thinking are incapable of registering the negativity of this hiddenness. 
                                                
311 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper, 1962). 
312 Ibid., 59. 
313 Heidegger’s career is often divided into “early”, “middle”, and “late” stages. See for 
example Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, “Martin Heidegger: An Introduction to his 
Thought, Work, and Life” in A Companion to Heidegger, Volume 20 of Blackwell 
Companions to Philosophy, eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (Malden MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 1-15. While there are profound differences in Heidegger’s 
objectives and emphases throughout these phases, I argue that the negative structure I 
describe has played an important role in all three stages. 
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In other words, all positive modes of thinking are structurally incapable of registering the 
negative presuppositions on which they are founded. Accordingly, he believes the task of 
philosophy is to orient itself toward this negativity, concretely registering it, in order to 
overcome the constraints of positive modes of thought. According to Heidegger, positive 
modes of thought have dominated the Western philosophical tradition; further, they have 
formed the basis of natural science. Thus, he believes modern science will never be able 
to register its negative conditions of possibility, for to do so from within science would 
necessarily presuppose the positive presence of these conditions. In other words, the 
negative conditions of possibility of science will never be available to scientific modes of 
thinking. Philosophy, for Heidegger, has the potential to orient itself toward concealment 
as such. Orienting oneself to this concealment would be, for Heidegger, the proper way to 
approach fundamental concepts taken for granted by science, including the physical 
concept of time. 
 For example, in a 1954 lecture “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger claimed that 
“[i]f the sciences themselves should at any time be able to find at hand within themselves 
what is not to be gotten around of which we are speaking, they would have before all else 
to be in a position to conceive and represent their own essence. But they are never in a 
position to do this.”314 Heidegger does not believe the sciences are capable of conceiving 
of their own “essence”. For Heidegger, the alternative to positive scientific inquiry would 
not involve making the truth of science and reality positively present, but would rather 
                                                
314 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 176. 
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consist in a proper orientation to its concealment. This would overcome the difference 
between science and its negative conditions of possibility. Heidegger does not see science 
as flawed or false, but rather as characterized by the lack of resources to properly 
conceive of its conditions of possibility, which inherently defy conception. 
 At first glance, this negative structure suggests two things with respect to the 
ideas about time and physics presented in this dissertation. First, it suggests that 
physicists’ relationships to fundamental concepts like time cannot be completely 
conceived of within the framework of physics itself. While, as this dissertation has 
shown, there have been many ways in which physicists have engaged with the concept of 
time, and just as many ways they have understood the meaning and purpose of physics, 
one could argue along Heideggerian lines that in all cases physicists have been 
committed to the project of positive conceptualization. And while they have analyzed, 
used, and speculated about many aspects of the concept time, they have never directly 
dealt with its conditions of possibility, which make meaningful discussion of the concept 
possible on any level. In all cases the presupposition that time is meaningful precedes all 
investigation into the concept of time, and thus cannot be the object of such investigation. 
Second, this Heideggerian structure suggests a possible method by which a 
philosophically minded history of science could approach the concept of time in physics; 
that is, with attention to its negative, inherently hidden conditions of possibility. While an 
understanding of the nature of time would not be possible within modes of philosophy 
that take positivity for granted, one taking a Heideggerian approach could orient itself to 
the negative foundations of the concept of time, and in this way gain some access to that 
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which defies conceptualization in terms of positive presence. Yet could such a 
Heideggerian analysis of time in physics ever be possible? Would it be able to access that 
which is a priori excluded from the concept of time per se, or would it continually 
commit the error of trying to force time within the constraints of positive 
conceptualization? 
 Other philosophers who have followed in Heidegger’s tradition have taken up the 
question of whether there are any positive possibilities for philosophy in relation to the 
negative foundations of concepts, and the difference between a concept and its conditions 
of possibility. For example, French philosopher Jacques Derrida has claimed that 
philosophy will never overcome the difference between a concept and the negativity, 
which is a priori excluded from the concept, in which it is grounded. Unlike Heidegger, 
Derrida does not see the task of philosophy as the proper orientation to concealment as 
such, in order to ultimately overcome the difference between a concept and its conditions 
of possibility. Rather, philosophy will always and necessarily repeat this difference in the 
act of pointing to it. Thus, all to which philosophy could or should aspire is the continued 
repetition of the difference between a concept and its conditions of possibility. Consider 
the following quotation from Derrida’s Aporias, which is devoted to a reading of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time: 
 
The work exceeds itself, it surpasses the limits of the concept of itself 
that it claims to have properly while presenting itself.  […] When 
someone suggests to you a solution for escaping [this] impasse, you can 
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be almost sure that he is ceasing to understand, assuming that he had 
understood anything up to that point.315 
 
 
For Derrida it would be impossible to properly register the negative conditions of 
possibility of a concept and fulfill the philosophical agenda laid out by Heidegger. Thus, 
if one accepts Derrida’s position, then an account of time in physics could only ever go as 
far as pointing to the elusive nature of the concept, while repeating the error of taking its 
positive presence for granted. This would suggest that just as the physicists considered in 
the dissertation presupposed the meaningfulness of the concept of time, so has this 
dissertation itself. While pointing to the heterogeneity and contingency of time, and 
unpacking the assumption that there is a truth to time, I have also presupposed such a 
truth. For Derrida, this is inescapable; the inherent contradiction involved in this type of 
analysis is unavoidable. 
 This being said, other thinkers who have engaged with Heidegger’s thinking, such 
as Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, have argued that philosophy must aspire to 
more than the repetition of the difference and contradiction inherent to conceptualization; 
philosophy could and should attempt to achieve something positive. Agamben discusses 
the negative structure raised in Heidegger’s work primarily with respect to the nature of 
language. He focuses on the presupposition that language exists, or what he refers to as 
the “event of language,” which structurally precedes all meaningful discourse. Along 
Heideggerian lines, he argues that this event/presupposition is the condition of possibility 
                                                
315 Jacques Derrida, Aporias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 32. 
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of all language, but is entirely and necessarily absent from that which is said. In 
Language and Death he writes:  
The scission of language into two irreducible planes permeates all of 
Western thought […] The very structure of transcendence, which 
constitutes the decisive character of philosophical reflection on being, is 
grounded in this scission. Only because the event of language always 
already transcends what is said in this event, can something like a 
transcendence in the ontological sense be demonstrated.316 
 
Agamben believes this structure is the essence of metaphysics, and that language is 
necessarily and exemplarily metaphysical. Nevertheless, he believes the task of 
philosophy is to overcome metaphysics and achieve something positive, a task he 
believes Heidegger proposed but was unable to achieve.  
Agamben makes several suggestions over the course of his work for what a 
positive achievement in philosophy would entail.317 While the specific details of such 
positive suggestions are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it raises the question of 
whether such a positive philosophical conclusion is even possible, and what it would look 
like. Is it enough to point to the heterogeneity of time at on a variety of registers, and the 
contentless presupposition of the meaningfulness of time, in order to understand the 
nature of time in terms of the negativity in which it, and conceptualization in general, is 
grounded? Or should one attempt to say something positive about the nature of time, and 
                                                
316 Giorgio Agamben, Language and death, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 82. 
317 Positive solutions to metaphysical problems take different forms in different 
instantiations of Agamben’s work, from poetry, to ethics, to religious notions of 
messianism. For an overview of Agamben’s work, see Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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overcome the negative foundations of the concept? Would such a positive statement even 
be possible, and if so what would it look like? I tend to agree with Derrida’s position, 
acknowledging that all one can do is continually point to the absence of a positive 
essence of time, and that one necessarily mischaracterizes this absence while doing so. 
By looking at the concept of time in a variety of contexts - noting its heterogeneity, and 
tracing the presuppositions that condition it - I hope to have pointed to the absence of an 
essence of time, as well as used this absence to help understand the concept of time that I 
have necessarily presupposed as positive along the way.   
Time is a topic Heidegger wrote about extensively, and Heidegger’s account of 
time was deeply bound up with his central ideas about human existence and death.318 
However, this dissertation has focused on the concept of time in physics, placing time as 
a category in Heidegger’s thought far outside the scope of the concepts at stake in this 
project. Yet Heidegger’s position on the negative conditions of possibility for 
conceptualization, as well as the responses of Derrida and Agamben to this aspect of 
Heidegger’s work, can help in a final analysis of the concept of time in postwar physics. 
This being said, Heidegger, Derrida, and Agamben all conceive of concepts as detached 
from historical particularities. While the negative structures they discuss can provide 
tools for approaching the concept of time in physics, and conceptualization in general in 
science, their methods can only go so far toward accessing the historical specificities of 
concepts in the particular contexts in which they emerge. Thus, the ideas of these 
continental philosophers must be taken together with those of historians and philosophers 
                                                
318 For example, Heidegger’s accounts of time and temporality are central to division II 
of Being and Time. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. 
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of science, who grapple with physics as a deeply situated enterprise, to gain a deeper 
sense of the meaning of time, and fundamental concepts in general, in physics.  
 
*** 
 
This dissertation has revealed the concept of time in postwar American physics as deeply 
heterogeneous on a variety of registers. Postwar American physicists understood time as 
a unit of measure, a physical variable, a background for change, and part of the fabric of 
spacetime, to name a few of the many roles in which time was cast. Further, they 
assumed that time possesses a variety of properties, including, but not limited to: 
universality, contingency, symmetry, existence, and meaning. Building on continental 
philosophical thinking, one can add to this list the heterogeneity of the concept of time in 
relation to its conditions of possibility, a heterogeneity that comes with any concept 
conceived of within a positive, scientific tradition.  
In addition to deepening the heterogeneous picture of time, consideration of the 
structures presented by continental thinkers such as Heidegger, Derrida, and Agamben 
can help one orient oneself to this heterogeneity - and the absence of a positively present 
concept of time, or set of well-defined concepts of time - within physics. Moving beyond 
the fact that there are many different concepts of time, and assumptions about time, 
within physics, this tradition can help frame the question: what can be learned from this 
heterogeneous picture of time in a particular historical context? By situating time within 
the context of subgroups of postwar American physicists, this dissertation has highlighted 
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the specificity of different concepts of time on the many registers in which time functions 
within physics. This specificity speaks to the more general insight that there is no single, 
unified concept of time to be found within physics. Further, by tracing the contours of 
this specificity we can see the ways in which the absence of a unified concept of time 
gives meaning to the concept as understood within different episodes in physics, as the 
condition of possibility for any positive concept. Thus, a historically specific, 
differentiated account of the concept of time in physics – taken together with more 
general ideas about conceptualization in modern thought, and the role of philosophical 
attention to historical specificity – can help provide insight into the fundamental absence 
that underpins the concept of time in physics.  
 
4. 
In this dissertation I have situated physicists in the postwar United States in relation to 
the competing pulls of philosophy of pragmatism, in terms of their engagement with the 
concept of time. Further, I have examined the different ways these physicists understood 
time, the ways these understandings changed, and the various levels of assumptions and 
presuppositions at work. Finally, in this conclusion I have considered concept of time in 
physics on a philosophical register – borrowing from a line of thinking from continental 
philosophy – to explore what can be said about the concept of time, and concepts in 
general, in physics.  
 Overall, the dissertation has detailed the movement of shifting professional 
boundaries of physics, along with some contours of the deeply heterogeneous, and 
 197 
ultimately elusive, concept of time. Time in physics, and the presuppositions on which it 
is founded, continue to change; alongside these changes, new ideas about what it means 
to be a physicist, and the nature and essence of the concept of time itself, continue to be 
stake.  
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